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Commentary
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Under Threat: Iran And North Korea1
Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr.2
The world changed in 1945 with the advent of the atomic bomb.  For the first 
time, humankind possessed a weapon with which it could destroy itself.  However, 
disarmament efforts gradually gained momentum and over time a web of inter-
national treaties and agreements was constructed which limited weapon develop-
ment and inhibited the spread of nuclear weapons as well as chemical and biological 
weapons.  These efforts changed the course of history and made the world a safer 
place.
Nuclear weapons are truly unlike any other form of weaponry.  The atomic 
bomb used against Hiroshima in 1945 was 14 kilotons or 14 thousand tons of 
TNT explosive equivalent.  In a few years, the United States and the Soviet Union 
were testing nuclear weapons in the megaton range or million tons of TNT explo-
sive equivalent.  Soon, a vast nuclear arms race was underway.  The Soviet Union 
built 55,000 nuclear weapons, the United States some 72,000 and at one time had 
32,500 in its arsenal, the Soviet Union possessed around 45,000.  This effort even-
tually bankrupted the Soviet Union and cost the United States in excess of $5.5 
trillion in 2004 dollars.3
President John F. Kennedy truly believed that there was a seri-
ous risk that nuclear weapons were destined to sweep all over the world. 
In March of 1963 in response to a reporter’s question at a news confer-
ence, he said, “[P]ersonally, I am haunted by the feeling that by 1970 
. . . there may be 10 nuclear powers instead of 4, and by 1975, 15 or 20. . . . I would 
regard that as the greatest possible danger and hazard.”4  He spent much of his 
presidency pursuing the cause of nonproliferation.  President Kennedy had been 
told by the outgoing Secretary of State, Christian Herter, in December of 1960 that 
nuclear weapons would spread to additional countries and that the most likely next 
1 This article is drawn in significant part from a forthcoming book by the author.
2 Ambassador Graham is a former Special Representative of the President for Arms Control, Non-Prolifer-
ation, and Disarmament (1994-1997), in which capacity and others, he participated in the major arms-control/
non-proliferation negotiations in which the United States engaged between 1970 and 1997.  He served as General 
Counsel to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) (1977-1981, 1983-1993), as 
Acting Director of ACDA (1993), and as Acting Deputy Director of ACDA (1993-1994).
3 Robert S. Norris, and William M. Arkin, “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945-
2000,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 56 (March-April 2000): 79.
4 Robert Dallek,  An Unfinished Life:  John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963 (Boston:  Little, Brown & Co.2003), p. 
615.
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nuclear weapon states were India and Israel.  He took this very seriously.5
If such anticipated proliferation had in fact happened, there could be far more 
than two dozen nuclear weapon states in the world today, with nuclear weapons 
integrated into their national arsenals. Mohamed ElBaradei, the former Director 
General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and more recently a 
leader of the opposition during the revolution in Egypt expressed this concern in 
2004 when in a speech in Washington D.C., he said, “The danger is so imminent . 
. . not only with regard to countries acquiring nuclear weapons, but also terrorists 
getting their hands on some of these nuclear materials – uranium or plutonium.”6 
Director General ElBaradei said in another speech around the same time that more 
than 40 countries then had the capability to build nuclear weapons. Under such 
circumstances with that many nuclear weapon states in existence, potentially every 
significant conflict could have brought with it the risk of going nuclear.  It might 
have also become extremely difficult to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of 
terrorist organizations.
In 1965, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly took up the subject. A 
resolution was passed, which over the next few years, proved to be the blueprint of 
the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).  Among other things, this resolution 
called for “balanced obligations” between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon 
states in the treaty to be negotiated.  The NPT was signed in 1968 and entered into 
force in 1970 and came to be recognized as the principal reason, along with the par-
allel extended deterrence policies of the United States and the Soviet Union, that 
President Kennedy’s darkest fears have thus far not been realized.
The success of the NPT was no accident.  The treaty was based on a care-
fully crafted central bargain, which incorporated the “balanced obligations” concept. 
In exchange for a commitment from the non-nuclear weapon states (today more 
than 180 nations, most of the world) not to acquire nuclear weapons and to submit 
to international safeguards to verify compliance with this commitment, the NPT 
nuclear weapon states (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and 
China) pledged unfettered access to peaceful nuclear technologies and undertook 
to engage in nuclear disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination 
of their nuclear arsenals.  It is this basic bargain that for the last four decades has 
formed the central underpinnings of the international non-proliferation regime.
However, one of the principal problems with this arrangement has been that 
the NPT nuclear weapon states have never fully delivered on the disarmament part 
of this bargain.  The essence of the disarmament commitment in 1968 and there-
after was that, pending the eventual elimination of nuclear weapon arsenals, the 
nuclear weapon states would:  agree to a treaty prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests, 
that is, a comprehensive nuclear test ban; negotiate an agreement prohibiting the 
further production of nuclear bomb explosive material; undertake obligations to 
drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals; and give legally binding commitments that 
they would never use nuclear weapons against NPT non-nuclear weapon states. 
5 Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb:  American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and 
North Korea (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), p. 254.   Reported in an editorial, “A Warning About WMD,” in the 
Washington Times, June 25, 2004.
6 Reported in an editorial, “A Warning About WMD,” in the Washington Times, June 25, 2004.
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However, few of these disarmament elements of the NPT basic bargain have been 
actually accomplished forty years later.
The NPT is essentially an international strategic political undertaking, which 
should be observed.  It is not a gift from the non-nuclear weapon states.  Few deny 
that today the NPT is in trouble.  The question is how long it can remain viable as 
an unbalanced treaty with an important part of its basic bargain unrealized and a 
significant part unraveling as North Korea and Iran pursue the bomb.  Recognizing 
this vulnerability of the NPT, and with the end of the Cold War accompanied by 
the potential spread of nuclear weapon technology to failed and failing states and 
international terrorist organizations, serious efforts have begun to attempt to move 
toward the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, as called for in the NPT.
Since the mid-twentieth century almost all American presidents have placed 
arms control and non-proliferation policy high on their agendas.  President Dwight 
D. Eisenhower considered his failure to have achieved a nuclear test ban to be the 
greatest disappointment of his presidency.  The NPT was signed on President 
Lyndon Johnson’s watch.  President Richard Nixon oversaw the negotiation of the 
SALT I Agreements and the beginning of the SALT II Treaty process.  The SALT 
II process was continued under President Gerald Ford and concluded under Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter.  President Carter also attempted to negotiate a comprehensive 
nuclear test ban, which was finally concluded under President Bill Clinton’s leader-
ship.  President Ronald Reagan advocated the abolition of all nuclear weapons and 
completed the medium range nuclear missile treaty.  The most successful arms-con-
trol President was President George H.W. Bush.  His Administration concluded 
four major arms-control treaties during his four years as President:  the START 
I Treaty, the START II Treaty, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, 
and the Chemical Weapons Convention.  No other President has successfully com-
pleted more than one.  Thus, nuclear arms control, non-proliferation, and disarma-
ment negotiations have been at the center of U.S. foreign policy for much of the last 
fifty years.
No other President has spoken out more eloquently and in such a compre-
hensive manner, than President Barack Obama, who in Prague in April of 2009 
declared his strong support for a replacement START Treaty to be followed by 
deeper cuts in nuclear weapons leading to a multilateral nuclear weapon reduction 
negotiation involving all of the nuclear weapon states.  He reiterated his support 
for U.S. ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT), and he confirmed his own support for a process that would lead to 
a nuclear weapon free world.  He underscored his commitment to the strengthen-
ing of the NPT, along with measures to enact stronger safeguards of fissile material 
around the world.  In addition, he urged the prompt negotiation of a treaty pro-
hibiting the further production of fissile material.  The following September, with 
President Obama in the chair, the United Nations Security Council endorsed the 
goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons.
In addition, the long-awaited Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) for this Admin-
istration was released in the spring of 2010.  Among many other things, the NPR 
brings U.S. national policy into line with the U.S. 1995 NPT political commit-
2012 GRAHAM 3
ment, effectively never to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon NPT 
parties in good standing.  It also reduces the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. secu-
rity policy, another NPT commitment, made in 2000.  The NPT is the central in-
ternational agreement underlying international peace and security in today’s world. 
The principal quid for the quo of most nations of the world to never acquire nuclear 
weapons under this Treaty was the test ban.  It is the only arms-control agree-
ment explicitly mentioned in the NPT, and it is the most significant commitment 
made by the nuclear weapon states to bring the necessary political balance to the 
NPT, the idea of “balanced obligations” mentioned above.  The 1995 Statement of 
Principles, which was the political price for making the NPT a permanent Treaty, 
referred to an indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and explicitly called for the 
negotiation of a CTBT in one year, that is, by the end of 1996.
This 1996 deadline from the NPT was met, and the CTBT was signed in 
September 1996 with the United States as the first signatory, but the U.S. Senate 
rejected the CTBT in 1999.  Over 150 states have now ratified the CTBT, includ-
ing 36 of of the 44 states whose ratification is required by the Treaty for entry into 
force.  Most of the rest of this required group are waiting upon ratification by the 
United States, China, Israel, and Indonesia more or less explicitly.
While President Obama could have immediately pushed for ratification of the 
CTBT in 2009—at the time when history tells us that a new President’s political 
strength is at its zenith— his Administration, perhaps correctly, chose not to do so. 
Passing the CTBT in the U.S. Senate has never been primarily a matter of the mer-
its of the Treaty; it largely has been about politics and views about nuclear weap-
ons policy.  Most Senators are unacquainted with the Treaty details and important 
specific issues such as verification and nuclear stockpile maintenance.  Rather, they 
follow the lead of a few Senators who are knowledgeable and who have specific 
nuclear issue agendas which they wish to pursue.  This was true in 1999, was true 
in February, 2009, and is true today.  And, without U.S. ratification, the CTBT will 
never come into force.
A further complication has been the complexity of the process of achieving 
START Treaty ratification.  The negotiations were completed in late March, 2010, 
after a year of vigorous effort.  A deployed total warhead level of 1,550 operational 
strategic warheads and a limit of 800 strategic nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles 
were agreed.  These are significant contributions.  Their achievement have opened 
the door to negotiations toward further, much steeper U.S.-Russian reductions in 
strategic nuclear weapons, perhaps to the level of 1,000 total nuclear weapons each. 
This level is regarded as a necessary step to permit consideration of multilateral 
nuclear weapon reduction negotiations involving all nuclear weapon states which, 
over a long period of time, if successful, would put the world community on the 
road toward the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.  Of course, as long as the 
NPT holds.
However, the NPT remains in crisis, in part because of the essential failure 
of the disarmament agenda, and in part because of the continuing high political 
value of nuclear weapons, whereby the possession of nuclear weapons is seen as the 
distinguishing feature separating great powers from other states.  With the NPT 
basic bargain remaining unrealized after forty years, states eventually could leave 
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the Treaty; North Korea already has de jure, Iran has de facto.  Without the NPT, 
disarmament is nothing.  The NPT is threatened from many sides today but pri-
marily at this time by the nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea.  The nuclear 
programs in these two states threaten to break open the NPT regime in the Middle 
East and Northeast Asia and thereby unleash the wide-scale nuclear proliferation 
that President Kennedy so greatly and rightly feared.
When considering the Iran issue, one should remember that Iran has been pur-
suing nuclear weapons for many decades.  With the assistance of Germany, France, 
and South Africa, Iran began making plans for a large nuclear infrastructure under 
the former Shah in the 1970s.  A contract was signed with Siemens of Germany to 
construct two 1,000 megawatt nuclear power reactors at Bushehr, near the border 
with Iraq, in the late 1970s.  Ultimately, Iran hoped to build twenty power reactors 
or perhaps even more, making it a major player in the world nuclear industry.
In 2004, long-held suspicions that the quest for nuclear power production was 
linked to a nuclear weapons program were largely confirmed by one of the Shah’s 
former foreign ministers, Ardeshir Zahedi, who said, “the assumption within the 
policymaking elite was that Iran should be in a position to develop and test a nucle-
ar device within 18 months” of making the decision to construct nuclear weapons.7
Why would Iran want nuclear weapons?  The motivations of the Islamic Re-
public today are, of course, different than those under the western-aligned Shah, 
but the radically different regimes share one common and compelling reason for 
pursuing the bomb:  international prestige.  Since early in the Cold War, the pos-
session of nuclear weapons has distinguished great powers from other states.  The 
political value of nuclear weapons has not declined since the end of the Cold War, 
despite urgings that nuclear weapons should play a lesser role in the security poli-
cies of states.  The United Nations Permanent Five (the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) by no accident are the nuclear weapon states 
authorized by the NPT.  In 1958, British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan said 
that the British program “puts us where we ought to be . . . in the position of a great 
power.”  President Charles de Gaulle of France said in 1961 that “a great state,” 
which does not possess nuclear weapons when others do, “does not command its 
own destiny.”  Prime Minister Vajpayee of India indicated in 1998 after the In-
dian tests that India now was a truly important country since “We have a big bomb 
now.”8  When the Permanent Five met in Paris to fashion a response to the Indian 
and Pakistani tests, there were reports that Germany and Japan sought to come as 
well but were told no, at some level, since they were not nuclear weapon states.
Iran is a proud country.  The Persian cultural heritage is one of the richest in 
world civilization.  The Persian Empire was once the world’s most powerful in his-
tory.  If former provinces and client states of that empire now have nuclear weapons, 
why should modern Persia not possess them as well?  The view of many Iranians 
likely is that Iran deserves to be a great power.  Dr. Akbar Etemad, the director of 
7 Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran:  Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2007), 
p. 136.
8 Thomas Graham, Jr., “Avoiding the Tipping Point,” review of The Nuclear Tipping Point:  Why States Recon-
sider Their Nuclear Choices, ed. by Kurt M. Campbell et al., Arms Control Today 34 (Nov. 1, 2004): 45.
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Iran’s nuclear program at the time of the monarchy, asserted that the Shah’s program 
was designed to provide the nuclear option should any of Iran’s regional competi-
tors move in that direction.9  But there is more to it than that.  In the 1970s, none 
of Iran’s potential competitors were moving toward nuclear weapons.  However, if 
there was one thing that the Shah was interested in pursuing, it was international 
prestige for Iran and derivatively for himself.
Many Iranians believe that, as a great civilization with a long history, Iran has a 
right to acquire nuclear weapons.10  The nuclear program and Iran’s national identi-
ty have become linked in the minds of Iran’s rulers.  For instance, Ali Hussein-Tash, 
Deputy Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, said in 2006, “A na-
tion that does not engage in risks and difficult challenges, and a nation which does 
not stand up for itself, can never be a proud nation.”11  A reformist activist, Sayyed 
Mostafa Tajzadeh, noted in 2003, “It’s basically a matter of equilibrium; if I [do not] 
have a nuclear bomb, I don’t have security.”12
For better or for worse, Iran suddenly was able to see itself as the region’s major 
power with the demise of Saddam Hussein.  The acquisition of nuclear weapons by 
Iran could enhance its role as a regional power and increase Iranian influence in the 
Middle East.  Of course, the Islamic Republic has other motivations that the Shah’s 
regime did not.  Iran under the Shah was allied with and protected by the United 
States; this is no longer true.  The Islamic Republic was deeply scarred by the dam-
age inflicted on it during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, in which more than a mil-
lion people died; that experience left a strong “never again” sentiment among both 
Iran’s rulers and its population.  Nuclear weapons for the Islamic Republic are seen 
as insurance that something like the war with Iraq will never happen to Iran again. 
It is also seen as a measure of fair treatment.  Iranians note that, under the Shah, the 
Western powers supported the nuclear power program; they also note the West’s 
silence about Israel’s nuclear-weapons program.  Why should Iran be any different?
After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran initially did not pursue nuclear 
weapons.  Ayatollah Khomeini, as well as others in the regime, was of the view that 
the widespread, indiscriminate nature of nuclear weapons was contrary to Islam’s 
rules on warfare.  Toward the end of the devastating war with Iraq, Ayatollah Kho-
meini apparently changed his mind.
The nuclear program began again in earnest under President Rafsanjani, who 
took office in 1989, and has been continued by his successors, both the reformist 
Mohammad Khatami and the conservative, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  The Ger-
mans were unwilling to return and rebuild the two Bushehr reactors on which 
Germany had begun construction work prior to the Iranian Revolution and which 
were badly damaged during the war with Iran.  Iran then turned to Russia, which 
signed a $800 million contract with Iran to complete the construction of one of the 
two reactors.  Thus began a close Russian-Iranian commercial nuclear relationship 
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., p. 154.
11 Ibid., p. 149.
12 Ibid., p. 155.
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that has continued to the present day.  As a practical matter, the damage was such 
that Russia had to begin construction anew at the Bushehr site.  Despite constant 
pressure from the United States, Russia persevered in this effort and announced 
completion of construction of the reactor in 2004.  Nevertheless, Russia delayed 
delivering fuel for the reactor for some years and argued that its reliable supply ob-
viated the need for Iran to engage in domestic uranium enrichment.  The first fuel 
load was finally delivered in late 2009.
The United States has been concerned about the Iranian nuclear program for 
many years.  During the 1980s, the Reagan Administration persuaded European 
governments to adopt strict controls on exports to Iran of items that might be used 
for a nuclear weapons program.  In 1992, Robert Gates, then director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), testified before Congress that Iran was seeking nuclear 
weapons and might acquire them by the year 2000.  The United States has tried 
repeatedly over the years to limit the involvement of Russia and other nations in the 
Iranian program, with only partial success.  Many agreements were made, the most 
notable being the December 1995 accord negotiated by Vice President Al Gore 
and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.  Russia agreed to limit its cooperation 
with Iran to only one reactor at Bushehr.  In 1992, the U.S. was able to block the 
sale of nuclear items to Iran.  Argentina was persuaded not to ship fuel fabrication 
equipment to Iran, which was already packed and ready to go.  Later, China agreed 
not to sell to Iran a reactor it was seeking.  In 1995, China had plans to sell two 
300-megawatt pressurized water reactors to Iran.  U.S. Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher spoke with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and China eventu-
ally backed away from the sale.  “A regime with this kind of record simply cannot be 
permitted to get its hands on nuclear weapons,” Christopher told reporters.13
Perhaps the most revealing incident of all took place the previous year, when 
U.S. and other Western intelligence learned that Iranian officials had visited the 
Ublinsky Metallurgical Works in the former Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan.  The 
Iranian visitors had expressed interest in highly enriched uranium (HEU), which 
was stored at the facility apparently in a “highly insecure way.”  In order to ensure 
the HEU would not fall into Iranian hands, the United States ultimately purchased 
all 1,320 pounds of the HEU stored at the plant and removed it in three transport 
aircrafts to Oak Ridge National Laboratory in an operation known as “Sapphire.”14 
There could be no other purpose for Iran to attempt to acquire such material except 
for the construction of nuclear weapons.
Nevertheless, the Iranian program appeared to slow somewhat during the lat-
ter half of the 1990s.  It appeared that diplomacy worked, complemented by falter-
ing steps within Iran; however, American officials were unaware of the ongoing 
cooperation between Iran and the A.Q. Khan network.  The U.S. intelligence com-
munity had become aware of Khan’s efforts to trade uranium enrichment technol-
ogy to North Korea, but the CIA had missed the Iranian arrangement with Khan. 
Over many years, Iran had been acquiring uranium enrichment technology from 
Khan for deployment at its facilities being developed at Natanz.  Most significantly, 
13 Richelson, Spying on the Bomb,, pp. 508-09.
14 Ibid., p. 507.
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this involved the transfer of plans and models of centrifuge systems.  In addition, 
it later became known that Khan had acquired from China the blueprints for a 
nuclear weapon tested by China in 1966 at around the 20-kiloton level.  The plans 
for this weapon were later found to have been transferred to Libya.  It is reasonably 
likely that they were transferred to Iran as well.
All this changed in 2000, when the CIA was able to penetrate the Khan net-
work.  One of the key figures in the Khan ring agreed to cooperate with the CIA. 
He was the network’s senior representative at the transshipment post of Dubai in 
the United Arab Emirates.  In this way, the CIA learned that centrifuges and other 
equipment were being sent by Khan to Iran and Libya.  The CIA not only learned 
about the illegal transfers, but it also was given access to the equipment as it passed 
through Dubai.  This access permitted the CIA secretly to cripple this equipment, 
including the technology going to Iran.  The sabotage was effective and verified by 
the IAEA as inspectors who travelled to Iran.  Inspectors noticed vacuum pumps 
that had been cleverly damaged so they would not work and a power supply that 
had been shipped to Iran was found to be defective.
Then at a briefing at the National Press Club in Washington in 2002, the Na-
tional Council of Resistance of Iran, the political arm of the People’s Mujahedin, 
known as the MEK, revealed the existence of a heavy-water reactor program at 
Arak and enrichment facilities at Natanz.  Although this organization is often re-
ferred to in American media as a “dissident organization,” in reality, the MEK had 
been a terrorist organization operating in Iran and was listed as such by the United 
States for many years.  The organization was expelled from Iran in the 1980s to 
Iraq, where it became a wholly owned subsidiary of Saddam Hussein.  Thus the 
source was suspect, but the facts apparently were real.
The Natanz facility, construction of which began in 2000, included a pilot en-
richment plant, which could house some 1,000 centrifuges and a large underground 
facility eventually intended for perhaps fifty thousand centrifuges.  At Natanz, Ira-
nians would eventually be able to enrich on an industrial scale and produce enough 
highly enriched uranium for 20 weapons a year or more.  The heavy-water reactor 
at Arak, once operational, might produce plutonium sufficient in amount for one 
to two weapons per year.  It is approximately the same size as the North Korean 
reactor at Yongbyon, which has fueled that country’s nuclear weapons program. 
Overall, the Atomic Energy Organization established by the Shah did not pro-
vide administrative direction for the nuclear program in Iran.  Rather, the program 
was, and is, led by the elite Revolutionary Guards, removing any doubt that it is 
intended as a military program the ultimate objective of which is nuclear weapons.
Iran’s nuclear program includes a number of facilities that have been developed 
over the years.  In addition to the facilities at Arak and Natanz, there is a Nuclear 
Technology Center located at Isphahan that includes mini reactors, subcritical as-
semblies, and a fuel fabrication laboratory.  It may be Iran’s equivalent of Los Ala-
mos.  Also located at Isphahan is the Uranium Conversion Facility, which converts 
uranium “yellowcake” to uranium hexafluoride gas for separation in the centrifuges 
at Natanz.  In Tehran is the Tehran Nuclear Research Center with an operating re-
search reactor, a radio isotope production facility, various laboratories, and a waste 
handling facility.
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The University of Tehran houses a five-megawatt research reactor, provided by 
the United States to the Shah’s regime, which makes medical isotopes under IAEA 
safeguards. Argentina supplied fuel (enriched to nearly twenty percent as opposed 
to two to four percent for commercial power reactors) for this reactor, but it is run-
ning low.  There are also various front companies that buy technology and material 
abroad for the nuclear program, such as Kala Electric in Tehran.15  In 2010, the 
world learned of the secret enrichment facility under construction at a Revolution-
ary Guard base near the holy city of Qom.  The underground facility may have 
been intended to house potentially around 3,000 centrifuges, enough for a weapons 
program, but not for a power program.  Since the discovery of the site, the Iranian 
Government may have lost interest in this facility.
In the days and weeks after September 11, 2001, Iran took steps to distance 
itself from al Qaeda and the attacks in New York and Washington.  The mayor 
of Tehran sent his condolences.  When the U.S. was preparing its assault on Af-
ghanistan after the Taliban government refused to give up Osama bin Laden, Iran 
indicated that it would return American warplane pilots downed in the forthcom-
ing fighting.  Iran also pressed its allies in the Northern Alliance to work with the 
Americans and permitted the United States to ship food trucks across its territory 
to Afghanistan.  At the January 2002 conference of donor nations in Tokyo, Iran 
pledged $350 million for rebuilding Afghanistan.  After the Taliban government 
was overturned, Iran played a helpful role in the creation of the Karzai government 
in the Bonn negotiations in December 2001.
In addition, Iranian leaders confirmed their willingness to cooperate with the 
United States to further Iran’s economic interests.  President Muhammad Khatami 
said: “The government cannot come up with the money needed to create a million 
jobs a year. We need private foreign investments.”  Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei 
also asserted, “We and the U.S. have many differences.  But this does not mean that 
we cannot adopt a regular policy in view of our national interests.”16
Nevertheless, the second Bush Administration firmly shut the door on this 
historic opportunity in the President’s 2002 State of the Union speech in which 
he denounced the Islamic Republic as part of an “Axis of Evil” along with Iraq and 
North Korea.  To President George W. Bush, Iran was a repressive, aggressive, and 
ideological state that must be treated with hostility until its regime changed.  Bush 
announced that Iran was a “major sponsor of terrorism,” condemning the “unelected 
few” who were suppressing Iranians.  Bush promised that the United States “would 
not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most 
dangerous weapons.”17 In the context of the attack of September 11th and the sub-
sequent U.S. retaliatory invasion of Afghanistan, this could only be seen as a direct 
threat.  Since this occurred, there has never been any real chance of heading off the 
Iranian nuclear program with one remarkable exception.
The Iranian response was predictable.  President Khatami had said a few 
15 Ibid., pp. 503-05.
16 Tayeyh, Hidden Iran, p. 121.
17 Ibid., pp. 128-29.
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months prior that there were “no obstacles preventing economic cooperation with 
the U.S.”  However, after having heard Bush’s harsh rhetoric, Supreme Leader 
Khamenei now responded that the “drunkard shouts of American officials reveals 
the truth that the enemy is the enemy.”  Even President Khatami rejected Bush’s 
statement as “war mongering and insulting toward the Iranian nation.”  The Iranian 
public was alienated by the State of the Union speech, and Iranians resented being 
defamed by an American politician.18  It was a watershed in U.S.-Iranian relations. 
The Iranian establishment had reached far in the direction of the United States to 
achieve improvement in relations, but the Bush Administration’s worldview pre-
vented any success.
Perhaps the most unfortunate episode of all took place over a year after the 
“Axis of Evil” speech, following the invasion of Iraq by the United States.  Remark-
ably, the United States was given a third and last opportunity to reach some sort of 
an accommodation with Iran.  This time it appeared to present the chance to at least 
negotiate the framework of a “grand bargain.”
In a proposed dialogue of “mutual respect,” the Iranian proposal set forth a 
sweeping proposal.  Tehran offered to end support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
and to pressure those militant groups to cease attacks on Israel.  The Iranians would 
disarm Hezbollah and ensure it became a purely political party in Lebanon.  They 
offered to open up their nuclear program completely to inspection to alleviate any 
fears of weaponization.  Iran would sign the NPT and offered extensive American 
involvement in their nuclear program.  With respect to terrorism, Iran offered full 
cooperation against all terrorist organizations—especially al Qaeda.  On Iraq, Iran 
would work actively with the United States to establish political stabilization and 
a democratic, secular government.  Finally, Iran would accept the 2002 Saudi peace 
plan for Palestine, recognizing and making peace with Israel in return for the latter’s 
withdrawal from the occupied territories and a two-state solution.
In return, Iran wanted members of the MEK, which had been based in Iraq 
under Saddam’s protection for some years, to be turned over to them. Tehran was 
willing to exchange al Qaeda militants in their custody, potentially making them-
selves a target, in exchange for members of the MEK.  Iran wanted removal from 
the “Axis of Evil” list, an end to all U.S. sanctions, and recognition of war repara-
tion claims from the Iran-Iraq war.  The Iranians also requested that full access to 
nuclear, biological, and chemical technology within the limits of relevant treaties be 
respected and asked that there be greater recognition of Iran’s legitimate security 
interests in the region.  This was a remarkable, unprecedented proposal.  If real, it 
could have led to a completely different situation in the Middle East.  Subsequently, 
some argued that it was a ploy, others that it was real and presented an historic 
negotiating opportunity.  Tragically, we shall never know.
At the State Department, Secretary Colin Powell wanted to accept this pro-
posal as the basis for negotiations.  However, Vice President Cheney and Secretary 
of Defense Rumsfeld reportedly blocked it in the White House, heading off any 
internal U.S. government consideration.  Their plan was to overthrow the Iranian 
regime after finishing with Iraq, so negotiations seemed unnecessary.  As Under-
18 Ibid., pp. 121, 129.
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secretary of State John Bolton had put it, go to Baghdad and “turn right.”  The 
United States never responded to the proposal but sent a message to Iran through 
the Swiss government making it clear such a deal would not be seriously consid-
ered.19  After January of 2002, Iran’s approach to the United States in general and 
with respect to the nuclear program in particular was entirely tactical.
On August 5, 2005, the EU-Three (United Kingdom, France, and Germany), 
which had been conducting negotiations with Iran since late 2003, proposed signif-
icant economic and political cooperation if Tehran gave up its uranium enrichment 
program.  Iran flatly rejected this proposal, and the EU-Three cancelled further 
negotiations.  A day or two after that, the Isphahan conversion facility resumed 
operations after a moratorium of some months.  In September, the IAEA Board 
passed a resolution warning Iran of a possible referral to the Security Council un-
less measures were adopted to increase transparency, reestablish suspension of ura-
nium enrichment activities, and reconsider the heavy-water reactor at Arak; Iran 
rejected the resolution.
In early January 2006, Iran informed the IAEA of its intent to resume research 
and development of peaceful nuclear technology and a few days later removed the 
IAEA seals at enrichment sites.  By then there had been considerable construction 
at Natanz, and operations could begin.  The next week, the UN Permanent Five 
met in Jordan to consider the Iranian nuclear crisis.  On February 4, a resolution 
was adopted by the IAEA Board calling on the Director General to refer Iran to the 
UN Security Council.  The vote was 27 to three, with five abstentions and with all 
the UN Permanent Five voting in the affirmative.20  On March 8, the IAEA formal-
ly submitted a report on Iran’s nuclear program to the Security Council.  With this 
submission Iran could no longer claim to be a NPT party in good standing.  Under 
the treaty, Iran no longer had an “inalienable” right to peaceful nuclear technology 
and the Security Council would be able to approve sanctions on Iran.
Thus, the desultory negotiation phase came to an end.  The EU-Three did spo-
radically continue to meet with Iran, and the U.S. Undersecretary of State, William 
Burns, did join a negotiating session in 2008.  The emphasis shifted to sanctions 
rather than negotiations, neither of which has been successful on slowing the Irani-
an nuclear program.  Subsequently, the Security Council adopted three more sanc-
tions resolutions, but as Washington seeks to engage Iran on its nuclear program, it 
must recognize that hostile rhetoric and threats appear to have only a limited effect 
on Iran’s behavior.
When President Obama took office, he inherited a situation in Iran that ap-
peared unamenable to a solution.  Over the previous six years, negotiations had 
made no progress and sanctions had failed to have their intended effect.  President 
Obama announced that he would try for a year to press for real negotiations with 
Iran.  If this did not succeed, then other measures would be considered.  President 
Obama sent messages to Tehran, but the establishment in Tehran did not appear to 
19 Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance:  The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (New Haven:  Yale 
University Press, 2007), pp. 243-57.
20 Shahram Chubin, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2006), p. xx.
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have any interest in negotiations.  Then came the disputed Iranian presidential elec-
tion of June, 2009, and the subsequent near rebellion by the opposition, followed by 
a brutal crackdown by the government.
While the Obama Administration initially had concerns about negotiating 
with the Iranian government under such circumstances, Washington decided to go 
ahead.  In the fall of 2009, the IAEA developed an agreement whereby Iran would 
transfer most of its stocks of low enriched uranium (LEU) to Russia to be modified 
to up to about 20 percent enriched.  The process was suitable for the production of 
medical isotopes by Iran’s TRIGA research reactor, which was then running low on 
fuel.  After enrichment modification, the uranium would be transferred to France 
for fabrication into research reactor fuel and then returned to Iran.  This agreement, 
at the time, would have significantly reduced Iran’s bomb-making ability for about 
a year while fulfilling an Iranian requirement.  The Iranian representative agreed to 
it in Vienna, but it was quickly disavowed by Tehran.
Shortly after the negotiation at the IAEA, at the G-20 meeting in Pittsburgh, 
President Obama, President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, and Prime Minister Gor-
don Brown of Great Britain announced the discovery of a secret uranium enrich-
ment site at a Revolutionary Guard base near the holy city of Qom.  CIA monitors 
actually had discovered it some time before.  The allied leaders demanded that con-
struction be immediately halted and took the position that the failure to notify the 
IAEA of the commencement of construction several years before was a violation of 
Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement.  The leaders also insisted that the site be made 
immediately available for IAEA inspections.  Upon their arrival a few weeks later, 
IAEA inspectors estimated that the facility could house up to 3000 centrifuges, 
which was impractical for commercial enrichment but not for a bomb program.
On November 27, 2009, the IAEA board adopted a resolution declaring the 
secret site to be an NPT violation, demanded a work stoppage, and once again 
called for the referral of this new discovery to the UN Security Council.  In re-
taliation, Iran announced plans to build ten more sites, five immediately, a highly 
impractical idea.
In May 2010, the presidents of Iran, Brazil, and Turkey signed a new Tripartite 
Agreement in Tehran.  It was similar to the previously proposed IAEA Agreement. 
Iran would deposit 1200 kilograms—somewhat over half of its then current sup-
ply—of LEU, low enriched uranium (two to four percent), in Turkey for “safekeep-
ing” under IAEA safeguards.  In return, Iran would receive within one year 120 ki-
los of medical-research reactor fuel enriched to 19.75 percent for use in its research 
reactor supplied by the “Vienna Group” (the United States, France, Russia, and the 
IAEA).  Nothing else would be affected.  Iran would continue to enrich, both to 
two to four percent as well as to twenty percent.
However, while the fall 2009 agreement would have removed more than three-
quarters of Iran’s LEU, this new agreement would remove only around half, leaving 
Iran with enough enriched uranium to make one nuclear weapon if further en-
riched to the 90-percent level. Western nations had little interest in this proposal, 
regarding it largely as a ploy to avoid sanctions.
By this time, President Obama’s one-year negotiating time frame had long 
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since expired, stalemate still reigned, and the Iranians continued to move ahead, 
albeit with some doubts expressed internationally about the rapidity of progress 
on the program.  The focus was now on achieving a fourth UN Security Council 
Resolution in response to the secret site.  A new draft resolution approved by all 
of the Permanent Five, was released in New York the day after the announcement 
of the agreement in Tehran.  Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asserted that the 
draft resolution was the appropriate response to the announcement in Tehran.  The 
Security Council adopted the resolution by a vote of twelve to two, with only Brazil 
and Turkey voting no.
While Iran continues to assert that its program is peaceful, aimed only at nu-
clear power, the entire history of its program appears to tell a different story.  Begin-
ning with the Shah in the 1970s, there was an apparent interest in the prestige and 
power associated with nuclear weapons.  When Ayatollah Khomeini disavowed an 
interest in nuclear weapons, the Bushehr reactor program was put on the shelf; 
when Iranian policy changed, the reactor program was revived.  A.Q. Khan was not 
known as a promoter of nuclear power; he was selling nuclear weapon capability. 
Iran had a nearly twenty-year clandestine relationship with him and acquired from 
him centrifuge enrichment technology and possibly the design of a Chinese nuclear 
weapon.
There are other indicia, such as the many links of the nuclear program to the 
military, the domination of the program by the quasi-autonomous Revolutionary 
Guard, as well as constantly changing explanations and the destruction of evidence 
and buildings before inspection.  The assertion of an “inalienable right” to peaceful 
nuclear technology is not relevant in this case.  The NPT does grant such a right 
but only to treaty parties in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations. 
Iran has twice been found by the IAEA to be in violation of NPT-related obliga-
tions.  The Iran case has been referred to and is in the hands of the United Nations 
Security Council.  So until a nuclear explosive test removes all doubt, or until a 
deal can be reached to satisfy all sides, one must prudently assume that the Iranian 
objective is, in fact, nuclear weapons or at least the achievement of a nuclear weap-
ons technical capability from which status weapons could be quickly produced if 
desired.
What does this mean in terms of policy for the international community?  The 
time for truly effective negotiations with Iran likely ended early in 2002 with the 
“Axis of Evil” speech, with the one exception noted.  Sanctions have not changed 
Iranian behavior.  The new sanctions—the fourth round—adopted by the Secu-
rity Council on June 9, 2010, also seem unlikely to change Iranian behavior, but 
possibly they may have some useful effect.  As Steven E. Miller, Director of the 
International Security Program at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science 
and International Affairs, said, “I think that by default we end up with sanctions 
because we don’t know what else to do.”21  For his part, President Ahmadinejad the 
day before had declared. “If the U.S. and its allies think they could hold the stick of 
21 Neil MacFarquhar, “U.N. Approves New Sanctions to Deter Iran,” New York Times, June 10, 2010, pp. A1, 
A4.
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sanctions and then sit and negotiate with us, they are seriously mistaken.”22  Russia 
and China probably will be opposed to further sanctions.
The military option does not seem practical either.  Secretary Gates has said 
that it would only delay the Iranian program by “a few years.”  To accomplish any-
thing more than such a temporary delay would appear to require something truly 
massive, conceivably a month or more of sustained bombing, followed by an inva-
sion by Special Forces and perhaps mainline military units.  This will not happen, 
and, in any case, Iranian retaliation would be severe.  They would probably begin 
with attempts to devastate Gulf State allies of the West with missiles and air at-
tacks.  All of this being the case, perhaps the policy of the international community 
should be to try to continue negotiations in the hope that something will come of 
them one day.
In any case, Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, or even a nuclear weapons 
capability, will create many international complications.  Since the primary cause 
of all this is the unremitting hostility of successive Iranian Islamic Republic gov-
ernments toward everything Western, maybe someday all this will cease, Iran will 
become more of a country than a cause, and these sorts of calculations will no lon-
ger need to be made.  For now, after the opportunities lost in the 2001-2003 time-
frame, Iran remains a problem with no easy solution.
The roots of the North Korean nuclear problem stretch deep into history as 
well.  In 1964, North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung, who was installed by the So-
viets after World War II and later triggered the Korean War when he launched an 
attack on the South, journeyed to China seeking nuclear weapons technology.  Nu-
clear cooperation agreements had been signed with the Soviet Union in 1956 and 
1959, as well as with China in 1959.  The United Nations forces, led by the United 
States, humbled Kim’s forces and an uneasy truce had succeeded the Korean War in 
the region of the 38th parallel, near the original border between North and South. 
These cease-fire arrangements, referred to as the Demilitarized Zone or DMZ, still 
are in place some fifty-seven years after the cessation of hostilities.
When China tested its first nuclear weapon in 1964, it became a brand new 
member of a nuclear weapons club that at the time included four other countries 
(the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France).  China 
was not interested in becoming a nuclear-weapons proliferator and politely declined 
Kim’s request.  Muammar Qadhafi also tried to obtain nuclear technology from 
China in 1970, and Kim Il Sung made his request again in 1974, at a time when 
South Korea was exploring a nuclear option.  China’s response to both requests was 
negative once again.  In the late 1970s, Kim gave the order to North Korean govern-
ment officials to begin seeking nuclear weapons on their own.  The Soviet Union 
had sold a small research reactor, capable of little beyond laboratory work, to North 
Korea in the 1960s.  The reactor was built at Yongbyon, north of Pyongyang; the 
Soviets also established a research center there.  In the early 1980s, North Korea, or 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (the DPRK), began building a larger re-
search reactor at Yongbyon in the twenty to thirty megawatts (thermal) range - five 
22 David E. Sanger, “U.S. Presses Its Case Against Iran Ahead of Sanctions Vote,” New York Times, June 8, 
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/08/world/middleeast/08nuke.html.
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megawatts (electric).  That reactor, which became operational in 1986, produced 
heat and electricity and also plutonium.  By the end of the decade, North Korea was 
mining uranium and building two larger reactors, fifty megawatts (electric) and two 
hundred megawatts (electric).
With so much nuclear activity underway, North Korea came under heavy pres-
sure from the Soviet Union to join the NPT.  It did so in 1986, the year its new 
five-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon became operational.  Initially, North Korea re-
fused to negotiate a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA as required by the NPT. 
Finally, facing significant international pressure, North Korea signed such an agree-
ment with the IAEA in early 1992.
When IAEA inspectors, led by IAEA Director General Hans Blix, began 
their work in the DPRK, they soon discovered an undeclared reprocessing facility. 
North Korea referred to the facility as a “radioisotope laboratory,” supposedly ca-
pable of only research.  Inspectors also became suspicious of two undeclared waste 
storage sites.  They asked to inspect them and were denied permission to do so.  It 
was later surmised that North Korea shut down its five-megawatt reactor in 1989 
for three months, long enough to withdraw fuel rods sufficient to reprocess enough 
plutonium for one to two weapons.  Inspectors analyzed nuclear waste samples, and 
the results of their analysis indicated that more than the ninety grams of plutonium 
North Korea had admitted to producing had actually been reprocessed.
In February 1993, the board of the IAEA in Vienna requested a “special inspec-
tion” of the two waste storage sites which it was believed, based on satellite imagery 
supplied by U.S. intelligence,23 could indicate that there had been undeclared plu-
tonium production.
The IAEA board had initially been divided over whether to make such a de-
mand, but the satellite imagery persuaded those who were uncertain.  The board 
gave Pyongyang 30 days to cede to its request—but did not need to wait nearly that 
long for the response.  North Korea rejected the inspection request the very next 
day and, about two weeks later, on March 12, gave the three-month notice required 
by the withdrawal provision of the NPT.  North Korea halted IAEA inspections of 
any kind.  This was a significant shock to the international community as no state 
had ever before exercised the withdrawal provision of the NPT or that of any other 
international arms control or non-proliferation agreement.  Near the end of March, 
the IAEA board approved a resolution stating that it could no longer certify that 
illegal nuclear material diversion from peaceful activities to a nuclear weapons pro-
gram had not taken place in North Korea.  The board forwarded the DPRK case to 
the UN Security Council for consideration of sanctions.
Even though it was by no means certain that China, one of the Security Coun-
cil’s permanent members, would support imposing international sanctions on an 
already destitute North Korea, messages arrived from North Korea indicating a 
willingness to negotiate.  By the early spring of 1993, the United States and Kim Il 
Sung’s increasingly isolated regime agreed to negotiate.  In June, on the eighty-ninth 
day of the ninety-day notice period Pyongyang had given, North Korea “suspended” 
23 Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition:  Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), pp. 249-50.
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its withdrawal from the NPT.24  (Whether it was truly a “suspension” or a cancella-
tion of plans to withdraw has been debated for years.)
When North Korea finally did withdraw from the NPT in January 2003, of-
ficials in Pyongyang claimed they could withdraw with just one day’s notice since 
they had used up eighty-nine of the ninety days in 1993.  Some United Nations and 
other international organization officials, as well as officials of some states, argue 
that the 90-day clock begins all over again under the NPT and that, as a result, 
North Korea’s withdrawal was invalid.  They insist that North Korea remains le-
gally bound by NPT provisions.  At some NPT meetings, an empty chair is main-
tained for the DPRK.
When Kim Il Sung, at the age of 82, suddenly died of a heart attack in July 
1994, his son and successor, Kim Jong-il, did not change his policies.  In October of 
1994, the United States and the DPRK reached an “Agreed Framework,”25 meaning 
in effect that the agreement was not a treaty requiring approval by the U.S. Senate. 
Once the Agreed Framework was in place, the fuel rods that had been withdrawn 
from the five-megawatt reactor stayed in the spent fuel pond and the reactor ceased 
operations, all under continuous monitoring by returning IAEA inspectors.  Under 
the Agreed Framework, the nuclear program that North Korea had begun in the 
1980s was frozen.  The five-megawatt reactor could make enough plutonium for 
one nuclear weapon a year.  The Agreement was in force for eight years, meaning 
that it prevented the production of material for eight nuclear weapons that North 
Korea might otherwise have acquired.
North Korea nonetheless continued to expand its ballistic missile program and 
in 1998 launched a Taepodong I ballistic missile over Japan into the Pacific.  Pyong-
yang claimed this to be an attempt to place a satellite in orbit, but this assertion was 
widely regarded as implausible.  The third stage of the missile failed, but the test 
outraged Japan, which had long feared an unpredictable, nuclear-capable neighbor 
to its west.  After threats of UN sanctions, North Korea agreed to a moratorium on 
further such launches.  The message was clear: the DPRK could develop a ballistic 
missile delivery system for nuclear weapons threatening its regional neighbors.
However, another threat, even more menacing than the DPRK ballistic mis-
sile program, soon emerged.  In the early 1990s, A.Q. Khan, the scientist who had 
pioneered Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons program, brokered an arrangement to trans-
fer uranium enrichment technology to North Korea in exchange for designs and 
parts for North Korea’s medium-range ballistic missile, the Nodong.  This missile, 
capable of delivering nuclear weapons, became known as the Ghauri in Pakistan. 
Khan made his first trip to North Korea in 1993 with then Prime Minister Benezir 
Bhutto, who was seeking friendly relations with reclusive North Korea.  On the 
side, Khan made his deal.  He made perhaps up to a dozen more trips in Pakistani 
air force planes—thereby implying government or at least armed forces support—
to North Korea in the 1990s, delivering plans, parts, as well as completed centrifuge 
machines.
North Korea is a dangerous state.  It has a long track record of being will-
24 Ibid., p. 253.
25 Ibid., pp. 275-76.
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ing to sell anything to anyone for its own benefit and a history of state terrorism 
against South Korea.  A nuclear-armed North Korea, with ballistic missiles capable 
of reaching targets throughout Northeast Asia, posed a double danger.  First, the 
closed, inscrutable government of dictator Kim Jong-il, who may be preparing to 
pass control to his youngest son, could sell nuclear weapons to Iran or to terrorist 
organizations.  He could also transfer bomb production technology as it did to 
Syria in the 2005-2007 time-frame.  Second, a nuclear-armed North Korea, be-
cause of its nuclear capable medium range missile, the Nodong, is a grave threat to 
Japanese and South Korean cities.
Pyongyang’s track record also includes a certain realpolitik and willingness to 
negotiate.  Above all, the North Korean regime, grappling with overwhelming pov-
erty, occasional famine, and few allies, is interested in survival and in economic ben-
efits.  Military action against the DPRK is not an attractive option due to the threat 
to Seoul from the huge North Korean artillery and rocket forces arrayed along the 
DMZ border less than twenty miles away.  Diplomacy is the only practical option.
 In October 2000, Kim Jong-il sent his number two official, Vice Marshall Jo 
Myong Rok of the Korean People’s Army, to Washington.  Marshall Jo met with 
President Clinton in the Oval Office along with other high-ranking national secu-
rity officials, including Secretary of State Madeline Albright and National Security 
Advisor Sandy Berger.  The marshal wore his dress uniform covered with medals; 
he was cordially greeted by President Clinton.
Marshall Jo sat next to President Clinton in the Oval Office meeting, holding 
in his hand a brown folder.  The President asked Jo if it was a letter for him, where-
upon Marshall Jo stood and formally handed over the folder to Clinton.  Clinton 
promptly opened the folder and read the letter, pronouncing it a “good letter.”  In the 
missive, Kim Jong-il stated that he was prepared to stop the production, export, and 
use of long-range ballistic missiles.  Then Marshall Jo unveiled another surprise. 
He said that on behalf of Kim Jong-il, he would like to invite President Clinton to 
come to Pyongyang to sign an agreement on missiles.  “If you come to Pyongyang, 
. . . Kim Jong-il will guarantee that he will satisfy all your security concerns,” he 
said to President Clinton.  Indeed he went further and said to Clinton, “I need to 
secure your agreement to come to Pyongyang.  I really need to take back a positive 
answer.”26  Clinton was noncommittal but generally spoke positively with Jo.  He 
wanted the DPRK to understand that they could work with him.  All in the room 
sensed that a deal might be possible that might take the two countries all the way to 
a position that would enable them to normalize relations.
Since the time of the Agreed Framework negotiation, North Korea’s objective 
had been, for its own purposes, to end its adversarial relationship with the United 
States.  For the time being, the Agreed Framework had accomplished that goal, 
but it was not long before the agreement began to fray.  After the Clinton-Jo meet-
ing, a communiqué was released which stated that neither government would have 
“hostile intent” toward the other and that both were committed to “build a new 
26 Mike Chinoy, Meltdown:  The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis (New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 
2008), p. 25.
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relationship free from past enmity.”27  Clinton delayed making his decision to go to 
North Korea and sent Secretary Albright to Pyongyang some weeks later to convey 
President Clinton’s views and also to prepare for a possible visit by the President. 
Charles Kartman, Jack Pritchard, Kartman’s deputy, Wendy Sherman, State De-
partment Coordinator on policy toward the DPRK, and, Assistant Secretary of 
State for East Asian Affairs Stanley Roth accompanied the Secretary on this trip.28
In discussions over two days with Albright, Kim Jong-il displayed a mastery 
of his brief, indicating that a missile deal was possible and making it clear that he 
wanted improved relations with the United States.  He expressed the hope that 
the United States would no longer view North Korea as an adversary.  When the 
American election day arrived on November 7, 2000, the DPRK government made 
clear that it wanted relations with the United States to continue to improve and 
hoped to do business with whoever became the next President.  In a commentary 
on the election in Pyongyang’s official newspaper, it was asserted “the improved rela-
tions between the two countries are in line with the desire and interests of the two 
peoples.”29
The long stalemate over who would be the next President greatly complicated 
decision-making on North Korea within the Clinton Administration.  Clinton very 
much wanted to respond to the DPRK’s conciliatory gestures and visit Pyongyang. 
Even though many government experts believed the North Koreans would accede 
to an agreement if Clinton took the risk, the long internal debate finally concluded 
that too many loose ends remained and that one more visit by a high-level emissary 
was necessary before a summit trip could be agreed.  Wendy Sherman, with an ac-
companying delegation, could be sent instead, with a proposed date for President 
Clinton’s trip in her pocket.  She would put the visit on the table as soon as the 
remaining principal issues, especially verification, were resolved.30
Many experts in government were convinced, however, that if Clinton simply 
took the risk and went, the North Koreans would see to it that agreement was in 
fact reached.  Ultimately the White House did not want to take a risk until the 
election impasse had been resolved.  The Clinton Administration did not want to 
go forward even with the two-phased approach of sending Sherman first.  Clinton 
officials believed that the new President needed to be briefed on this, but he could 
not be briefed until they knew who had won the election.  Finally, George W. Bush 
was declared to be President.  By this time, it was too late for President Clinton to 
go to North Korea.
As Bush entered office, the DPRK attempted to signal that it hoped to resume 
a dialogue with the new Administration.  On February 8, 2001, at the Atlantic 
Council in Washington, Li Gun, the Deputy North Korean UN Representative, 
said, “We hope the Bush administration maintains the U.S. engagement policy to-
27 Ibid., p. 26.
28 Ibid., pp. 26-27.
29 Ibid., p. 35.
30 Ibid., pp. 35-36.
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ward North Korea.”31  The North Koreans were reassured by the fact that there 
remained the communiqué signed by President Clinton and Marshall Jo pledging 
“no hostile intent” between the two countries.
However, the personnel of the new Administration, particularly on the Na-
tional Security Council staff, made no secret of their distrust of North Korea in 
general and of Kim Jong-il in particular.  They also made clear their desire to scuttle 
the Agreed Framework as fast as possible.  State Department experts explained 
to skeptical Bush Administration staffers that the DPRK regarded the Clinton-Jo 
Communiqué as the foundation stone of their relationship with the United States 
in much the same way that China regarded the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972 
signed by Richard Nixon.  This argument was not accepted by senior NSC staff 
officers.  Secretary Powell and Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage, on the other 
hand held quite different views.  While Powell thought that it would have been a 
mistake for Clinton to have gone to North Korea, he very much wanted to continue 
the Clinton engagement policy.  Powell brought James Kelly to the post of Assistant 
Secretary for East Asia.  Although Kelly was somewhat skeptical on the Clinton 
policy toward North Korea, he was experienced and highly respected.  He was a 
supporter of the Agreed Framework.32
With the new Administration now in place in Washington, South Korean 
President Kim Dae-jung was worried about a possible change in policy in Wash-
ington toward engagement with the DPRK.  Thus, South Korea decided to press 
for an early meeting between Bush and Kim.  Many career U.S. officials and outside 
experts were counseling South Korea to wait, saying that the new Administration 
was not yet ready for a summit meeting.  There was an ongoing policy review on 
North Korea, and it was believed that many top officials had not shifted intellectu-
ally from being part of a presidential campaign to governing.  In other words, they 
had not moved from rhetoric to practical decisions on policy.  However, Kim was 
determined to come to Washington.  He had been a long-time dissident who resist-
ed military dictatorships in South Korea.  He had survived several attempts on his 
life.  Upon coming to office, he had created a Sunshine Policy of engagement with 
the North, for which he had received the Nobel Peace Prize.  He was convinced 
that he could persuade President Bush to continue the dialogue with Kim Jong-il.33
The meeting was set for March 7, and in preparation for the visit, the South 
Korean Foreign Minister met in Washington with Secretary Powell.  Powell reas-
sured him that the administration was supportive of the Sunshine Policy and that 
it intended to continue with the Agreed Framework.
On the day President Kim arrived in Washington, National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice gave an interview to The New York Times.  Speaking as an anony-
mous “senior administration official,” she said the DPRK as well as Kim Jong-il 
were a “problem.”  At the same time, Powell met with reporters and indicated that 
the Bush Administration planned to pick up where the Clinton administration left 
31 Ibid., p. 43.
32 Ibid., pp. 44-48.
33 Ibid., pp. 49-50.
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off in dealing with North Korea.34
The next morning, Secretary Powell hosted President Kim and his National 
Security Advisor at Blair House for breakfast.  Powell was accompanied by several 
senior State Department officials.  The meeting, according to one of the partici-
pants, was “wonderful.” Powell and Kim were comfortable with one another, and 
Powell made clear that the two governments shared the same view as how to deal 
with the DPRK.  The policy of engagement would continue.  Kim used the oc-
casion to try out the presentation that he planned to make to the President.  The 
Americans who were present believed the arrangement was brilliant. 35
However, the situation was to change quickly.  The following morning, the 
Washington Post ran a story about Powell’s meeting with the press the day before 
the talks.  The headline read “Bush to Pick Up Clinton Talks on N. Korean Mis-
siles.”  The headlines appeared to cause a firestorm at the White House.  Powell 
received a call from Rice at Blair House as he was preparing to head over to the 
White House with President Kim..  Rice demanded that Powell set affairs straight 
with the press right away before Bush and Kim did their press conference after their 
meeting.  So Powell had to leave the meeting between Kim and Bush, and, in a hu-
miliating way, say to a confused group of reporters waiting outside the Oval Office 
that no agreement really had yet been reached with regard to the engagement policy 
toward the DPRK, andthat the situation would need additional study.36
The meeting between President Bush and President Kim has accurately been 
described  as “a disaster.”  Kim Dae-jung was seventy-five years old.  He had suf-
fered for years struggling for human rights against South Korean dictators of the 
past.  He had been jailed, tortured, and had survived a death sentence on sedition 
charges and an assassination attempt.37  He was the popularly elected President of 
South Korea and had been awarded the Nobel Prize the previous year.  He was 
used to and deserved respect.  George W. Bush had no clear idea who Kim Dae-
jung was or what he represented.38  He only knew he did not like being lectured on 
the importance of negotiating with Kim Jong-il, a man whom he had never met but 
somehow intensely disliked; to be urged to follow the policies of former President 
Clinton; and to be friendly with a man who had publically questioned the value of 
ballistic missile defense, one of his Administration’s top two objectives.  After Kim 
made the same speech to Bush that he had given at Blair House, Bush challenged 
Kim and his ideas and made it clear he would not follow the Clinton policies to-
ward North Korea and would not resume the missile talks in the foreseeable future. 
Basically, it was a posture of:  we detest Kim Jong-il, and we do not agree with your 
34 Ibid., p. 53.
35 Ibid., p. 53-54.
36 Ibid., p. 55
37 Ibid.; Choe Sang-hun, “Kim Dea-jung, Ex-President of S. Korea, Dies at 83,” New York Times, Aug. 19, 
2009, p. A25.
38 See Chinoy, Meltdown, pp. 50, 56.
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Sunshine Policy.39  To the Bush Administration, North Korea represented one of 
the most compelling justifications for its pursuit of a ballistic missile defense poli-
cy.40  So the Administration did not want to forego North Korea’s hostility. This 
policy view thus was solidly based on U.S. domestic policies as opposed to national 
security analysis.  After this unfortunate meeting, between President Bush and his 
South Korean counterpart the internal Administration policy review with respect 
to North Korea continued.
When the policy review finally ended in early June, President Bush announced 
that the U.S. was prepared to resume “serious negotiations” with North Korea, but 
there were conditions, such as improved verification of the Agreed Framework, a 
ban on missile exports, controls on the DPRK missile forces, and reductions in 
North Korea’s conventional military capability.  In addition, there was no renewal 
of the “no hostile intent” communiqué from the Clinton Administration.  The Bush 
Administration wanted concessions on all these issues from the DPRK before it 
would do anything.  This could not possibly look any other way but intensely hos-
tile to North Korea.
A few months later, shortly after the terrorist attacks on the United States of 
September 11, 2001, North Korea in an official statement described the attacks 
as “a very regretful and tragic incident” and stated that the DPRK was “opposed to 
all forms of terrorism.”41 Throughout the fall of 2001, the DPRK tried its best to 
distinguish itself from the international terrorists to avoid being grouped into the 
“bad guy” camp.  The DPRK signed on to UN counter-terrorism conventions that 
it had not theretofore ratified.  However, it was no use; President Bush denounced 
Kim Jong-il on October 16th as he was leaving for an Asia Pacific Economic Fo-
rum meeting in Shanghai, saying that Kim should stop spreading weapons of mass 
destruction around the world.  In November, President Bush made a similar de-
nunciation while speaking to reporters in the Rose Garden, asserting that to have a 
relationship with the U.S., North Korea would have to stop proliferating weapons 
of mass destruction, implying that the DPRK would be “held accountable.”42
Then the Nuclear Posture Review, which is the Pentagon Report on nuclear 
policy, was completed in December 2001.  Portions of it became public, in particu-
lar the section asserting that the United States needed to maintain nuclear weapons 
for the possible use of such weapons against Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and North 
Korea at that time, even though perceived as adversaries, all NPT non-nuclear-
weapon states.  This campaign of increasing the negative pressure came to its high 
point in the President’s State of the Union speech in January of 2002.  The relevant 
section denounced the “Axis of Evil” threatening the United States—in its near final 
draft mentioning only Iraq.  The White House, in order not to be seen as singling 
out Iraq, instructed the speech writer to add Iran (which had just been helping the 
39 Ibid., p. 55.
40 Ibid., p. 59.
41 Ibid., p. 65.
42 Ibid., pp. 67-68.
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U.S., in its fall effort to drive the Taliban out of Afghanistan and establish a new 
government) and North Korea (so as to have the President appear less anti-Islamic 
in his State of the Union speech).  The public in South Korea saw this language as 
possibly justifying a war on the Korean Peninsula.  The U.S. buildup against Iraq 
was well under way.  Naturally the DPRK reacted angrily but at least for the short 
term acted with caution.43
In spite of all of this, the chief advisor on North Korean affairs to President 
Kim Dae-jung went to Pyongyang for several days of talks.  After his return, he 
announced that Kim Jong-il had said that he was prepared to accept a visit by an 
American government envoy.  After many months, the DPRK expressed a willing-
ness to accept the call of the Bush Administration for negotiations.  Secretary Pow-
ell pressed for authority to respond with what became known within the United 
States government as the “Bold Approach,” in other words comprehensive talks. 
This touched off another internal debate, but this time, the State Department pre-
vailed, and Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly was 
authorized to lead a delegation to Pyongyang on July 10, 2002.44
A new surprise was in store during their visit.  The Central Intelligence Agency 
approached the State Department with the message that they had new information. 
For some time, CIA officials said, the DPRK had been conducting a secret uranium 
enrichment program to develop nuclear weapons,45 which was highly contrary to 
the spirit and the rationale of the Agreed Framework.  The information caused a 
full review of available intelligence to be ordered.  The review disclosed an equip-
ment procurement effort that hitherto had not been noticed.  The operation began 
on a small scale in the 1990s but had become a major program by 2002.  The new 
intelligence may have come from an agent inside North Korea or it may have come 
from an increasing understanding of Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan’s illegal, 
clandestine, nuclear proliferation network.
By the end of the summer, the CIA had pieced together quite a full picture of 
the DPRK enrichment program.  The operation had remained a small research 
effort until 2002 when it became a much more serious program.  Principals were 
briefed by the CIA on the program in September, and it was concluded that busi-
ness as usual was no longer possible with the DPRK.  It was feared that North 
Korea might in fact be close to a uranium bomb. Kelly was authorized to go to 
Pyongyang with the sole mission of accusing the DPRK of this program, not to 
negotiate.46
On the morning of October 3, 2002, Assistant Secretary Kelly and his small 
delegation landed at Pyongyang airport.  His mission, after further machinations in 
Washington, was to accuse the DPRK of violating the Agreed Framework Agree-
ment, at least in principle, and nothing more.  The North Koreans were expecting 
a negotiation.  As was common practice, the North Koreans would host a lavish 
43 Ibid., pp. 68-72.
44 Ibid., p. 80.
45 Ibid., p. 82.
46 Ibid., pp. 114-15.
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dinner for the visiting American delegation.  Normally, the U.S. would reciprocate 
the second night, but Kelly was under further orders to rub it in and refuse to 
reciprocate.  The North Koreans were notified of this in advance, confirmed upon 
Kelly’s arrival.  Due to this behavior, the DPRK housed Kelly and his delegation in 
a downtown hotel where they had to check in like regular tourists, rather than one 
of the guest homes maintained by the Foreign Ministry.47
The first meeting was scheduled that afternoon with Kim Gye-gwan, one of 
several vice-ministers and a long time interlocutor with Americans.  This was in-
tended as a short discussion.  A larger meeting was scheduled for the next morning 
with Kim, followed by a meeting with the First Vice Minister, Kang Sok-ju, a key 
figure in the government.  At the afternoon meeting Kim invited Kelly to begin. 
Kim said he wanted to learn about current U.S. policy toward North Korea and to 
understand the true intention of the United States with respect to dialogue with 
the DPRK.  Kelly decided that instead of an introductory discussion he would 
read his prepared script.  The basic message was that the President had planned 
to have serious discussions with the DPRK about transforming the U.S.–North 
Korean relationship.  However, the U.S. had irrefutable evidence that North Korea 
had embarked on a secret program to develop nuclear weapons through uranium 
enrichment, so such dialogue was no longer possible.  Kelly’s brief also covered sub-
jects such as U.S. concerns about the Agreed Framework, terrorism, missiles, con-
ventional forces, and human rights.48
After Kelly’s presentation, Kim asked for a break and left the room, probably 
to brief the First Vice Minister.  When he returned, his response was relatively 
brief, rejecting the charges about a covert HEU program out of hand and stating 
that those who were opposed to a better relationship between the U.S. and the 
DPRK fabricated such charges.  He then presented standard talking points on the 
relationship.  The dinner that evening was uneventful although the North Koreans 
remained offended that the U.S. would not be reciprocating.49
The next morning, Kelly presented virtually the same script that he had the 
previous afternoon.  Kim responded that it was clear that the United States now in-
tended to pursue a policy of “strangulation” of North Korea and intended to change 
North Korea’s system by force.  Therefore, only a hard-line response would be ap-
propriate, involving conventional forces and missiles.  The HEU charges did not 
merit a response he said.50
Not long after this discussion, the U.S. delegation had a nearly one hour meet-
ing with Vice Minister Kang.  This perhaps was the most fateful meeting in the 
long and tortured history of U.S.-North Korea discussions.  Kang said that he had 
been thoroughly briefed by Vice Minister Kim and had conducted discussions with 
47 Ibid., pp. 115-16; Charles L. Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy:  The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the 
Bomb (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 35.
48 Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy, p. 35.
49 Ibid., p. 36.
50 Ibid., p. 37.
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senior government officials through the night.  He said that the United States had 
completely destroyed the Agreed Framework as a result of designating North Ko-
rea as part of the “axis of evil,” establishing a preemptive nuclear strike policy, and 
singling the DPRK out for nuclear attack.  He noted that Article III of the Agreed 
Framework provided that the U.S. would not use or threaten to use nuclear weap-
ons against the DPRK.  The new U.S. policy was a direct violation of the arrange-
ment.  The DPRK had no choice but to modernize its armed forces.  The U.S. 
claims that the DPRK has a uranium enrichment program for the fabrication of 
nuclear weapons.  The DPRK was prepared to develop even more advanced weap-
ons and put itself on an equal footing with the United States to discuss denuclear-
ization.51
“We are part of the axis of evil and you are gentlemen,” Kang quipped.  “This is 
our relationship.  We cannot discuss matters like gentlemen.  If we disarm ourselves 
because of U.S. pressure, then we will become like Yugoslavia or Afghanistan’s Tali-
ban, to be beaten to death.”  All eight of the Americans concluded that, even though 
Kang did not explicitly say so, they believed his statements amounted to an admis-
sion by North Korea that it had a HEU nuclear- weapons program.  Kang asserted 
after discussion that the DPRK had to counter the “physical declaration of war” 
by the United States.  The American delegation’s conclusion was subsequently and 
consistently denied by the DPRK.52
In response, the United States lobbied its partners in the Korean Energy De-
velopment Organization (KEDO) to terminate heavy fuel oil (HFO) shipments to 
North Korea.  Also, on November 14, 2002, KEDO announced the suspension of 
HFO shipments in a statement that condemned North Korea for building nuclear 
weapons.  North Korea’s response came late the next month when it announced the 
expulsion of IAEA monitors and the removable of IAEA monitoring devices from 
the nuclear complex at Yongbyon.  On January 10, 2003, North Korea declared 
that the ninety-day NPT withdrawal period, which had begun ten years earlier, 
was now completed.  The DPRK was no longer a party to the Nuclear Non-Pro-
liferation Treaty.53
In 1994, the Clinton Administration had been prepared to go to war if North 
Korea began reprocessing  the fuel rods that had been pulled from the Yongbyon 
reactor for plutonium.  In 2003 and thereafter, the Bush Administration simply 
stood by, hoping for a regime change and moving ahead as intended with its missile 
defense policy as North Korea reprocessed spent fuel twice in 2003 and 2005 from 
the Yongbyon reactor, thus enabling the DPRK to have obtained enough plutoni-
um for an estimated up to eight additional nuclear weapons.54  Adding this estimate 
to the plutonium gained from the three-month reactor shutdown in 1989 and the 
intelligence estimate for the DPRK, they could have generated enough plutonium 
for eight to ten nuclear weapons.
51 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
52 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
53 Ibid., pp. 40-44.
54 Ibid., p. 44.
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In the spring of 2005, the Bush Administration’s view was that North Korea 
could be planning an imminent nuclear weapon test.  The previous year, in an at-
tempt to reverse the deteriorating situation, the Six-Party Talks process involving 
North and South Korea, the United States, Japan, China, and Russia had begun 
with the stated goal of ending the DPRK nuclear program.  In September 2005, 
with the United States downplaying the HEU issue, North Korea agreed in princi-
ple to terminate its nuclear program pursuant to the negotiations.  However, a long 
period of stalemate followed with no further forward progress in the negotiations. 
On October 9, 2006, North Korea performed a nuclear test.  The test was largely a 
failure in that an intended four kiloton test resulted in considerably less than a one 
kiloton explosion.55  The nuclear explosion in the DPRK was detected, down to the 
kiloton, all over the world by seismic stations established by the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty Office.  The test signaled a new, more dangerous era in which one 
of he world’s most unstable regimes could evolve into a nuclear weapon capable 
state, putting its regional neighbors in harm’s way.
A short time afterward, North Korea signed an agreement to close down its 
five-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon and begin the termination of its nuclear pro-
gram.  In July 2007, the reactor was closed down in the presence of IAEA inspec-
tors.56  All of these developments came in spite of the fact that President Bush 
somewhat earlier had once again had attacked Kim Jong-il personally in a press 
conference on April 28, 2005, volunteering that “Kim Jong-Il is a dangerous person. 
He’s a man who starves his people.  He [has] got huge concentration camps.  And . 
. . there is concern about his capacity to deliver a nuclear weapon.”57  However, after 
one attempted North Korean test, the negotiations seemed to be finding the right 
track.  Secretary of State Rice had sufficient clout with the White House to press 
forward with a diplomatic effort at State in the face of the continued White House 
preference for regime change, which had become a virtual non-policy.
In 2007, progress was made in disabling the Yongbyon reactor and in under-
standing the size and scope of the DPRK program.  There were many U.S. and 
other Western technical experts in North Korea and the DPRK who agreed to 
make a comprehensive declaration of the DPRK nuclear program by the end of 
2007.  The deadline was not met, but a declaration was finally made in June 2008. 
The declaration contained significant information on the plutonium program but 
nothing on the uranium enrichment program.  Neither did the declaration include 
anything regarding an alleged DPRK role in building a research reactor in Syria 
capable of producing plutonium, which was destroyed by Israeli warplanes in Sep-
tember 2007.
As agreed, President Bush gave notice of his intent to remove the DPRK from 
the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism.  When at the end of the 
forty-five-day notice period, the DPRK had not agreed to a verification arrange-
ment for its declaration, which the United States insisted should occur.  The Presi-
55 See ibid., pp. 150-52, 194-98.
56 Chinoy, Meltdown, pp. 325-26, 339.
57 Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy, pp. 15-16.
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dent let the notice period expire without taking any action.
In early September, however, Washington announced that it would not take 
North Korea off the state sponsors of terrorism list until it agreed to an extensive 
written verification arrangement.  The U.S. demanded full access to “any site, facility 
or location” deemed relevant to the DPRK nuclear program.  David Albright, the 
U.S. nuclear expert, referred to this demand as a “verification wish list” comparable 
to what Iraq had agreed to “only after it was bombed.”  North Korea made a counter 
proposal in which it agreed to some provisions but objected to two key elements—
visits to undeclared facilities and the taking of samples.58  However, the United 
States did admit that it did not have any agreement in writing from the DPRK to 
establish a verification arrangement and had communicated its wish for a verifica-
tion system only verbally.  The United States added this unilateral demand after 
North Korea already complied with the previous commitment.  For their part, the 
DPRK declared it would restore and restart the Yongbyon reactor, thereby enabling 
them to make more plutonium if this dispute continued.  Once again, it appeared as 
though the process with North Korea might be unraveling.
However, the situation began to improve in October.  North Korea had barred 
inspectors from Yongbyon and had prepared to resume plutonium production.  The 
U.S. then suddenly decided that the DPRK had shown progress and announced 
that a verbal agreement had been reached on verification.  The agreement would 
permit visits to undeclared sites and for inspectors to take away environmental 
samples from facilities, which could determine how much plutonium had been pro-
duced.  No text of such an agreement has ever been produced, but this did take the 
dispute out of the news until after the American elections.
On October 11, 2008, President Bush removed the DPRK from the State De-
partment’s state-sponsors-of-terrorism list.  Inspectors were readmitted, and it ap-
peared that the disarmament process was back on track.  However, in November 
of  that year, the DPRK refused to allow inspectors to remove samples from the 
Yongbyon nuclear complex, saying in a formal statement that it had never agreed to 
sampling.  In December, the DPRK explicitly refused to agree to a written verifica-
tion plan, thereby ending the nuclear disarmament process on the Korean Penin-
sula for the Bush Administration.  Thus, in 2007 and 2008 some limited progress 
was made in the Six-Party Talks.  In the end, however, the Bush Administration left 
an entirely unconstrained situation for its successor.
In the spring of 2009, North Korea conducted the launch of a communication 
satellite that experts concluded was a subterfuge to test the Taepodong-II missile, 
which in theory would be capable of reaching North America.  The launch was 
judged to be a failure, but there was speculation that it was the intent of the DPRK 
to develop nuclear weapons that would be designed to be deployed on medium- and 
long-range ballistic missiles.  Later in 2009, North Korea conducted a second nu-
clear test that was more successful and about six kilotons.  The DPRK announced 
that it was now a nuclear weapon state.  The nightmare scenario of a nuclear weap-
on capable North Korea possessing medium range ballistic missiles threatening the 
Northeast Asia region took a significant step toward reality.
58 Glenn Kessler, “Far-Reaching U.S. Plan Impaired N. Korea Deal,” Washington Post, Sept. 26, 2008, p. A20.
26 BAKER CENTER JOURNAL OF APPLIED PUBLIC POLICY
In November 2010, Stanford Professor and former Director of the Los Ala-
mos National Laboratory Siegfried Hecker and two Stanford colleagues were visit-
ing North Korea.  While there, they were unexpectedly given a tour of a formerly 
secret uranium enrichment facility with perhaps up to 2,000 centrifuges.  Heck-
er said that he was “stunned” that North Korea had built such a plant so quickly. 
Some American officials speculated that the purpose of showing off the plant was 
to advertise this capability to other countries who might want to buy what it could 
produce.  American officials regarded this plant as “significantly more advanced” 
than what Iran possessed and were of the view that this plant could not have been 
built so quickly unless there was a network of secret nuclear sites elsewhere.59
When the Bush Administration came into office early in 2001, it inherited a 
North Korean situation at a promising point.  The long-running crisis had been 
contained, and the process was on a road toward resolution.  The DPRK had in 
its possession perhaps enough plutonium for one on two nuclear weapons, but the 
plutonium program was capped and contained by the Agreed Framework.  U.S. 
officials were beginning to learn the details of North Korea’s illicit bargaining with 
A.Q. Khan; but at this stage, the DPRK had actually done nothing with the ura-
nium enrichment nuclear-weapons program beyond receipt of the centrifuge tech-
nology from Khan and related research.  There was near agreement on termination 
of the missile program, both the domestic and import parts, and progress had been 
made toward some sort of broad settlement with North Korea.  However uneasy, it 
might have at least removed the DPRK from the ranks of rogue nations.
Today there is no Six-Party Talks process for the nuclear disarmament of 
North Korea, and there is an active ballistic missile development program.  North 
Korea has conducted two nuclear weapon tests and has declared that it is a nuclear 
weapon state.  These are developments deeply contrary to U.S. and world security 
interests.  These developments could drive Japan and South Korea toward nuclear-
weapons programs and thus serve as the death knell for the NPT.  The DPRK 
could try again to help Syria create a nuclear-weapons program, continue to as-
sist Iran on its program, and help the dictatorial regime in Myanmar establish a 
nuclear-weapons program.  Lastly, the transfer of nuclear weapon material to ter-
rorist organizations by North Korea cannot be ruled out of the question.  All of this 
would bring President Kennedy’s darkest fears closer to realization.
The nuclear-weapons programs in Iran and North Korea during the Bush Ad-
ministration were allowed to develop into grave threats to the continued viability 
of the NPT as well as to United States national security and the peace and security 
of the world community.  Nevertheless, in spite of all these very real dangers along 
with other threats, this does still remain a time of promise because of the com-
mitment of President Obama and his Administration to nuclear-arms control and 
non-proliferation.  Widespread support for progress on nuclear-arms control and 
non-proliferation in the international community as well as the growing support 
for Global Zero also make this endeavor possible.  Of course, it is also a time of 
great difficulty because of the many overwhelmingly serious crises that were left 
59 David E Sanger and William J. Broad, “U.S. Concludes N. Korea Has More Missile Sites,” New York Times, 
Dec. 15, 2010, p. A13.
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at the end of 2008.  These crises include the world economic downturn, climate 
change, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine, in addition to the matters discussed here-
in, particularly the cases of Iran and North Korea.
The polarized political situation in the United States is a serious obstacle to 
progress, and much time has passed.  Great damage to the disarmament process has 
been sustained and the proliferation crises seem to grow steadily more dangerous. 
However, while the hour is growing late, it is not too late.  Success remains possible; 
that safer and more secure world that all of us want can still be built.  We must not 
give up.  In a real sense, we must all truly keep the faith and, to paraphrase a famous 
British statesman, never, never give in.60
60 See Winston S. Churchill, “Speech at Harrow School,” Oct. 29, 1941, reprinted in Robert Rhodes James, 
ed., The Complete Speeches of Winston S. Churchill, vol. 6 (London: Chelsea House, 1974), p. 6499.
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The Twilight of the Neoadministrative 
State: Crises, American Political Development, and the 
“New Interventionism”
Robert F. Durant, American University
Introduction
Until the worldwide financial meltdown of 2007-2008, “collaboration,” 
“partnerships,” and “networks” were the catchwords and phrases of our time.  In 
fact, public administration scholars routinely talked less about “government” and 
more about “governance.”  The latter incorporates the idea that public, private, and 
nonprofit organizations working together, rather than government agencies acting 
unilaterally, are the dominant mode for delivering goods, services, and opportunities 
to citizens.  Theirs was a non-interventionist view of the role of the state, with many 
proponents viewing government as the source of, rather than the solution to, 
societies’ ills.
By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, however, a full-
blown assault was underway on the power of this neoadministrative state to 
deal adequately—technically, politically, and philosophically—with the world’s 
formidable challenges.  Perceptions of crises—immediate, looming, or contrived—
stimulated such thinking, along with perceptions of government failure.  The former 
included global warming, the war on terror, spiraling national and foreign debt, 
revelations of the contributions of crony capitalism and government deregulation 
to financial crises worldwide (e.g., in the United States, Greece, Iceland, and 
Portugal), and underfunded entitlement programs in major industrialized nations 
exacerbated by an aging population (e.g., in France).  For the United States, the 
latter were ensconced in perceptions of misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance 
related to the Iraqi war, Hurricane Katrina, and—later—the BP Gulf oil spill.
It was the worldwide financial crisis of 2007-2008 and its aftermath, 
however, that brought about what many see as the most immediate and significant 
reinvigoration of the state—i.e., the federal government in the United States 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s.  The unprecedented monetary size of 
the financial rescue efforts in the United States; the partial nationalization of nine 
major American banks and portions of the automobile industry; and the enactment 
or expansion of classic command-and-control regulatory authority in new federal 
laws regulating the mortgage, derivatives, and credit card industries proved enough 
for opponents of the Bush and Obama Administrations and prominent journalists 
to claim that the United States  was on its way to state socialism (Meacham and 
Thomas 2009).
Relying heavily on my previous publications on this topic, this article argues 
that those who see the rise of a new Leviathan in the United States  under the 
Bush and (especially) the Obama Administrations falsely conflate the “ends” or 
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“how much?” question regarding state intervention in markets with the “means” or 
“how implemented?” question.  When one looks today and historically at the “how 
implemented” question in the face of domestic and global crises, one persistently 
finds interventionist state policies creating implementation structures which 
ensure that organized market interests preserve power, access, and influence in 
the administration of programs.  The paper attributes this to the three causal 
mechanisms in American political development: path dependency, the constitutive 
effects of public policies, and layering (Pierson 2004).  Thus, those expecting, 
hoping for, or lamenting a period of state dominance over markets as a result of the 
“new interventionism” in the United States  under President Obama fail to grasp 
the realpolitik of administrative reform historically in this nation.
The article begins by offering a synopsis of a theoretical framework for 
understanding the dynamics of American political development in response to 
crises—real, perceived, or imagined—presented in greater detail in my previous 
publications (Durant 2009 and 2011).  I then show the empirical foundations of 
this framework by giving an overview of the reactions of federal  policymakers 
historically to these crises (for a more in-depth treatment, see Durant 2009). 
Reviewed next is how similar trends of state activism, tempered by implementation 
structures reserving corporate access, influence, and power, are already occurring in 
the nation’s response to the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
Crises, Path Dependency, and American Exceptionalism
Much talk has arisen of late—some positive and some critical—about 
American exceptionalism.  These values include faith in markets, individualism, 
and minimal state preferences (Lipset 1996).  As used in this article, the term 
should not be interpreted as implying the moral superiority ofthe United States, 
but rather the uniqueness or distinctiveness of the American Madisonian system 
of diffused (rather than concentrated) responsibility occasioned by separation of 
powers, checks and balances, and federalism (Kingdon 1999).  Thus, no matter 
how aggressive or sizeable the initiative taken legislatively to advance state over 
market interests in the face of crises (domestic, international, or intermestic), the 
compromises necessary to pass legislation in such a hyperfragmented system ensure 
implementation structures that allow market interests access and influence during 
rulemaking and enforcement.
Indeed, the trajectory or arch of reform in response to crises exhibits scant 
variation acrossAmerican history.  First come calls by reformers that existing 
administrative structures are ill-suited for dealing with emerging trends, 
contemporary problems, or crises.  In the case of crises, calls for state intervention 
are typically grounded in three sets of rhetorical issue-framing:  the need for new 
structures are needed to produce administrative synergies that were previously 
nonexistent; the need to respond quickly and effectively to perceived imminent 
danger (i.e., if we do not act, the consequences will be profound); and the need to be 
on the “right side of history,” given fundamental changes in society.  These arguments 
are quickly countered by opponents and agnostics as likely to have perverse effects, 
and they would be futile given the complexity of the issue, or jeopardize other 
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things we value (e.g., state-led healthcare reform jeopardizing freedom of healthcare 
choices by individuals).
For their part, affected market interests (large and small business alike) raise 
rhetorical claims such as these, but only up to the point at which they realize that 
something is going to happen.  Then they try to shape implementation structures 
that ensure them additional access and influence as agencies exercise their discretion 
in carrying out the law.  Alternatively, they may lead the call for reform before 
others do when events and the inability of existing structures to advance their 
interests occur.  In either case, the legislative process requires a consolidation of 
perspectives that results in implementation structures that are “halfway, halting, and 
patchworked” (Skowronek 1982) and that do not replace the status quo.  Rather, 
they get layered within existing and crowded policy spaces and their accompanying 
implementation structures, thus ensuring difficulty of implementation and conflict 
among disparate agencies (among any new ones created and legacy agencies that 
remain in existence).
These structures also produce biases within the system, privileging some 
policies and interest groups and diminishing or marginalizing others over 
subsequent decades.  In other words, it is not just that politics creates policy, 
but policy creates politics (Schattschneider 1975).  More formally, policies have 
“constitutive” effects.  They do so in several ways: (1) they generate new interest 
groups that participate in subsequent legislative reauthorization and appropriation 
decisions in Congress; (2) they either legitimize or marginalize different groups; 
(3) they either enhance or diminish citizens’ sense of political worth and efficacy; 
and (4) they create implementation structures for carrying out policy that ensure 
access to some and deny it to others.  These, in turn, exhibit “path dependency” and 
“amplifying” effects.  That is, early policy decisions and implementation structures 
constrain future policy options, participants, and opportunities.
In the case of administrative governance reforms in reaction to national and 
global crises, these “constitutive” effects create and amplify the ability of corporate 
interests to ensure that their capacity to influence the discretion that agencies 
exercise is institutionalized in governance (and agency) structures.  Cross-sectoral 
implementation structures that are developed also create resource dependence, 
monitoring, and accountability challenges that are less tractable when programs are 
housed within single public agencies (Frederickson and Stazyk 2010)—thus setting 
the stage for additional leverage for private actors over policy implementation.  This 
“amplifying effect” also sets the stage for disappointments, if not failures, in reforms, 
which diminish citizen faith in government and provoke either the next crisis or 
future calls for administrative reform—at which point, the cycle begins anew. 
Failure to recognize this realpolitik lies at the heart of mistaking increasing levels of 
state activism in response to crises for a major aggrandizement of state power and a 
commensurate loss of power for private enterprise.  To see how and why this is the 
case, we turn next to the empirical foundations of these claims.
Discerning the Forest from the Trees
To paraphrase Kierkegaard’s famous observation, “We live our lives forward, 
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but understand them backwards.”1  Given the anti-state, pro-market, and 
competitive cultural foundations of the United States, creating a “government out 
of sight” was the default option of American leaders in the wake of crises in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (e.g., the Whiskey Rebellion, the War of 1812, 
and the depressions of 1819, 1837, and 1873) (Balogh 2009; Howe 1979; Wilentz 
2005).  During the nation’s first century, they did so by, among other things, relying 
on tariffs collected atAmerican ports rather than on internal taxes; by depending on 
the decentralized nature of local government with its watchful eye on the judiciary; 
by subsidizing and giving tax-free deals for settling and developing western lands 
and infrastructure; and by not recognizing a distinction “between state and civil 
society or, for that matter, public and private roles for citizens” (Balogh 2009, 
24).  In this sense, energetic government by the state came packaged through the 
talents of all sectors (public, private, and nonprofit) rather than through reforms 
dominated by the national government.  Wrought also in the nineteenth century 
was a linkage between markets and citizenship that helped further put the United 
States on a networked, cross-sectoral governance path.  Indeed, during the first 
three decades of the nineteenth century, the notions of democracy and capitalism 
themselves became linked in Americans’ minds to create an enduring “myth of 
national identity” (Howe 1979).  Even the Civil War did not leave as its legacy 
a “permanent autonomous federal bureaucracy” (Skocpol 1992, 68) as a result of 
Southern reactions to Recontruction.
However, a critical juncture of claims that existing administrative structures 
were not up to the task of contemporary problems combined with enduring cultural 
predilections to launch the Progressive reform movement of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.  Progressives saw existing governance structures as 
unable to cope with, for example, health and safety problems in urban areas where 
immigrants congregated.  These structures were also incapable of ending the 
corruption of political machines dependent on immigrants for electoral support. 
Likewise mismatched were state regulatory authorities with a burgeoning industrial 
system that crossed state lines, along with international economic, industrial, and 
foreign policy threats that reformers said only professionalization and executive-
centered government could allay.  Madisonian checks-and-balances were too 
cumbersome, slow, and amateurish to cope with these challenges and would put the 
United States  at a commercial and military disadvantage.
The 1880s witnessed the most dynamic period of economic growth in 
the United States since the Civil War, but it was largely concentrated in rural, 
1 Kierkegaard appears to have expressed this concept over time in a variety of forms.  See, e.g., Alexander Dru, 
ed. and trans., The Journals of Søren Kierkegaard (London:  Oxford University Press, 1951), 127 (“It is perfectly true, 
as philosophers say, that life must be understood backwards.  But they forget the other proposition, that is must 
be lived forwards.” [1843, Entry 465]) ; Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, eds. and trans., Søren Kierkegaard’s 
Journals and Papers (Bloomington, Ind.:  Indiana University Press, 1967), I:449 (“Life can be interpreted only 
after it has been experienced . . . .” (1838, Entry 1025], 450 (“Philosophy is perfectly right in saying that life must 
be understood backwards.  But then one forgets the other clause—that it must be lived forwards.” [1843, Entry 
1030]), 469 (“The sad thing about us human beings is really that in almost everything in our lives hindsight is 
best; that is, after we have done something, often badly, then we know how we should have done it.” (1849, Entry 
1074]; see also William James, Essays on Radical Empiricism (London: Longmans Green, 1922), 238 (“ . . . a saying 
of Kierkegaard’s to the effect that we live forwards, but we understand backwards.”) (quoted in Hong & Hong, eds., 
Journals and Papers, I:537 n.553).
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sole proprietary business ventures.  That era observed the beginnings of trade 
associations of businesses, but nowhere near the proliferation that came during 
the Progressive Era (e.g., the Indianapolis Monetary Commission, the National 
Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the National 
Foreign Trade Council).  Indeed, as Lears (2009) argues, commerce and courage 
were linked in many minds to the manly virtues that an “overciviliz[ed]” Gilded Age 
and Victorian society had been jeopardizing since the end of the Civil War.
However, with the Panic of 1893, the nation went through a financial 
depression unparalleled since the 1819 and 1837 depressions and not experienced 
again until the Great Depression of the mid-twentieth century.  Lasting four years, 
the devastation of the 1893 depression was immense and is typically seen as the 
wellspring of the Populist movement that preceded the regulatory agenda-setting 
efforts of the Progressive reform movement.  Also contributing to these movements 
was the rampant labor unrest spawned by a reconstruction of American capitalism 
that followed in the wake of the Panic of 1893.  The result was an unprecedented 
corporate reorganization of American industry, especially in the form of a noticeable 
increase in industrial mergers.  While approximately 20 industrial corporate 
consolidations had resulted from merger activity since the 1880s and 1890s, nearly 
300 industrial corporate consolidations had occurred by 1904 (Sklar 1988, 45-46).
Underlying these trends was a growing recognition by business—large and 
small alike—that classic economic liberalism was now obsolete.  Its focus on 
rugged individualism, localism, and competition that was so central to the nation’s 
economic development in the early to mid-1800s, an era of largely rural and 
proprietary capitalism (small artisan and business competition), was no longer 
working to the nation’s advantage.  Competition, corporate capitalists averred, was 
“socially inefficient,” wasteful of resources, and unnecessary with the revolution 
of mechanization in America.  Cooperation, coordination, and the application 
of scientific principles to industry management was their preferred solution. 
Meanwhile, small business wanted protection from large producers.  Thus, for 
different reasons, both wanted a “government of laws, not of persons.”  They saw this 
as conducive to a favorable investment environment, techno-economic progress, 
interclass cooperation, and social stability—in short, “clean government” and “social 
efficiency” (Sklar 1988, 30-31).
As this “revolution of cooperation” or “cooperative commonwealth” took root 
(Weinstein 1968), labor unrest occurred on a scale seldom seen before or since. 
During the 1880s and 1890s, the “efficiency” focus of corporations sparked a 
working-class “national strike day” in 1886 to demand an eight-hour workday. 
Wage cuts also contributed to repeated and sometimes violent strikes involving 
hundreds of thousands of unskilled industrial workers, with unrest spiking in 1877, 
1886, 1892, and 1893 (Trachtenberg 2007, 88-89).  Concomitantly, traditional 
definitions of responsibility that were associated with individuals were redefined 
by corporate interests in the National Civic Federation (see more below) as “socially 
responsible” behavior—defined partially as not fomenting economic class divisions.
In the midst of this unrest, both the large and small business communities 
had common interests in advancing some form of regulatory agenda.  Small 
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business was disenchanted with laissez-faire competition and wanted it curtailed 
by regulation.  For larger businesses, politics was too unpredictable, inefficient 
(because of patronage), and responsive to untutored public opinion to afford a stable, 
predictable, and safe business environment.  At the same time, many middle-class 
social Progressive reformers, small business leaders, and corporate leaders agreed 
that regulatory reform was a “counterpoise to the threat of working class revolution” 
occasioned by repeated labor turbulence (Weinstein 1968, xi (quoting Sidney 
Kaplan, “Social Engineers as Saviours:  Effects of World War I on Some American 
Liberals,” Journal of the History of Ideas 17 ( June 1956): 354-55)).  This occurred 
as a business movement successfully ensured a twentieth century-oriented “state 
intervention to supervise corporate activity, rather than a [nineteenth-century] 
movement for the removal of state control over private enterprise” (Ibid., xiii).
Consequently, in a pattern that reproduces and amplifies itself 
throughoutAmerican history in the wake of crises, the halfway, halting, patchworked, 
and layered implementation structures that were created to accommodate 
the disparate aims of this Baptist-bootlegger coalition frequently came about 
in ways advocated by the regulated community.  These structures ultimately 
allowed historically privileged interests to ensure longer-term power, access, and 
influence to shape subsequent regulatory agendas, enforcement aggressiveness, and 
enforcement targets.  For example, industry associations actually lobbied in favor 
of what were typically seen as Progressive reforms creating independent regulatory 
commissions (IRCs)—such as the Interstate Commerce Commission and the 
Chemistry Bureau (charged with implementing the Pure Food and Drug Act of 
1906)—for the purpose of reining in the “malefactors of wealth.”  Kolko chronicles, 
for example, how “any measure of importance in the Progressive Era was not merely 
endorsed by key representatives of businesses involved; rather such bills were first 
proposed by them” (Kolko 1963, 283; see also Hofstadter 1989; Wiebe 1967). 
As Weinstein puts it, traditional liberalism favoring free markets morphed into 
“corporate liberalism” (Weinstein 1968, xi-xiv, 3).
Corporate liberalism, however, also appealed to the enfranchised, well-educated 
citizens, the rising professional class, and social reform leaders.  It did so by “granting 
them status and influence as spokesmen for their constituents on the condition 
only that they defend the framework” offered, which favored business-oriented 
agendas and implementation structures (Weinstein 1968, xiv; see also Sklar 1988; 
Trachtenberg 2007; Wiebe 1967).  For example, the National Civic Federation, 
a coalition of largely corporate businessmen founded in 1900,established the 
principle of tripartite—business, labor, and public—representation in politics 
(Sklar 1988; Weinstein 1968, xv).
Historians often portray the end of the Progressive Era in 1920 as a function 
of the citizenry’s tiring of the moral proselytizing of the social reformers involved 
(McGerr 2003).  However, a less-recognized faction of the Progressive reform 
movement continued in the form of the “associationalism” movement.  Nevertheless, 
associationalism, too, produced administrative approaches to existing and projected 
crises that resulted in the advantaging of market over state interests.  Dubbed the 
“associative state” (Hawley 1974), Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover most 
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notably championed this alternative model.  Associationalism was premised on 
government-stimulated voluntary cooperation to address public problems, with 
direct federal government intervention being a last resort if private and civic 
volunteerism failed (Kennedy 2005).  For the proponents of associationalism, 
properly educated and self-governing businesses, state and local governments, 
voluntary organizations, and professional associations informed by data analyses 
provided by federal agencies would willingly tackle any problems or crises identified 
(Hofstadter 1989).
Nor did the associationalist elements of the Progressive Era fade away as 
popularly portrayed.  Rather, its public-private partnership components were 
marbled into the administrative state during the New Deal and in subsequent 
decades (e.g., Burner 1978; Clemens 2006; Hawley 1974).  Hart, for example, argues 
that due to the “shadow of the welfare state and the warfare state, the associative 
state has survived” and “advocacy [has occurred] on its behalf in virtually every 
Administration” since FDR’s (Hart 1994, 30).  The justifications offered for each 
iteration of associationalism from the 1960s on have been highly reminiscent of 
previous administrative reform movements in the wake of alleged crises, stressing as 
they have gaps in governance capacity to deal with societal problems.  These include 
President Kennedy’s expansion of associationalist public-private partnerships 
to the textile and construction industries in the face of global competition, the 
Carter Administration’s plans for “generic technology” and a government-industry-
labor economic revitalization board to compete with international competitors, 
and the Atari-Democrat fascination with the Japanese Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry in the face of cooperative mercantilism abroad in the 1980s. 
Associationalist “heirs” in the Reagan and Clinton Administrations persistently 
tried “to replace the adversarial relationships [among businesses] that they thought 
placed American firms at a disadvantage in the world economy” (Hart 1994, 27).
The 1980s and 1990s also witnessed continuing movement toward public-
private hybrid organizations pushed by associationalists during the 1920s, including 
the now discredited Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Koppell 2003).  These were all 
efforts to shape a “new kind of governmental agency, one that sought not to regulate. 
. . but to make private groups more statesmanlike and hence better able to cope 
with modern conditions and problems” (William Hard, as quoted in Hawley 1981, 
3).  However, problems quickly arose, especially in the consumer protection policy 
arena and its fate in Congress.  These problems were presaged in patterns over the 
past four decades in interest-group testimony before congressional committees. 
Not only is this arguably a surrogate for interest-group policy access, but it also 
highlights the policy predilections of members of Congress over time because 
they control witness lists.   By whatever measure, prior research on interest groups 
suggests that the “ordinary task of advocating for protecting consumers is left to a 
small and shrinking community of organizations and a very few individual voices” 
(Bykerk and Maney 2010-2011, 653).
Political science researchers have discerned several trends from 1987 to 2006 
(from the 100th Congress to the 109th Congress) that illustrate the constitutive 
effects of public policy and that set the stage for continued layering without 
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learning (Bykerk and Maney 2010-2011).  First, consumer protection remained 
a consistent issue in Congress during the entire time span.  In fact, hearings in the 
House consistently expanded over this time period, from a low of seven after the 
Republican Party takeover of the House in 1994 to a high of nineteen in the 106th 
Congress.
Second, a decided and persistent gap favoring business over consumer group 
participation in hearings developed during the Republican years, with the 104th 
Congress sustaining the most significant gap.  In the 104th Congress, business 
interests constituted seventy-four percent of all groups giving testimony.  In the 
years since, consumer group testimony plummeted even further, never exceeding 
twelve percent of the total number of appearances by all groups and falling to a 
low of four percent in 2004.  Moreover, while there were ninety-one consumer 
protection groups identified in a study of interest-group testimony between 1970 
and 1986, the 1987 to 2006 study identified only thirty-three consumer groups 
testifying (Bykerk and Maney 1991-1992).  What is more, with the dominance of 
peak associations such as the Chamber of Commerce and the National Association 
of Manufacturers, it is clear that business perceived a sense of common interest in 
advancing its agenda.
Third, business participation never fell below fifty-five percent of the total 
number of interest groups testifying on consumer protection between the 100th 
Congress and 108th Congress.  This means that even if all other participants in 
those hearings are combined (e.g., labor unions, consumer groups, state attorneys 
general, think tanks, and independent experts such as university professors), they 
are still competing for influence with businesses and associations of considerable 
political clout (e.g., the American Council of Life Insurers, the American Bankers 
Association, the Independent Bankers Association, the Chamber of Commerce, 
the National Retail Federation, and the National Association of Manufacturers). 
Other research indicates that consumer groups did not fare any better with 
individual legislators during this era at the federal level (Bykerk 2008) and that 
campaign contributions to state election candidates were sometimes advancing 
conservative interests (Witko and Newmark 2005).
Finally, scholarship indicates that federal and state agency rulemaking during 
the 1990s did not escape inordinate business influence in relationship to consumer 
interests.  Especially profound has been the role of business and professional 
associations at each stage of the rulemaking process.  Premised on prior research, 
there is little doubt that interest-group involvement in the development of rules 
is deep and influential.  Research by Golden (1998), Kamieniecki (2006), and 
Yackee and Yackee (2006) has found a bias toward business participation in the 
process.  For example, in a study examining over thirty regulations from four 
different agencies, Yackee and Yackee (2006) found that over fifty-seven percent of 
public comments came from business interests.  Likewise, survey data from studies 
conducted by Furlong and Kerwin (2005) suggest that businesses, and the trade 
associations that represent businesses and professions, were (and remain) involved 
in rulemaking more often than are other groups.   While others have found that 
influence varies across stages of the regulatory process, it nonetheless raises the 
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specter of a concentrated strategy to advance industry interests in this venue (Kraft 
and Kamieniecki 2007).
These trends in Congress were the predicate for the self-regulatory 
preoccupation by its members that led to the 2007-2008 financial crisis and its 
aftermath.  For starters, the 1999 Gramm-Leech-Bliley Act (henceforth, the GLB 
Act) repealed the Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act (more formally, the Banking 
Act of 1933).  This made it possible for commercial (and not just investment) 
banks, as well as unregulated hedge funds and over-the-counter (OTC) traders, to 
participate in highly profitable, exorbitantly opaque, and risky speculative schemes 
involving the securitization of prime and subprime mortgages.  Touted as a system 
that would diffuse risk among a large number of securities holders and thus create 
a more “shock-proof ” global financial system, securitization had precisely the 
opposite effect (Helleiner 2011).  Within ten years, most of the risks were held by 
a relatively small number of institutions that were deemed “too big to fail.”  Indeed, 
the GLB Act had intensified competitive pressures among these institutions, 
prompting many of the largest to embrace mortgage securitization as they watched 
competitors’ profits rise.
Dovetailing with this, Congress placed pressures on Freddie Mac and Fannie 
Mae to buy more subprime mortgages, pressures that interacted in deleterious 
ways with other regulatory actions reflecting the influence of the financial industry 
in regulatory structures.  Still, private lenders remained the prime underwriters 
of subprime loans.  The financial industry had been creating new financial 
instruments such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt 
obligations (CDS).  These allowed mortgage lenders to worry less about the risks 
they were assuming in awarding mortgage loans because they sold them to others. 
They also masked the risks that underwriters were accepting.  This occurred as 
a spate of private firms entered the market, bundling prime and risky subprime 
mortgages into MBS packages.  In turn, these were often subdivided and sold as 
CDS packages.  Concomitantly, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
further reduced risks to investment banks for getting into mortgage securitization 
schemes by lifting a 12:1 leverage ratio.
While all this was happening, regulators created “market-friendly” 
accountability structures that “trusted private actors to self-regulate” (Porter 2005). 
In 2000, Congress ratified a veritable laissez-faire regulatory environment for OTC 
derivatives trading.  In addition, regulators adopted and implemented standards 
developed by the industry itself when it came to derivatives, accounting, and hedge-
fund management.  In the process, elected officials and regulators privatized the 
tasks of valuing market risks and assets to credit-rating firms whose compensation 
schemes depended on undervaluing risk.  Eventually, the opaqueness of the 
financial instruments created nearly froze lending in the United States and abroad. 
Not knowing which lenders held risky subprime debt in their portfolios destroyed 
confidence in the entire system.
Also illustrative of self-regulatory emphases of the era were developments 
in international financial markets.  Paradoxically, these efforts started with the 
creation of the Basil Accords in 1988, which were subsequently updated between 
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1998 and 2004.  The aim of the accords—collectively known as Basil II—in the 
wake of financial crises in Mexico (1994) and East Asia (1997-1998) was to create 
common capital standards to reduce threats to global financial markets.  The rub 
was that these standards did not apply to the primary protagonists in securitization 
(viz., investment banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies).  Among other self-
regulatory devices, Basil II also allowed banks to use their own internally generated 
value-at-risk models to determine their risk reserve, and they created only voluntary 
standards for credit-rating organizations (Helleiner 2011).
Consonant, as well, the 1990s saw a movement by elected officials worldwide to 
shift financial regulatory power to their treasury departments.  As Roberts (2010) 
explains, a two-track “logic of discipline” reminiscent of the politics-administration 
dichotomy again took root as nations shifted financial authority to finance ministers 
and erected legal restraints on borrowing and spending.  This time it was not hordes 
of immigrants and political machines that required shifting policy decisions to 
experts who would apply their technocratic skills to public problems in rational 
ways unavailable to the masses.  As one anonymous official in the UK Treasury put 
it in 1987, “Parliament is incapable of exercising its financial responsibilities.  We 
must do it for them” (Roberts 2010, 47).  Meanwhile, in the United States, former 
Federal Reserve Chair Alan Blinder argued that the country would be better off 
if more policy decisions were taken out of the “political thicket” and placed with 
“unelected technocrats” (Roberts 2010, 47).
Given the logic of isomorphism, nations faced with spiraling federal spending, 
mounting debt, and what some called “fiscal drift” began shifting increasing 
amounts of fiscal power to their finance ministries.  In the short run, the strategy 
appeared effective as deficits began to decline, which further reinforced lock-in and 
isomorphism of these approaches.  In the long run, however, their flawed logic was 
that technocrats in finance ministries could constrain the out-of-control spending 
habits of legislatures and other agencies.  However, the power of the treasury was 
only good as long as a crisis existed (Roberts 2010).  Then, in 2007, the finance 
ministries became the biggest spenders of all in trying to pull the world back from 
financial collapse.  Subsequently, as Roberts points out and the Tea Party and the 
Occupy Wall Street movements in the United States  attest, this approach seemed 
so antithetical to democratic accountability once things went very badly that 
populist revolts from the Right and Left subsequently ensued.
“Layering without Learning” in the Post-Financial Crisis 
Era
Market deregulatory efforts seem to have come disastrously home to roost in 
the 2007-2008 global financial meltdown.  The same aggressive state initiatives 
that prompt calls of a new Leviathan, if not socialism, in America are accompanied 
by implementation structures which assure that market interests continue to 
have access and influence in the distribution of resources, regulatory power, and 
legal enforcement.  Consider, for example, the Bush Administration’s Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.  The act created within the Treasury 
Department the Toxic Asset Recovery Program, which was to purchase troubled 
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assets and equity from financial institutions to deal with the subprime mortgage 
crisis.  The program subsequently contracted out the bulk of its asset-management 
functions to between five and ten large private sector asset-management firms. 
A “bare-bones internal staff of about two dozen people” (rather than career 
bureaucrats) were hired to oversee how these firms spent the first $250 billion of 
the recovery plan (Landler and Andrews 2008).
Likewise, much of the economic stimulus package (the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009) that passed in the early weeks of the Obama 
Administration involved money for pass-through funding to states and localities 
and private sector subsidies, albeit with line items for some capacity rebuilding 
in the federal government.  Relatedly, President Obama’s Treasury Secretary, 
Timothy Geithner, relied heavily on public-private partnerships to buy up toxic 
bank assets.  Certainly, grants to subnational governments and contracts to private 
and nonprofit organizations have strings attached, but reams of intergovernmental 
and implementation research demonstrate that bargaining and mutual adaptation 
characterize these efforts (Hill and Hupe 2009).
Next, the Financial Reform Act of 2010 (henceforth, FINREG) was designed 
to deal with flaws in the existing financial regulatory structure.  FINREG is too 
massive to consider in all its aspects in this article.  Clearly, however, the new law 
represents an improvement over the status quo in a variety of ways.  These include 
the early resolution authority that FINREG provides as an antidote to “too big 
to fail” institutions, and its closing of gap-ridden existing regulation that caused 
lapses in oversight which nearly brought the world’s global economy to its knees. 
Still, FINREG also created a significantly increased and unprecedented role for the 
Treasury Department within government (Cho 2010, A1).  For example, Treasury 
acquired sweeping new power to shape bank regulation, oversee financial markets, 
and review the regulations issued by a new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB).  Importantly, however, it did not acquire the ability to regulate Freddie 
Mac and Fannie Mae, organizations whose lending practices led to the mortgage 
crisis.  Nor does the CFPB have direct regulatory authority for all banks (indeed, it 
regulates approximately ten percent of banks).
The CFPB inherited regulatory authorities from existing (or “legacy”) financial 
regulatory agencies that failed to perform adequately during the financial crises, 
but which did not go away.  These authorities included not only those under the 
Truth in Lending Act, but also those under six other financial regulatory statutes. 
Moreover, the CFPB was located within the Federal Reserve and overseen by a 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) designed appropriately to take a 
systemic view of the financial markets that was lacking in the past.  The council 
consists of representatives from all the other seven financial regulators.  The 
chairman of the council is, again, the Treasury Secretary.
Each of these design features ensures the continuing access and influence of the 
legacy financial regulators that failed to perform adequately.  To be sure, the CFPB 
was given an independent budget when Congress guaranteed that it would receive 
increasing percentages of the budget allocated to the Federal Reserve (rising from 
ten to thirteen percent).  It can also ask Congress for additional funding.  However, 
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the FSOC has the ability to reverse, stall, or drop any regulation issued.  Moreover, 
the location of the CFPB in the Federal Reserve also suggests that consumer 
protection will face an uphill battle in a culture focused historically on stability and 
safety of the system rather than on consumer protection.  Furthermore, creating the 
CFPB with a dual mission of protecting consumers while assuring the safety and 
viability of the system as a whole will make the CFPB susceptible to policy swings 
in the political appointees who leadthe bureau.  Meanwhile, the fragmented and 
layered structure that requires the CFPB to coordinate (e.g., gain information from 
legacy regulators) and work with state regulators to advance consumer protection 
affords a variety of other veto points for the banking industry.
To be sure, advances have been made and others are still evolving.  However, 
they are advances that have, to date, to be wrenched from financial interests largely 
on their terms.  Overall, as one of the most informed observers of the financial scene, 
Michael Lewis, argues,American financial stress tests are nowhere near as stringent 
as they should be.  He is joined by European critics who have argued that the first 
two rounds of stress tests conducted by the European Banking Authority in the 
European Union (EU) were similarly deficient (Taiti 2011).  For example, two of 
the largest Irish banks that survived stress tests failed within months of evaluation, 
leading to that country’s financial bailout by the IMF and the EU.  Meanwhile, 
credit default swaps still remain largely unregulated, rating agencies that were 
complicit in the mortgage crisis remain largely untouched, and the sinewy bounds 
between Goldman Sachs Chase and the Treasury Department remain unabated.
Conclusion
This article has examined how the American political system has historically 
reacted to crises—financial or otherwise—since its founding.  It has offered a 
framework for understanding repeated patterns of privileging business interests, 
as well how and why American exceptionalist values help privilege those interests 
because of such features as anti-statism, individual liberty, classic economic 
liberalism, and the folklore of competitive capitalism as opposed to the reality of 
administered capitalism since the early 1900s.  In the process, it has shown the 
persistent allure and path dependency of nongovernmental implementation 
structures; of implementation structures designed to ensure future access and 
influence for those interests (regulated or otherwise); and of halfway, halting, and 
patchworked regulatory structures layered atop each other in America’s Madisonian 
system to compromise effectiveness.  It has done all of this, it is hoped, in ways 
that call readers’ attention to the fallacy of assuming that today’s aggressive federal 
legislation should be equated with a move toward state dominance of markets or to 
the rise of socialism inthe United States.
As mentioned earlier, however, one should not assume that a massive 
conspiracy controlled by business is underway.  Equally misguided is assuming 
that no progress is being made toward addressing the social ills that are negative 
externalities of markets.  Progress has been made historically and in contemporary 
times.  However, path dependency means that the alternatives for addressing such 
market challenges are constrained by, among other things, early choices made; the 
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sequencing of events and the conjuncture of others; and changing interests and 
conflicts within and across authority structures in the United States.  Only when 
shifts in secular trends arise, exogenous shocks occur to the system, supporting 
coalitions disintegrate, or the interests of those advantaged by existing structures 
shift do new reform movements arise and then go through the cycle depicted in 
this article.  Moreover, in these instances, even massive shocks to the system are 
insufficient for fundamental change.  Policy spaces are too crowded, institutional 
interrelationships in policy spaces too intertwined, and the dynamics of the legislative 
process so demanding of concessions to the status quo that nonincremental change 
disadvantaging business to the advantage of state power is unlikely absent a total 
breakdown of system legitimacy.
Thus, those expecting, hoping for, or lamenting that the “new interventionism” 
in the United States means a period of state dominance over markets ignore not 
only the power of the past to shape the present, but also the powerful, protean, 
and durable sway of American exceptionalist values.  These affect the nation’s 
predilection for networked, cross-sectoral solutions to public problems.  Put most 
simply, market and nonprofit solutions to public problems are an easier “sell” to 
the American polity, consonant as they are with American exceptionalist values. 
Such solutions also are marbled throughout a Madisonian system that diffuses 
responsibility among actors, affords multiple access points to policy making by 
disparate actors, and necessarily layers new implementation structures atop old 
ones.  The networked state is here to stay, as it has been throughout American 
history in times of normalcy and in the wake of crises.
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Prospects for the Future Administration of 
Elections
Robert M. Stein, Rice University
Introduction
Where, when, and the how American voters cast their ballots has become 
highly variable.  We do not all vote on the same day, we vote at a host of different 
places, and we do so on a cornucopia of types of voting equipment ranging from 
paper ballots to sophisticated electronic voting machines.  In this context, trying to 
predict what the future conduct of elections will look like in the next half century 
is daunting and requires a well-planned strategy.  In this essay, I offer both a way 
of understanding and predicting how elections might be conducted in the future. 
This essay is not intended to be a prescriptionbut, rather, is intended to provide a 
conjecture about the future of the administration of elections in democratic systems. 
Further, this essay is not about how elections are contested, who wins, why, and 
the consequences of electoral outcomes for governance.  Instead, I am concerned 
with how we conduct our elections, with the impact of our election procedures 
on who votes and for what offices, and with whether the voters’ performances and 
evaluations of their voting experiences vary with the way elections are conducted.
In the next section, I identify the goals associated with the administration of 
elections in democratic systems of government.  Each goal is briefly described and 
assessed in terms of current practices, (mostly, but not exclusively in the United 
States) constraints, and impediments to achieving these goals.  In section three, I 
identify what practices pursuant to these core goals of election administration we 
might expect in the future.  I assume that predicting the administrative conduct of 
elections in the future requires that we understand the constraints and incentives for 
achieving the core goals of election administration and the trade-offs between each 
goal.  Within this framework I identify some of the political, economic, social, and 
technological trends that might impact election practices and their consequences 
for governance.
The Goals of Election Administration
In democratic systems of governance, we primarily hold elections in order 
to choose persons to govern on our behalf.1  Contesting candidates who receive 
the most votes are selected to govern.  Of course, the consequences of elections 
for governance are myriad and beyond the scope of this paper.  I identify five core 
functions and goals for the administration of elections.  These include:
•	 Assuring that all persons who are eligible to vote can register to vote. 
•	 Assuring that all persons who want to vote are able to vote.
•	 Assuring that all voter choices are accurately recorded. 
1 Other elections direct and enact policy in the form of referenda and initiatives.
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•	 Assuring that all votes are accurately counted. 
•	 Assuring that all voters have a positive and confident voting experience.
Voter Registration
In the United States, the determination of who is eligible to vote is a shared 
responsibility between the states and the federal government.  The Constitution, 
Supreme Court decisions, and Congress determine who may be eligible to vote in 
federal elections.  The states and their localities have authority to regulate this right 
by requiring voters to be registered to vote before balloting.  Requirements for voter 
registration directly and indirectly limit who is eligible to vote and thus who have 
access to the ballot.  Several states place limitations on who can register to vote, as 
in the case of excluding convicted felons from participating in the voting process. 
The most onerous constraint voter registration requirements place on voting is the 
requirement to be registered before election day in order to vote.  This requirement 
varies across states but essentially requires that a citizen reside for a minimum 
period of time (e.g., 30 days before an election) at the same address in order to be 
eligible to vote.
Voter registration requirements are a relatively recent practice that began in the 
late nineteenth century (see Bensel 2004) to avoid voter fraud.  The goal of ballot 
access for eligible voters is weighed against the competing goal of avoiding election 
fraud.  Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) and others (Squire et al. 1987; Rhine 
1996) have shown that voter registration requirements suppress voter participation 
among otherwise eligible voters and particularly among the most residentially 
mobile portions of the population (the poor and young).  Squire et al. (1987) 
conservatively estimate that turnout would increase by nine percent with election 
day voter registration, which is currently practiced in ten states.  Voter participation 
might be expected to increase significantly if voter registration requirements were 
eliminated or if registration were allowed on election day, or whenever one voted.
One such improvement in the voter registration system is the development 
of a single, uniform, and interactive computerized statewide voter registration list, 
maintained and operated by the state or federal government.  Locally maintained 
voter registration lists are often inaccurate, out of date, and thus an obstacle to 
voters who have recently moved to the area.  The Help American Vote Act of 2002 
(HAVA) required that states have a statewide voter registration database in place 
by 2004.  To date, less than half of the states have complied with this requirement 
of HAVA.
Enhancing Voter Turnout
In the 2000 Current Population Survey, the modal response to the question, 
“Why did you not vote in the 2000 Presidential election?” was, “Too busy.” 
Enhancing the likelihood that registered voters will go to the polls may require 
extensive campaign activities, a fundamental change in attitude toward government, 
or the removal of obstacles that prevent an individual from voting (e.g., access to 
transportation).
One way to think about voting is that it is inconvenient or at least competing 
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with other interests, including work, shopping, school, and recreation.  People who 
might want to vote will not because they choose to engage in some other activity 
on election day.  Many states have endeavored to make voting more convenient by 
authorizing relaxed requirements for absentee mail-in ballots, permanent absentee 
mail-in voting, all-mail elections, in-person early voting, and, in the case of overseas 
military personnel, internet voting.2
The evidence is mixed and weak, however, as to whether convenience voting 
actually enhances voter participation, particularly among those who historically do 
not vote.  Since its adoption in Texas in 1988, for instance, early voting has not been 
associated with a significant increase in voter turnout in that state, especially among 
individuals who historically do not vote, such as the younger generations and racial 
and ethnic minorities (Stein 1998; Stein and Garcia-Monet 1997; Berinsky et al. 
2001; Berinsky 2005).  Allowing people to vote up to two weeks before election 
day at a variety of locations that are more proximate to where people work, shop, 
and travel maybe more convenient for voters; but it is only more convenient to those 
who already vote on election day.  Extensive research in a host of states with in-
person early voting over the last twenty years has failed to show that early voting 
significantly increases turnout (Berinsky 2005).  Moreover, the evidence is that in-
person early voting actually increases the likelihood that those who already vote on 
election day will be more likely to cast a ballot when they are afforded more days, 
times, and places to vote.
Of course, the reason for this unfulfilled promise of early voting is simple; voters 
do not vote early if they do not know for whom they are going to vote.  Exit polls 
have consistently shown that early voters are strong partisans, ideologues, attentive, 
and informed citizens. They know about early voting, and most importantly, their 
vote choices have been made well before election day.  Election day voters are 
significantly less likely to have strong partisan and ideological preferences, are less 
interested in and informed about politics and political campaigns, and are far more 
likely to make their vote decisions just before election day (Stein 1998).
Like in-person early voting, election day polling centers afford citizens the 
opportunity to vote at any polling place—not just one location.  The centers are 
located at large venues, including shopping malls, hotels, and even car dealerships. 
To date, the research has shown that affording election day voters the ‘“conveniences”‘ 
of early voting increases turnout between four percent and seven percent (Stein and 
Vonnahme 2008; Brady and McNulty 2004; Dyck et al. 2005).  Most importantly, 
the positive effect election day polling centers have on turnout is greater for 
individuals who are infrequent rather than frequent voters.  The lessons learned 
from early voting can be applied to election day voting with the desired effect—
increased voter turnout among those who historically are too busy to vote (Stein 
and Vonnahme 2010; Gimbel and Schuknecht 2003).
Mail-in ballots can also increase voter turnout.  For instance, Oregon, which 
has the most extensive and widespread experience with mail-in voting, moved to 
an all-mail ballot in 1998.  To date, the evidence suggests that voter turnout has 
increased by ten percent since the adoption of all-mail voting in Oregon (Richey 
2 Several states, including Arizona and Michigan, have conducted partisan primary elections on the internet.
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2008).  In constrast, Richey’s analysis and others (Hamner and Traugott 2004; 
Karp and Banducci 2000; 2001; Kousser and Mullin 2007) show that states 
that have adopted in-person early voting or permanent mail-in voting have not 
experienced a significant increase in voter turnout.  The lessons learned from 
states with all-mail elections and election day polling centers seem to offer the best 
prospects for enhanced voter participation.  While voter turnout is a major concern 
during elections, accurately recording votes presents another challenge to the voting 
process.
Accurately Recording Vote Choices (The Usability of Voting Systems)
Persistent problems in voting administration are often the result of errors 
associated with the casting of ballots. An error occurs when what is recorded does 
not reflect the intent of the voter.  On a paper ballot, this may result from “mismarks” 
when voters fail to properly mark the box, circle, or bubble on their paper ballots 
for their chosen candidates.  The residual vote is defined as the difference between 
the number of voters who come to the polls to vote and the number of votes cast 
per ballot contest.  When the number of votes cast for any one race is less than the 
total number of ballots cast, we observe an undercount.  Related to the incidence 
of undercounts are weak and anemic candidate campaigns that fail to inform and 
mobilize voters.  Voting equipment, long lines, and ineffectual poll workers can 
operate to deter voters from casting a complete ballot (Bernstein et al. 2001).
In contrast, overcounts happen when voters improperly mark or select more 
than one ballot choice for a single contest.  These ballots are invariably voided because 
voter intent cannot be readily determined (Knack and Kropf 2003).  This problem 
became famous and problematic during the recount of the 2000 presidential ballots 
in Florida where an assortment of punch card voting systems produced overcounts 
(Kimall et al. forthcoming). In the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election, 
Congress enacted legislation that banned some voting systems, most notably punch 
cards, and funded the purchase of electronic voting machines in federal elections.
New voting technologies, unfamiliar even to the most frequent voter, can lead 
voters to unintentionally fail to record their preferred vote choice. Overcounts are 
most often attributed to ballot design, voting technologies, and the interaction of 
these factors with voter attributes (e.g., education, age, and related physical acuity). 
Here human factors interact with technology and ballot design to produce errors 
similar to those observed with the use and operation of consumer products (Greene, 
Byrne,  and Everett 2006; Everett, Byrne, and Greene 2006; Laskowski et al. 2004; 
Roth 1998).
Using different methodologies (i.e., experimental and aggregate studies), 
research settings (precincts, cities, and states), as well a mix of different voting 
technologies, the researchers have found that paper ballots are significantly 
superior to lever machines, direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines, 
and punched cards in reducing the residual votes (White 1960; Asher et al. 1982; 
Shocket, Heighberger, and Brown 1992; Nichols and Strizek 1995; Knack and 
Kropf 2003; Kimball, Owens, and Keeney 2004; Ansolabehere and Stewart 2005). 
The congruity of these rankings, however, does not provide an unambiguous 
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explanation for voting technology’s effect on the residual vote.  Conditions unique to 
each technology may interact with human factors and local election administration 
to influence the residual vote.  Moreover, the actual impact of voting technology 
on residual votes may be exaggerated.  Voters “may intentionally abstain in a 
particular race” (Ansolabehere and Stewart 2005, 369) because of disinterest, lack 
of information, or no preferred choice among the contesting candidates.  There are 
conditions that cannot be attributed to any alternative voting technology nor readily 
measured with aggregate/precinct level designs.  “The incidence of uncounted and 
spoiled ballots depends strongly and systematically on [the] ‘county’ in addition to 
equipment. We conjecture that this county effect is substantially the result of local 
institutions of electoral administration, such as the administration of local polling 
places or advance instruction to voters” (Ansolabehere and Stewart 2005, 386).
The usability of a voting technology refers to the efficient and timely manner 
with which voter cast their ballots and voters’ confidence and satisfaction with the 
voting technology (Brennen Center 2006).  Usability can directly contribute to 
voter error and an increase in residual votes cast.  The literature on human factors 
and human computer interactions identifies several principals for the design of 
voting technologies directed at improving the voting experience.  Among the metrics 
recommended for usability by the Federal Election Assistance Commission are a 
lower error rate for marking the ballot, efficient operation, and voter satisfaction 
(EAC 2005).
The tradeoffs between different technologies may be influenced by how 
elections are administered and where they are held (i.e., the polling place location). 
There is evidence that the performance of different voting technologies is dependent 
on the quantity and quality of election day poll workers (Alvarez and Hall 2006; 
Hall, Monson, and Patterson 2007; Atkeson and Saunders 2007).  The number 
of adequately trained election day poll workers may have a direct impact on 
voter usability, satisfaction, and confidence with different voting technologies.  In 
addition, the place where one votes, specifically the proximity of the polling place to 
one’s residence or workplace, the availability of parking, and the ease of locating the 
polling place may structure a voter’s experience with different voting technologies. To 
date, the evidence strongly points to “low tech” solutions to residual votes, a solution 
that favors paper ballots over more sophisticated electronic voting machines.
Counting Ballots
Counting ballots also poses several problems for election administrators. 
For instance, there are challenges associated with improperly marked ballots.  In 
addition, poll workers can count votes inaccurately.  In large part, the antidote 
against counting inaccuracies is replication, that is, recounts.  However, this is more 
problematic when voting is conducted on DRE voting machines.  Without a paper 
record of the vote, and only a electronic record, it is difficult to know what is being 
recounted.  Moreover, without a verifiable paper record from DRE voting machines, 
it is difficult to replicate the individual ballot for recount. All DRE machines 
provide the voter a summary screen of his or her ballot choices before the ballot 
is actually cast.  Thirty-seven states require the printing of a voter-verified paper 
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ballot from DRE voting machines.  A paper copy of the voter’s ballot is available to 
the voter and to polling place officials.  A tangible copy of the ballot cast, however, 
is not considered a valid ballot and thus is not relied upon in recounts.  Recounts 
on DRE voting systems consist merely of readouts of the originally recorded votes.
Another obstacle to accurate counts of ballots is fraud.  Neither electronic 
nor paper voting systems are immune to fraudulent activity.  Fraud with electronic 
voting may, however, be less obvious.  Post-election audits (as opposed to recounts) 
provide a means of determining fraud.  In such audits, election officials examine 
a chain of events to determine, for instance, whether the number of persons who 
signed in to vote matches the number of ballots that were actually cast.  What is not 
altogether obvious is whether post-election audits of electronic voting can easily 
and in a timely fashion detect more sophisticated means of fraudulently tampering 
with electronic hardware and software.
Accuracy in counting ballots appears to be an ambiguous goal closely linked 
to other goals of election administration, most notably the accurate recording of 
intended vote choices and the usability of voting systems.  Counting ballots may 
seem to be easier on electronic voting systems, but recounts without verifiable 
ballots pose a significant challenge for detecting manipulation of voting systems. 
It is noteworthy that, to date, no significant incidence of electronic voter fraud has 
been reported during a national or subnational election.
Voter Performance and Confidence in Election Administration
A core goal of any election and its administration is that voters accept the 
outcome of the election as fair, honest, and legitimate.  The legitimacy of the election 
is at least necessary for a smooth transition of power and for compliance with the 
subsequent actions of the new government.  Voter confidence in the accuracy with 
which their vote will be counted has several sources, including partisanship, age, 
and voter experience (Alvarez and Hall 2008).  There is a significant amount of 
evidence that voters do perceive electronic voting systems as more accurate and 
usable than other forms but that such systems are also more prone to unintentional 
and fraudulent errors (Alvarez and Hall 2008:138).  Alvarez and Hall conclude, 
“Americans have a decidedly mixed view of electronic voting” (2008, 153).
Other research (Stein et al. 2008) shows a strong preference among voters for 
electronic voting systems over paper ballots.  Their preference extends to usability 
as well as confidence that one’s vote will be accurately counted.  The latter may 
reflect a growing confidence with either electronic voting or with the ever-widening 
role of electronic technology in society.  A recent study (Byrne et al. 2008) reported 
that voter preferences were significantly greater for electronic voting systems but 
that the same voters’ performance was not markedly better using electronic voting 
machines than traditional paper ballots.  The public’s preference for voting systems 
may not match their usability and performance, posing a serious challenge for 
the future administration of elections.  This study suggests that a greater level of 
performance does not accompany greater voter convenience.
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The Choices and Trade-Offs for Future Election 
Administration
Voter Registration
Relaxed voter registration requirements such as election day registration or the 
elimination of voter registration altogether would seem to enhance voter turnout, 
but the implementation of such changes in the near future seems unlikely.  One 
reason election administrators are unlikely to relax these requirements is due to their 
commitment to ensure against voter fraud.  A way to eliminate voter registration and 
still retain some prophylactic against voter fraud is to replace voter registration with 
the establishment of a national voter identification system.  Many countries utilize 
this system to track the movement of citizens, including permanent and temporary 
residents, for the purposes of work, taxation, and government benefits.  Such a 
system would be similar to that followed by the federal government in assigning 
Social Security numbers to people at the time of their birth.  The maintenance 
of a national registry would insure that persons attempting to vote would present 
a current identification that would be valid for their current address and validate 
their voter eligibility in a specific venue (i.e., state and locality).
The public’s support for a national identification system is strong, albeit largely 
driven by concerns about terrorism.  A 2007 poll conducted by Zogby International 
(2007) reported that seventy percent of respondents supported a national photo 
identification system maintained by the federal government.  Public support for a 
national ID system, however, might not carry over to a national identification card 
for voter validation in national and subnational elections.
Convenience Voting
Greater convenience voting is probably not the most efficacious means of 
assuring that everyone who wants to vote can participate.  This is an ironic conclusion 
since the public prefers convenience when voting, especially the sort that current 
technology affords (i.e., voting on the Internet).  Notwithstanding concerns about 
the security of ballots cast over the Internet ( Jefferson, Rubin, and Simons 2007), 
there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that greater voter convenience will 
increase voter participation.
The best administrative practices for enhancing voter turnout seem to be those 
that focus on election day voters (i.e., late deciders), which make the locations at 
which to vote on election day less competitive with other activities on election day 
(e.g., larger venues with ample parking, access to well traveled roadways, a larger 
number of voting stations/machines and poll workers).  The likelihood that these 
changes will be adopted seems dependent on the costs associated with conducting 
elections.  Since the enactment of HAVA  in 2003, the cost of conducting elections 
has increased significantly, mainly due to HAVA’s  requirement that older punch 
card and lever voting systems be replaced with electronic voting systems.  Until 
recently, federal funding covered the cost associated with the purchase of new 
voting equipment.  Without federal funds to replace aging voting equipment, local 
governments are likely to look for ways to reduce the cost of conducting elections 
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while still maintaining voter satisfaction previously enhanced with new voting 
machine technology.  There is evidence to suggest that election day polling centers 
and their degree of accessibility have a significant and negative effect on the cost 
of conducting elections (Stein and Vonnahme 2010).  This is also true for all-
mail elections.  Moreover, the cost advantage of polling centers might motivate the 
adoption of election practices that also increase access to the ballot for infrequent 
voters.
Recounts and Audits
The obstacle to timely, accurate, and fair recounts and audits is not an immature 
technology.  To the contrary, the technology exists to conduct recounts and audits on 
any voting system, paper or electronic.  The problem for the future is the disparity 
between the public’s frequent use and reliance on technology, their skepticism about 
the accuracy and security of electronic voting systems, and their ability to accurately 
replicate vote counts.  As Alavarez and Hall (2008) suggest, future generations who 
are more familiar with and trusting of technology will replace voters who are less 
familiar and trusting of these electronic voting systems.
Predictions
The Short-Term Prediction
The public’s demand for greater technological conveniences when voting 
confront two short-term (i.e., three- to five-year) obstacles:  first, the cost of 
expensive electronic voting equipment and, second, the public’s concern with 
security.  A likely compromise to Internet or electronic voting is permanent mail-in 
voting and all-mail elections.  Recall that with permanent and all-mail elections, 
voters are sent a ballot weeks before election day. Voters do not have to take the 
initiative to request a ballot.  This mode of voting is far less costly that traditional 
in-person voting, either on or before election day and poses fewer security risks 
than electronic or web-based voting systems.  Moreover, there is evidence to suggest 
that voters quickly embrace this mode of voting when it is first offered.3
One consequence of voting by mail before election day is that it may not be 
widely used by residentially mobile populations.  For many of the reasons discussed 
above, residentially mobile populations often fail to re-register to vote at their new 
residence.   These voters, who are disproportionately non-Anglo are less likely 
to request and use permanent mail-in ballots or participate in mail-in elections. 
Consequently, this mode of convenience voting may not have a uniform effect 
across the electorate.   A mode of voting like mail-in voting may be convenient for 
residentially stable voters, making it easier for those who already vote.
The Long-Term Prediction
In contrast, long-term trends favor remote web-based voting.  The demand 
for convenience voting will continue to grow as a new generation of voters who are 
3 Colorado adopted permanent mail-in voting in 2007.  By 2008, 64% of all ballots cast were cast by mail 
before election day.
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comfortable with and reliant on Internet technology replaces older voters who are 
often less familiar withsuch technology.  Objections to this mode of voting on the 
basis of added cost and security risks will abate.  The cost of the technology and its 
access will grow to the point where even the most mobile of persons will be able to 
remotely receive and send their ballots while retaining their eligibility to vote.  The 
cost of conducting elections via the Internet or on electronic voting systems is likely 
to decline as technology and the needed security are enhanced.
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Introduction
 It is axiomatic that courts of law play an important role at all levels of governance 
in the United States.  As a result, any examination of the future of governance must 
include consideration of the judicial branch.  The obvious question to be addressed 
at the outset is, “Will courts continue to have a prominent role in our society in the 
future?”  We think the answer to this question is most certainly, “Yes.”  As traditional 
social structures continue to evolve, society will rely increasingly on the enforcement 
of legal norms to maintain order and cohesion and to resolve conflicts.  So, courts 
are certain to have a future, but the broader query is:  “What will that future entail? 
What will courts look like a hundred years from now?”
 As a starting point, we must acknowledge the limited scope of our inquiry. 
Our focus is on the state trial courts, where the great majority of civil and criminal 
cases in this country are adjudicated.  Today, state trial courts are grappling with 
a number of extremely difficult issues, including (but certainly not limited to): 
providing security for judges, jurors, and other courthouse personnel; creating 
effective alternatives to incarceration in the face of overcrowded jails and prisons; 
developing effective treatment programs for persons with substance abuse issues; 
reducing the financial and temporal costs of litigation; providing access to justice 
for those of very limited means; securing stable sources of funding; and adapting 
to increased use of specialized courts and procedures.  All of these issues are 
precipitating significant changes, not only in the administrative processes of courts, 
but also in the way that cases are adjudicated.
 Together, these issues have precipitated the greatest challenge facing state 
trial courts in the future, namely, managing the caseload.  Even as state trial courts 
provide security, create alternatives to incarceration, develop effective treatment 
programs, they must also deal with the drastic increases in caseloads and the 
reality of unchanging or decreasing budgets.  We assert that the key challenges 
driving caseload management are managing information and managing the courtroom 
workgroup.  Here, we introduce the great challenge of managing the caseload and the 
constituent challenges of managing the information and managing the workgroup. 
We then offer visions for the future that address each of the constituent challenges. 
Finally, we offer three visions for the future that may completely eliminate the 
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greatest challenge of managing the caseload:  a vision of automated justice; a vision 
of Artificial Intelligence; and a vision of privatization.
The Significant Future Challenges
Caseload Management—the Greatest Challenge
 Frequent observation of local courts over the years, interviews with judges and 
other court personnel, and a review of the court administration literature lead us 
to conclude that the greatest challenge facing the state trial courts is managing the 
caseload.  Fundamentally, many courts are entirely overwhelmed with cases.
 This concern is most pronounced in our state court systems.  While federal 
judges adjudicate several hundred thousand cases per year, the fact that state courts 
handle several million in a year is simply overwhelming.1  The reality of state trial 
caseloads becomes inconceivable when matched to the fact that there are just over 
31,000 state trial judges in the nation.2  Further, the problem is not likely to be 
attenuated in the future—assuming (as we do) that demands on courts will increase 
while funding fails to keep pace.  This issue has been exacerbated in recent years by 
the economic downturn, which has significantly increased the number of criminal 
defendants seeking the assistance of public defender offices and the number of civil 
litigants electing to proceed without assistance of counsel.3
 A harbinger of the future of courts can be observed in the recent trends toward 
pretrial diversion, alternative dispute resolution, and drug courts.  Ostensibly, these 
can be viewed as an effort by courts to manage caseloads by diverting cases out of 
traditional legal processes.  Yet the problem is not merely one of volume.  Many 
of the cases that state trial courts deal with today require more than traditional 
adjudication and, increasingly, courts are being asked to target particular societal 
problems.  Thus, we have seen the development of numerous specialized “problem-
solving courts” across the country; specifically, “[t]he U.S. currently has more than 
2,000 drug courts, 200 mental health courts, 250 domestic violence courts, 30 
community courts, and 500 other models (e.g., homelessness, truancy, teen, and sex 
offense courts), with dramatic growth expected in the years ahead.”4  Specialized 
courts have also been innovative in changing how cases are placed on the docket in 
order to have less complex cases resolved sooner and in carrying out “therapeutic 
jurisprudence,”5 through which courts administer treatment services in addition to 
1 Robert A. Carp, Ronald Stidham, and Kenneth L. Manning, Judicial Process in America, 8th ed. (Washington, 
D.C., CQ Press, 2011) p. 70.
2 See Shauna M. Strickland, Chantal G. Bromage, Sarah A. Gibson, Ashley N. Mason, and William E. Raftery, 
comps.,  “State Court Caseload Statistics:  An Analysis of 2007 State Court Caseloads,” Fig. G (Williamsburg, 
Va.:  National Center for State Courts, 2009), pp. 92-93, available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/
csp/2007_files/StateCourtCaseloadStatisticsFINAL.pdf.
3 See Richard Zorza, “Access to Justice:  Economic Crisis Challenges, Impacts, and Responses,” in Carol 
R. Flango, Amy M. McDowell, Charles F. Campbell, and Neal B. Kauder, Future Trends in State Courts 2009 
(Williamsburg, Va.:  National Center for State Courts, 2009), p. 9.
4 Christine Sisario, “Improving Outcomes through Better Data Tracking:  The Use of Technology in Problem-
Solving Courts and Beyond,” in Flango et al., Future Trends in State Courts 2009, supra , note 3, at p. 92.
5 Carp et al., Judicial Process in America, supra, note 1, at pp. 65-66.
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traditional case proceedings.
 Another recent trend that affects the future of courts is the move towards 
out-sourcing and privatization.  Today, “ADR (alternative/appropriate dispute 
resolution), private judging, security services, facilities management, probation 
and community-based treatment programs, print-shop operations, court-reporter 
transcription services, case/cash management information services, e-f[i]ling, 
imaging, drug testing, public relations, employee assistance and counseling, and 
payroll services are frequently outsourced by courts across America.”6  In this 
regard, state trial courts have become increasingly “flat” organizations,7 and there is 
no reason to believe that this trend will abate into the foreseeable future.
 Finally, there is a trend towards collaboration and engagement.  Of course, 
courts cannot operate in isolation from other agencies of government—or from 
social institutions like schools, community organizations, or even entities in the 
private sector.  Indeed, the term “governance,” as distinct from “government,” 
“incorporates the idea that public, private, and nonprofit organizations working 
together, rather than government agencies acting unilaterally, are the dominant mode 
for delivering goods, services, and opportunities to citizens.”8  From the perspective 
of the courts, good governance entails working together with effective foresight 
and accountability to make decisions that are efficient, fair, unbiased, consistent, 
transparent, and attempt to do the most good for the most people.  Given these 
definitions, the greatest challenge of managing the caseload is to manage all of the 
issues and trends outlined above while simultaneously addressing the challenges of 
managing information and managing the courtroom workgroup.
The Challenge of Managing Information
 One element of the great challenge of caseload management is the challenge 
of managing information.  Courts are information-intensive environments, and 
the scope and complexity of information are only increased as courts move from 
traditional adjudication toward a role as problem-solvers.  Judges, lawyers, clerks, 
and court administrators routinely generate (and therefore must manage) a 
tremendous volume of information—including dockets, warrants, orders, opinions, 
memoranda, pleadings, briefs, reports, transcripts, depositions, subpoenas, etc. 
It is not uncommon for judicial proceedings to “bog down” as judges muddle 
through thick case files looking for particular paper records.  Further, the advent of 
computers has not solved the problem.  As Bud Borja, Chief Information Officer 
of the Oregon Judicial Department, has observed, court information systems “are 
siloed, inflexible, and unable to leverage new technologies or improve business 
practices.  They inhibit our ability to promote new and improved ways to share 
6 Gordon M. Griller, “The Growth Of Outsourcing:  Courts Are Becoming Flatter,” in Flango et al., Future 
Trends in State Courts 2009, supra, note 3, at  p. 18.
7 See generally Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat:  A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century (New York: 
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux Publishers, Inc., 2005).
8 Robert F. Durant, “The Twilight of the Neoadministrative State?  Crises, American Political Development, 
and the ‘New Interventionism,’” paper presented at the Workshop on the Future of Governance, Howard H. Baker 
Jr. Center for Public Policy, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tenn., Oct. 15, 2010, p. 1.
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court data with criminal justice and human service agencies, legal and business 
stakeholders, and the public.”9
Electronic Courts
 Court administrators have begun to grapple with the information challenge, 
and already it is not uncommon to hear them speak of “e-Courts.”  Oregon is one 
of the more innovative states in this regard, and is moving toward a statewide 
electronic courthouse that, when fully implemented, “will expand and simplify 
access to courts, allow electronic document filing and payment of fees, and provide 
numerous other benefits.”10  Presumably, one of the benefits to be reaped by moving 
to electronic courts is financial savings.  Going paperless has obvious benefits to 
lawyers and litigants. “E-filing saves time, which in turn reduces transaction costs—
costs ultimately borne by clients.”11  One study of courts in Manatee County, 
Florida, found that the electronic filing of over two million documents saved nearly 
$1,000,000 in a single year.12
 Moving from paper documents to e-filing may also benefit courts with respect 
to the quality of information used in decision making.  Jim MacMillan at the 
National Center for State Courts has observed:
Many courts are continuing to view and insist that E-filed 
electronic documents should continue to be functionally the 
same as their paper and much dumber cousins.  Please consider 
that information entombed in a paper document is now locked 
as to the accuracy of the moment it is printed.  It is essentially a 
snapshot.  This of course results in all sorts of problems as to the 
information accuracy when that paper document is later read and 
used.  And unfortunately, judges and court staff are relying on the 
accuracy of that locked paper information to make decisions that 
affect people’s lives.13
 However, there is still resistance to the movement toward e-Courts.  Joseph 
Jarret, currently the Law Director for Knox County, Tennessee, recalled that when 
he practiced law in Florida, “despite the fact that the Federal Court went to an 
9 Bud Borja, “Oregon eCourt—Improving Judicial Outcomes and Services,” in Flango et al., Future Trends in 
State Courts 2009, supra, note 3, at p. 87.
10 Paul J. De Muniz, “Building Tomorrow’s Courts Today,” in Flango et al., Future Trends in State Courts 2009, 
supra, note 3, at p. 83.
11 Ben F. Tennille and Corinne B. Jones, “Developments at the North Carolina Business Court,” in Carol 
R. Flango, Amy M. McDowell, Charles F. Campbell, and Neal B. Kauder,  Future Trends in State Courts 2010 
(Williamsburg, Va.: National Center for State Courts, 2010), p. 92.
12 R.B. Shore,  Mark Singer, and Carole Pettijohn, “The ROI of Emerging Technologies,”  paper presented at 
the National Court Technology Conference, Denver, Colo., Sept. 2009.
13  James E. McMillan, “Why the Future Is Not Paper − Second in a Series,” Court Technology Bulletin, 
National Center for State Courts, June 23, 2010, available at http://courttechbulletin.blogspot.com/2010/12/
why-future-is-not-paper-second-in.html. 
exclusive e-filing Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system, 
nevertheless, at least one judge insisted that all documents be filed ‘the old fashioned 
way.’”14
 Judge Lee Haworth, Chief Judge of Florida’s Twelfth Circuit, points out that 
going paperless does not necessarily improve efficiency.  He specifically indicates 
that there is considerable room for technological improvement of the electronic 
environment:
[O]ne of my counties, Sarasota, has eliminated paper files.  Judges 
view almost all documents through an intranet that gives access to 
electronically scanned or e-filed papers.  The standard the court 
has set for clerks in the Twelfth Circuit is that the new technology 
they are designing for us must meet or exceed the efficiencies of the 
paper environment.  Judges should be able to access documents in 
case files from the bench or in chambers quickly.  However, judges 
handling large dockets or seeking to find specific documents in 
cases with many pages report that the current systems actually 
retard this ability.  Timed tests prove critical documents are 
more speedily located in paper files the old fashioned way.  This 
situation is due primarily to the lack of index and document word 
search functionalities, a deficiency clerks’ vendors are attempting 
to remedy.15
 Therefore, the mere reliance on electronic systems may not guarantee 
improvements in judicial efficiency or reductions in information management 
challenges.  The development of effective, efficient electronic information systems is, 
without question, one of the most pressing issues facing courts today.  How courts 
respond to the information challenge will to a great extent determine how courts 
operate in the decades to come.  Moreover, the challenge of managing information 
is only one element of the great challenge of caseload management; the second 
element is the challenge of managing the courtroom workgroup.
Managing the Courtroom Workgroup
 The second element of the grand challenge of caseload management is the 
challenge of managing the courtroom workgroup.  An important goal of the courtroom 
work group is to handle cases expeditiously.  Yet, in a society that is increasingly 
fast-paced, judges are often vexed by the difficulty of assembling all members of 
the courtroom workgroup together in the courtroom at an appointed time.  In 
a preliminary hearing in a criminal case, for example, the courtroom workgroup 
consists of the judge, the defendant, the prosecutor, the defense lawyer, witnesses 
for the prosecution (which often include law enforcement officers), and various 
ancillary personnel.  If any one member of the workgroup is not present, the 
14  E-mail from Joseph G. Jarret, Law Director, Knox County, Tenn., Sept. 10, 2010.
15 Interview with Lee Haworth, Chief Judge, 12th Cir. Ct., Sarasota, Fla., June 28, 2010.
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proceeding cannot go forward.  There are a number of reasons why this happens 
quite frequently:  the judge has taken ill; the defendant has been arrested and is 
in custody in another jurisdiction; the prosecutor is arguing a motion in another 
courtroom, and the hearing is taking longer than expected; the assistant public 
defender is on the phone trying to find her client; the deputy who is supposed to 
testify has an emergency call; and so forth.  Ultimately, while managing information 
is difficult, managing people is even harder.
 This problem is easily observable when one visits courts of limited jurisdiction, 
such as Tennessee’s General Sessions Courts.  In the General Sessions Courts, 
judges are asked to deal simultaneously with numerous cases at various stages of 
the judicial process.  In a setting that more resembles a retail store than a court 
of law, lawyers, witnesses, and defendants come and go as judges try to make 
progress through their dockets.  Of course, many of the proceedings, such as first 
appearances, arraignments and routine motions, are very brief and simple . . . once 
the courtroom workgroup has been assembled.
 To alleviate the difficulties inherent to this environment (and perhaps as a 
precursor to the future of adjudication), courts of limited jurisdiction increasingly 
conduct hearings with the assistance of remote video.  In fact, it is now common 
to have first appearances in criminal cases conducted remotely from the jail.  The 
defendant appears on video, which is displayed in the courtroom.  The defendant 
likewise sees the judge on a video screen.  The judge can explain the charges and 
make a determination on bail or counsel without having to transport the defendant 
to the courthouse.  From such limited beginnings a new movement is developing—
the movement toward “virtual courts” and virtual interactions.
Virtual Courts
 By definition, the virtual court is one that exists only in cyberspace.16  More than 
a decade ago, Gordon Bermant recognized that “in one configuration or another, 
the virtual courthouse is inevitable.  Its foundation is already under construction, 
but the scope of the edifice and the design of its interior spaces remain open for 
negotiation.”17
 Predating Bermant, a scenario involving virtual courts was articulated nearly 
two decades ago by futurist Jim Dator:
Same-day hearings, made possible by computers, were first 
applied to certain traffic cases, and then spread quickly to other 
areas, and throughout the system. Since these first cases did not 
require a physical appearance, it became more and more rare for 
anyone to appear physically in any courtroom. At the same time, 
improved means of electronic communication seemed to bring 
16 “By definition, the virtual courthouse needs to exist nowhere but electronically.”  Gordon Bermant and 
Winton D. Woods, “Real Questions about the Virtual Courthouse,” 78 Judicature 64 (1994), p. 64.
17 Gordon Bermant, “Courting the Virtual:  Federal Courts in an Age of Complete Inter-Connectedness.” 25 
Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 527 (1999), p. 528 (emphasis omitted).
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the court to the place of the controversy instead of the parties to 
the court.18
 Other scholars such as Paul D. Carrington, a strong proponent of virtual 
courts, cautioned that the movement described by Dator was not imminent at the 
turn of the twenty-first century.  “Virtual litigation,” said Carrington, “is not yet 
on our doorstep.  Neither the profession, nor the courts, nor the litigants—and 
certainly not this author—are ready for it, nor can they be made ready soon.”19 
Yet, only four years later, Michigan became the first state in the Union to establish 
a “cybercourt” with jurisdiction over business and commercial cases.20  Because 
the cybercourt’s jurisdiction was made concurrent with already existing tribunals, 
litigants have a choice between traditional and virtual litigation.  In the cybercourt, 
complaints, answers, motions, briefs, etc. are filed online; hearings take place via 
videoconference.  Evidence is presented through streaming audio or video.
 While there are few examples of functioning virtual courts in the United States 
today, the concept seems to be catching on, albeit with some reservations from the 
bench and bar.  Along these lines, Walt Smith, court administrator for Florida’s 
Twelfth Circuit, observes that
[a]s the technology improves, [virtual courts] may be a very real 
possibility.  We currently use a lot of video conferencing technology 
in our courtrooms.  However, for anything very important it is my 
understanding that the attorneys still prefer to come to court or 
have their witnesses physically appear in court, etc.21
 Judge Scott Brownell, a trial judge in Florida’s Twelfth Circuit, is very interested 
in the idea of virtual courts but also outlines specific impediments to the realization 
of such a concept:
The concept is great.  In real life, until virtual courts are a) three 
dimensional, b) in real time with no delay, and 3) designed on a 
large enough screen so anyone can see everyone else in the virtual 
courtroom, (perhaps a separate section of the screen for each 
person at the “virtual hearing”) it will not adequately substitute 
for real courtrooms.  In court a judge makes decisions every 
few minutes of every day in court.  These are decisions that are 
18 James A. Dator, “Inventing the Future of the Courts and the Courts of the Future:  A Futurist’s Perspective,” 
Hawaii Judicial Foresight Congress Proc., Honolulu, Hawaii, Jan. 6-8, 1991, subsequently published in Sohail 
Inayatullah, ed., Judicial Foresight in the Hawaii Judiciary (Honolulu: Judiciary, State of Hawaii, 1994), pp. 31, 36-
37.
19 Paul D. Carrington, “Virtual Civil Litigation:  A Visit to John Bunyan’s Celestial City,”  98 Colum. L. Rev. 
1516 (1998), pp. 1536-37.
20 Anita Ramasastry, “Michigan’s Cybercourt:  Worthy Experiment or Virtual Daydream?”  available at http://
writ.lp.findlaw.com/ ramasastry/20020206.html. 
21 Interview with Walt Smith, 12th Cir. Ct. Adm’r, Sarasota, Fla., July 7, 2010.
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driven by not only what the law requires and what the procedures 
require, but also based on the needs of this party, or that lawyer, 
or this emergency, or that lost visitation, or the time to rest, or the 
impact of this evidence might have on that jury or this witness 
without asking some questions and reading their response with 
expressions as well as words.  Two dimensional in its present state 
simply does not permit that level of decision-making.22
 One of the possible benefits of virtual courts is expanding access to the justice 
system.  More specifically, Douglas A. Blaze, Dean of the University of Tennessee 
College of Law, believes that cybercourts will improve access to justice in two ways:
First, I think that lawyers will be able to practice in rural areas 
more effectively without having to travel to those areas.  It will 
be more efficient for those lawyers and make the lawyers more 
readily available to rural clients.  We have unequal distribution to 
lawyers in most states and this will help increase the availability of 
counsel in areas where lawyers are limited.  Second, as mentioned 
above, I think that courts will become more “user friendly” and 
accessible (and as a result efficient) through the use of virtual or 
cybercourts.23
 However, Dean Blaze anticipates “limiting the use of virtual or cyber courts 
to certain aspects of the adjudicatory processes not to the end game of trials.”24 
Similarly, Judge John M. Scheb, a retired appellate judge and law professor in 
Florida, thinks that cybercourts have a future but is skeptical about virtual trials:
[Virtual courts] have a potential use in many proceedings, but not 
for criminal trials where defendants have a constitutional right to 
face their accusers. In civil litigation matters that require judicial 
determinations of factual matters it is important for trial judges 
to see all witnesses in order to assess their credibility.  Yet, there 
are limited phases of civil litigation that are susceptible to being 
handled in virtual courts.25
 Judge Mary Beth Leibowitz, a criminal court judge in Knoxville, Tennessee, also 
foresees virtual courts in specialized instances but not for general use in criminal 
proceedings.  In her view, the manner in which court reporters handle transcripts 
for criminal court could become virtual, but generally, Judge Leibowitz does not 
22 Interview with Scott Brownell, Judge, Fla. 12th Cir. Ct., Bradenton, Fla., June 29, 2010.
23 Interview with Douglas A. Blaze, Dean, Univ. of Tenn. College of Law, Sept. 22, 2010.
24 Ibid.
25 Interview with John M. Scheb, Judge, Fla. Ct. App., 2nd Dist. (retired), Sarasota, Fla., July 1, 2010.
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envision criminal courts becoming completely virtual.26  In this regard, Judge Lee 
Haworth envisions a “hybrid system” in which certain proceedings will take place 
in an electronic environment, but like other judges we interviewed, he does not 
foresee, nor does he favor, the total elimination of face-to-face hearings or trials:
I predict the next step will be virtual hearings viewable by the 
public where attorneys can appear for certain matters from their 
office with a video link to a judge in chambers or in a courtroom.  
However, few persons who have seen a baseball game or other 
sporting event in person would substitute that experience for 
watching it on television or a computer monitor.  There is a 
qualitative value to being close and in the physical presence of 
witnesses, the judge, and the litigants, and having a ringside seat 
at contested matters enhances the potential that fact finders will 
pay closer attention and achieve a better result.27
 Similarly, Jim McMillan, a court management consultant with the National 
Center for State Courts, believes that “a lot of simple and procedural work can 
be done virtually, but I seriously doubt that any significant litigation will be done 
without putting people in the same room for quite awhile.”28
 Perhaps the greatest resistance to the idea of virtual courts exists with respect 
to jury trials.  Gordon Bermant and Winton Woods identify four key issues with 
this aspect of jurisprudence:
Can judges and lawyers successfully conduct “virtual voir dire”?  
Where would the jurors be physically located?  Could jurors 
adequately judge the demeanor of witnesses who were virtually 
present but physically elsewhere?  Is it essential to our civil 
jury system that jurors physically sit together during trial and 
deliberate in the same room?29
 Therefore, it seems that along with concerns for defendants’ rights to face their 
accusers guaranteed in the Sixth Amendment, the role of jurors in a courtroom 
setting may provide the biggest obstacle for the implementation of virtual 
proceedings.  In this regard, Frederic Lederer notes that “[f ]reed of the need for 
a jury, virtual trials and courtrooms become much easier to institute.”30  However, 
26 Interview with Mary Beth Leibowitz, Judge, Knox County Crim. Ct., Knoxville, Tenn., July 6, 2010.
27 Interview with Lee Haworth, Chief Judge, Fla. 12th Cir. Ct., Sarasota, Fla., June 28, 2010.
28 Interview with James E. McMillan, Principal Court Management Consultant, Nat’l Center for St. Cts., 
Williamsburg, Va., July 6, 2010.
29 Bermant & Woods, supra note 16, at p. 66.
30 Fredric I. Lederer, “The Road to the Virtual Courtroom?  A Consideration of Today’s—And Tomorrow’s—
High-Technology Courtrooms,”  50 S.C. L. Rev. 799 (1990), p. 838.
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one must also recognize that jury trials are becoming rare events, especially in 
criminal cases.  Indeed, they are viewed by many as failures of the judicial system. 
As plea bargaining has become the overwhelming norm in criminal trials at the 
state level31 and the legal system evolves more toward problem-solving courts and 
adjudication by non-judicial actors, the problems associated with virtual jury trials 
become less of a concern.  Certainly, one “can more easily imagine arbitration panels 
or specialized tribunals resolving commercial disputes where a virtual gathering for 
decision-making would be accepted.”32
Alternatives That May Eliminate the Greatest Challenge
 What are the alternative visions that may eliminate the greatest challenge of 
caseload management?  How can we reconceptualize caseload management for 
the future?  Here, we articulate three visions for the future that may drastically 
reduce or eliminate caseloads for public courts:  (1) the vision of automated justice; 
(2) the vision of Artificial Intelligence, or AI; and (3) the vision of privatization. 
Automated justice reduces caseload management by handling every aspect of the 
case automatically or with minimal human intervention.  Artificial Intelligence 
reduces caseload management by using AI to handle the majority or all of the 
justice issues, either returning the final analysis to a human for a final decision or 
even making the final decision.  Privatization reduces caseload management for the 
public courts by off-loading some or all of the court functions to not-for-profit and 
for-profit institutions.
Automated Justice
 Beyond the use of e-Courts and virtual interactions in judicial proceedings, 
many jurisdictions have begun to use technology for police purposes.  For example, 
according to the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, as of September 2010, red 
light cameras were being used in roughly 485 American communities, and more 
than 68 jurisdictions employed speed detection cameras.33  When such cameras 
detect that a driver is running a red light or speeding, he or she simply receives a 
citation by mail (and/or e-mail).  The alleged offender is provided with a link to 
visit online and watch the video that provides evidence of the violation.  He or she 
is given the option to pay a predetermined fine or to appear in court (or before 
an administrative board) to contest the charge.  Although quite controversial (and 
certainly unpopular), these procedures appear to meet the essential requirements of 
due process.  That is, the alleged offender receives fair notice and the opportunity to 
be heard, so long as the accused is not charged additional penalties for challenging 
the citation and winning on appeal.
31 See Carp, Stidham & Manning, Judicial Process in America,  supra note 1, at pp. 190, 227.
32 Gordon Bermant, “Symposium:  The Powers and Pitfalls of Technology:  The Development and Significance 
of Courtroom Technology:  A Thirty-Year Perspective in Fast Forward Mode,” 60 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 621 
(2005), pp. 644-45.
33 Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, “Communities using red light and/or speed cameras as of September 
2010,” available  at http://www.iihs.org/laws/auto_enforce_cities.aspx (accessed Sept. 5, 2010).
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 It is also true that public spaces in the United States are becoming increasingly 
subject to video surveillance.  Most retail stores, shopping malls, and other places of 
business have their own cameras.  Most police cars are now equipped with dashboard 
cameras.  American cities are also following the example set by London, England, 
where the entire city is covered by video cameras.  While the larger implications for 
society of such techniques remain under debate, the trend towards increased use of 
technology in policing citizens is quite clear.
 Let us intersect the ideas of traffic cameras, citations by e-mail or mail, and 
video surveillance.  In the not too distant future, it may well be the case that many 
criminal prosecutions will follow the model of the red light and speed cameras. 
Shoplifting, assaults, disorderly conduct, prostitution, malicious mischief, 
incitement to riot, passing worthless checks, and many other forms of criminal 
behavior can be captured on the increasingly-ubiquitous video cameras.  In the 
future, video surveillance might well be augmented by audio.  Highly-sensitive 
directional microphones could be attached to cameras and could be activated by 
humans monitoring the cameras or, one might also expect, by computers analyzing 
what the cameras are recording.  Bio-sensors could augment the audio and video 
surveillance to collect bio-metric information about the individual’s identity and 
current physiological state.
 Thus, the inchoate offenses of solicitation and conspiracy, which hinge on 
verbal communication, could become susceptible to surveillance.  Police officers 
would not have to be on the scene to actually make arrests.  Violators could be 
notified by e-mail, be presented with the video and/or audio evidence against them, 
and be given an opportunity to contest the charges or resolve them by paying a 
fine, performing community service, making restitution, etc.  Those who wish to 
contest the charges could be directed to a Website to determine whether they are 
eligible for appointed counsel and, if so, to the public defender’s Website for an 
online interview.  Those who fail to respond within a given time frame would be 
subject to arrest and processing through the traditional means.  As a result, many of 
the minor offenses that now clog the dockets of courts of limited jurisdiction could 
be managed technologically and, if necessary, adjudicated with virtual interactions. 
Imagine a future in which the entire process from arrests to filings to verdicts to 
consequences to parole determinations is handled automatically.
 A third, inverse aspect of technology and surveillance could relate to the use of 
bio-surveillance combined with genetic indicators.  Studies of genetic dispositions 
could lead to information about the likelihood of committing a particular crime. 
Embedded bio-sensors examining our DNA and physiology could accurately 
identify proclivities for many types of crimes, especially crimes consistent with 
mental and physical disorders.  Based on these predicted and automated diagnoses, 
justice could be meted out in the form of fines, treatment, rehabilitation, and/or 
counseling.
Artificial Intelligence
 How will Artificial Intelligence (AI) affect the development of the courts? 
We already are witnessing the application of AI to the lawyering function.  In the 
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Economist Technology Quarterly five years ago, there appeared an article containing 
the following gem:
Given the choice, who would you rather trust to safeguard your 
future:  a bloodsucking lawyer or a cold, calculating computer?  
Granted, it’s not much of a choice, since neither lawyers nor 
computers are renowned for their compassion.  But it is a choice 
that you may well encounter in the not-too-distant future, as 
software based on “artificial intelligence” (AI) starts to dispense 
legal advice.34
 Also in 2007, LiveScience ran a short article on software designed to assist 
couples with divorce:
Divorce is never pleasant, but new software is aimed at making the 
process a little less harrowing.  The computer program combines 
artificial intelligence, game theory and an electronic or human 
external mediator to help divorcing couples settle their disputes in 
a fair and rational manner—and hopefully with fewer gray hairs.35
  While recognizing the complexity and nuance of judicial decision-making, 
researchers have already proposed AI models to aid judicial decision-making.36 
Using AI, K.W. Chau was able to correctly predict more than eighty percent of 
outcomes in construction disputes in a Hong Kong court.37  One might not be 
impressed with the twenty-percent error rate; but in an age of widespread skepticism 
about the ability of courts to find “correct” answers, who is to say that the program 
erred one-fifth of the time rather than the human judges?
 The obvious next step is to introduce AI software into virtual courts. 
Conceivably, lawyers and judges could be done away with altogether!  With respect 
to the lawyers, such a development might elicit widespread applause.  However, can 
judging really be computerized?  In this regard, one immediately recalls the term 
“mechanical jurisprudence” that legal realists and judicial behavioralists coined to 
disparage the notion that judging can and should be a purely logical or scientific 
34 “AI am the law,”  Economist Tech. Q., Mar. 20, 2005, available at http://www.economist.com/node/3714082 
(from the Mar. 12, 2005, print edition).
35 Melinda Wenner, “Divorce Software Designed to Handle Negotiations,” LiveScience, July 31, 2007, available 
at http://www.livescience.com/4569-divorce-software-designed-handle-negotiations.html.
36 See, e.g., Felipe Lara-Rosano and María del Socorro Téllez-Silva, “Fuzzy Support Systems for Discretionary 
Judicial Decision Making,”  in Vasile Palade, Robert J. Howlett, and Lakhmi C. Jain, eds., Knowledge-Based 
Intelligent Information and Engineering Systems 7th Int’l Conf. Proc., KES 2003, Oxford Univ., Sept. 2003, pt II, 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science:  vol. 2774 (Berlin:  Springer-Verlag GmbH, 2003), pp. 94-100.
37 K.W. Chau, “Prediction of Construction Litigation Outcome−A Case-Based Reasoning Approach,” in 
Moonis Ali and Richard Dapoigny, eds., Industrial Engineering and Other Applications of Applied Intelligence 
Systems 19th Int’l Conf. Proc., IEA/AIE 2006, Annecy, France, Advances in Applied Artificial Intelligence. (Berlin-
Heidelberg:  Springer-Verlag GmbH, 2006), pp. 548-53.
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enterprise.  Can a computer program, even one capable of learning, ever approximate 
the complex task of dispensing justice or settling disputed legal questions?  Perhaps 
it is facile to suggest that AI could ever be employed to render decisions in virtual 
appellate courts or reach a verdict in a complex civil or criminal trial.  On the other 
hand, what about routine or preliminary matters in minor civil and criminal cases? 
Surely the prospect of a much more advanced form AI than exists today being 
employed in such matters fifty years from now is quite conceivable (and we think 
quite likely).
Privatization of Adjudication
 Private companies could handle some or all of public state trial court functions, 
up to and including the actual decisions.  Based upon the assumption that markets 
can resolve disputes more efficiently than government, privatization may assure 
follow-up and efficiencies in processing.  At the same time, the private institution’s 
profit motive and/or the desire to perpetuate the organization will assure attention 
to the details and issues so that they can continue to win business.
 Private companies already offer information-management solutions and private 
solutions such as scheduling software companies, and call-ahead services could 
facilitate the courtroom workgroup.  Many activities of the courts—especially 
information-management—are already out-sourced to companies, and appellate 
courts have already upheld the delegation of police powers to private companies.38 
Privatization may be a way of managing public state trial court caseloads by 
eliminating them entirely.
Virtual Justice:  A Legal Dystopia?
 The challenges and visions above led us to consider a legal dystopia that 
may emerge from many or all of the visions, as well as the practical and ethical 
considerations inherent to these ideas.  We therefore recommend significant and 
additional research and discussion on these issues so that they may be understood, 
framed, and managed as they emerge.  We also recommend ongoing evaluation of 
future research so that we may all continue to learn from our work so that our 
previous work informs us as new ideas and opportunities emerge.
 Writing in 2006, Shulamit Almog suggested that “[t]he line between the 
wireless courtroom, based on digital technology, and the courtroom that exists 
entirely in virtual space may be the line that the law should not cross.”39  Perhaps he 
and others are alarmed at the following scenario described by Jim Dator:
 In certain cases at first, members of juries too were no 
longer physically together.  Eventually, whole neighborhoods, or 
communities, or random samples of them, became the juries.  In 
38 E.g., City of Knoxville v. Brown, 284 S.W.3d 330 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (appeal from the Circuit Court for 
Knox County, No. 3-649-06, Wheeler Rosenbalm, Judge, No. E2007-01906-COA-R3-CV, July 30, 2008).
39 Shulamit Almog, “Creating Representations of Justice in the Third Millennium:  Legal Poetics in Digital 
Times,” 32 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 183 (2006), p. 244.
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some controversies of worldwide import, indeed, the whole world 
was watching.
 During the early stages of this development, judges came to 
be administrators of decisions reached through experts systems 
and, later, AI.  Then humans—more nearly philosophers than 
judges—were used primarily to review AI decisions.  Now that 
scarcely seems necessary or possible, given the advances in AI on 
the one hand, and the virtual merger of humans with cyborgs and 
the imminent emergence of post-homosapiens, on the other.40
 In a sense, some might see virtual courts as dehumanizing the judicial process. 
Would the increased reliance on technology to enforce legal norms and resolve 
disputes necessarily result in a loss of humane values in the legal system?  Perhaps. 
Certainly this is an issue worthy of considerable thought and discussion, especially 
in regard to basic constitutional provisions related to a “fair trial,” such as the right 
to “confront witnesses.”
Fiscal Considerations
 In terms of practical considerations related to governance, it is important to 
note that a judicial system reliant upon technological innovation could prove costly. 
As we suggested at the outset, inadequate funding is a major concern for state trial 
courts today.41  Inadequate funding not only makes it more difficult for courts to 
perform their essential functions, but also diminishes their capacity to plan for the 
future and develop alternative information systems and models of adjudication. 
One court administrator we interviewed put it in these terms:
The most immediate problem is creating a stable source of 
funding for the courts.  If we [do not] accomplish this, it will have 
major ramifications concerning how we operate, our ability to 
dispose of cases in a timely manner, etc.  Interestingly enough, the 
cutbacks we have already taken have diminished our capacity to 
(1) spend time looking at what the future courts might look like 
(i.e., how we can improve); and (2) find the funds to experiment 
with technology to examine different ways for people to “appear” 
in court.42
The ultimate practical consideration is to constantly ask whether a particular 
function can be automated or eliminated. If automated, can it be handled by 
traditional computer systems, virtual systems, or artificial intelligence?  If eliminated, 
what will take the place of the missing function?
40 Dator, “Inventing the Future of the Courts and the Courts of the Future,” supra note 18, at p. 37.
41 “Forty-seven states . . . face shortfalls in their budgets in FY 2009 and FY 2010, influenced primarily by the 
worst decline in state and local sales taxes in 50 years.”  Daniel J. Hall, “How State Courts Are Weathering the 
Economic Storm,” in Future Trends in State Courts 2009, supra note 3, p. 1.
42 Interview with Walt Smith, supra note 21.
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Ethical Considerations
 Ethical considerations underpin every aspect of these visions for the future of 
the courts.  As we address the challenge of managing information by instituting 
e-Courts initiatives, what are the ethical considerations for backing up the digital 
data; protecting the data from hackers; and ensuring that all users of the systems 
are able to use the systems and technologies?  As we address the challenge of 
managing the courtroom workgroup by instituting virtual courts, what are the 
ethical considerations for maintaining confidentiality in the virtual space; verifying 
participant identities; and protecting the process from system crashes?  For the 
alternatives that may eliminate caseload management, how do we address issues of 
due process; rights and responsibilities of AI; and the possible disconnects between 
public and private interests?  We must continue to think about each of these visions 
and address each of the implications, especially with respect to the impacts on 
humans, governments, and private institutions.
Recommendations and Conclusions
 Based on the foregoing challenges and visions, we identified two 
recommendations.  First, we recommend significant additional research and 
discussion about the future of state trial courts in general and these challenges and 
visions in particular.  The issues, trends, and challenges are real; what we choose 
to make of those—and the visions we choose to implement—depends upon 
ongoing thought and rigorous conversations.  Second, we recommend constant and 
consistent evaluation of the future of courts ideas as the future emerges.  We must 
evaluate future thinking often and rigorously to see how we are progressing as a 
society towards the vision.43
 We have good reason to believe that the pressures that have moved courts 
in the direction of e-Courts and virtual interactions are not likely to abate and, 
if anything, will only intensify.  Information challenges that have precipitated 
dilemmas for the courtroom workgroup are not likely to subside in the future.  In 
fact, based on our discussions with experienced courtroom personnel, we suspect 
that these problems will only become more pronounced over time.  In the short 
term, we anticipate continued specialization of court systems, particularly with the 
advent of alternative styles of dispute resolution.
 In addition, we also know that the rate of technological change is increasing. 
Looking further into the future, then, it seems inevitable that currently unknown 
technological advancements will allow for virtual courts—and even virtual law 
enforcement—to become more prevalent.  However, we submit that this movement 
must heed the concerns expounded upon by the myriad legal professionals before 
it can come to fruition.  Whether in one hundred years’ time these visions will have 
completely replaced the notion of traditional courts, we cannot say.  We would 
venture a guess that a century from now, traditional courts will be the exception 
and not the rule.
43 James A. Dator, “World Futures Studies Federation List:  The Business Case for Foresight,” World Futures 
Studies Federation, Oct. 1, 2010.
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Why People Are Poor/Wealthy: Powerful Frames 
for Public Attitudes and Opinions
Mark D. Harmon, The University of Tennessee−Knoxville
Introduction
Why are people poor, and, conversely, why are people wealthy?  Those questions 
have filled books and journal articles, studies covering fields ranging from public 
policy to sociology to economics. The questions themselves, however, or more 
precisely the answers to those questions by respondents to public-opinion polls, 
represent not only a clear dividing line in the U.S. electorate, but also a strong and 
resilient frame through which information is sorted, stored, and applied.
Lakoff (2002, 2004) has pointed out that American conservatives take a 
“stern father” approach to understanding the world around them.  The world is a 
dangerous place.  People have bad instincts and must be taught right.  People who 
are successful have achieved such status by moral uprightness and good choices. 
People who are not well off, conversely, are in such a state because of some personal 
or moral failing.  Liberals or progressives in the Lakoff analysis follow more of a 
nurturing family model, seeing societal links and multiple causations.
Mediated portrayals of poverty also very likely play a role in public opinion 
about the causes of poverty.  Other researchers have critiqued the failings in 
mediated portrayals of poverty, specifically how those portrayals skew toward 
urban, African-American, and personal failings frames.  This article will present 
some of those findings, as well as other results that link mediated portrayals to how 
people assign causality regarding poverty, personal failings or societal problems. 
This research, however, will test a final link—how those views of “why are people 
poor/rich” represent a clear cleavage in both the American electorate and political 
information sorting.  Secondary analyses of polls on the matter will be used to test 
the strength of that link.  That is the purpose of this study.
Literature Review
Mediated Messages about Poverty and Race
Gilens (1996, 519-27) conducted a substantial content analysis of the 1988-
1992 images of race and poverty presented in nightly network newscasts and three 
major news magazines.  His study yielded 635 poor people (for 560 of whom race 
could be determined) in 214 still photos in 182 magazine news stories related to 
poverty and 1,100 poor people of 1,353 for whom race could be determined in a 
random subset of 50 out of 534 television news stories.  In both media, the poor 
presented were substantially more likely to be African-American than the actual 
national percentage of black poor.  Further, the most sympathetic impoverished 
subgroups (elderly and working poor) were underrepresented, while unemployed 
working-age adults, the least sympathetic group, were overrepresented.
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Gould, Stern, and Adams (1981) looked at primetime television entertainment 
shows and found few images of poverty, and those that existed were of a 
sentimentalized, simple, and happy deprivation.  Another analysis looked at the 
text of eleven Newsweek articles about welfare and found that the articles were 
dominated by a conservative view that stresses victims’ failures (de Goede 1996). 
Clawson and Kegler (2000) found that even in college textbooks, poverty is race-
coded as a “black problem” and that this view is bolstered by stereotypical images 
of the poor.
Two separate analyses (Cloud 1998; Clawson and Trice 2000) found that the 
stereotypes about race and poverty cycled through federal politics in the early 1990s. 
Bill Clinton’s 1992 pledge to “end welfare as we know it” and the congressional 
Republicans’ “Personal Responsibility Act” both built on mediated stereotypes 
about race and poverty.  Cloud (1998) concluded that the “family values” language 
of both such stereotypes constructs the family as the site of all responsibility and 
change, thus privatizing social responsibility for ending poverty and racism and 
demonstrating how Lakoff ’s conservative stern-father model moves easily from 
media to policy.
Media source as well as story framing may play a role in how much poverty/
race stereotyping is adopted by the news consumer.  Iyengar (1990) found that 
when news media frame poverty in general terms about outcomes, the public assigns 
responsibility for poverty to society.  When news presentations present an example 
of a particular poor person, however, respondents then assign causality to a failing 
in that individual.  Sotirovic (2001) found that viewer use of cable television news 
and entertainment shows correlated with greater perception of welfare recipients 
as non-white and young and with higher estimates of federal spending on welfare. 
This she blames on the contextually poor, event-centered, and overly personalized 
approach of such programs.  Persons who read public affairs content in newspapers 
or watched more “thematic” stories about welfare and poverty in the non-print 
media not only had more accurate perceptions of the dimensions of poverty, but 
also expressed greater support for welfare programs.
Public-Opinion Studies and a Working Theory
One study of early public-opinion polling data (Newman & Jacobs 2007) 
looked at attitudes toward the poor during the Depression and the subsequent 
New Deal and found that  “the jobless were regarded with suspicion, immigrants 
should be forced to ‘go home,’ women belong in the kitchen not on the shop floor. 
The harsher the economic conditions (by state), the more conservative were public 
attitudes.  Hence New Deal legislative victories accrued despite rather than because 
of public support” (Ibid., p. 6).
The link between ideology and answers to “why poor” also appears to be cross-
cultural.  Wagstaff (1983) studied attitudes toward the poor among male and female 
respondents in Liverpool and Glasgow, using MacDonald’s Poverty Scale and the 
Protestant Ethic Scale.  He found that supporters of the British Conservative Party 
were more likely to blame the poor for their plight, whereas Labour Party supporters 
were much less likely to do so.  Supporters of the Liberal / Social Democratic 
74 BAKER CENTER JOURNAL OF APPLIED PUBLIC POLICY
Federation (SDF) Alliance fell somewhere in between.  Similarly, Pandey et al. 
(1982) found that respondents in India with a right-wing orientation took  more 
negative attitudes toward the poor than those with a left-wing orientation.  Ideas 
about wealth also are very resilient.  Prabhakar (2008) conducted seven focus 
groups with 58 members of the English public about wealth taxes.  He hoped to 
counteract the “death taxes” frame described by Lakoff with other ways of framing 
the issue.  Participants, however, generally clung to opposition to wealth taxes even 
when presented with substantial contrary information.
The correlation of “why poor” answers to political ideology can be seen as a 
logical extension of Attribution Theory.  This theory observes that people have a 
compelling need to explain things and that those explanations tend to break down 
into causal assertions either internal to the self or external to an outside agent or 
force.  Zucker and Weiner (2006) studied the attribution of causes of poverty 
among student and non-student samples.  In both samples, conservatism correlated 
positively with individualistic causes and negatively with societal causes.
Beck, Whitley, and Wolk (1999) went one step further and sent a questionnaire 
to Georgia state legislators, asking them to evaluate ten explanations of poverty. 
The 74 respondents out of a total of 236 legislators (a 31-percent response rate) 
represented a good cross-section of the different demographics of the legislature. 
At significant levels, legislators who were Democrats, women, and people of color 
viewed low wages and discrimination as more important causes than did their 
Republican, male, and white counterparts.
Descriptive Data from Polls
Before one re-examines available datasets, however, it would be useful to review 
the descriptive data, the poll numbers concerning answers to questions about the 
causes of poverty.  Those polls rather consistently show significant numbers of 
respondents in both the “moral failings” and “social conditions” camps, but with 
slight majorities or pluralities selecting the moral failings explanation.
The U. S. General Social Survey (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 1990), for 
example, asked why people are poor.  When the option “lack of effort by the poor 
themselves” was  presented, 46 percent of the respondents said that is a very 
important reason, 45 percent somewhat important, and less than 9 percent not 
important at all.  Furthermore, 39.5 percent said that loose morals and drunkenness 
are a very important reason, 34.9 percent somewhat important, and 25.6 percent 
not important.
One specialized poll, a national telephone sampling of more than a thousand 
U. S. Catholics (Davidson 1995), found 214 respondents blaming poverty on 
“poor people’s own behavior such as not managing their own money,” while 761 
chose “social conditions such as lack of jobs and low wages.”  Eighty-three chose the 
response “Don’t Know.”
The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life Survey (2002) conducted a split 
sample, asking one group the general question of why American children are being 
raised in poverty, and another group the more specific question of why ten million 
American children are being raised in poverty.  The two groups did not differ 
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in their responses.  Half chose a “failure of the parents as individuals,” while 31 
percent opted for “social and economic problems,” and between 13 and 14 percent 
volunteering, “Both.”
Similar numbers emerged when Global Strategy Group (2005) polled 
Americans on behalf of the Foundation for Ethnic Understanding.  The question 
was “Do you think poor people in this country are poor because of reasons that are 
largely under their own control [47 percent] or because of reasons that are largely 
out of their control [41 percent]?”  Ten percent said, “Don’t Know,” and two percent 
refused to answer.
One previous nationwide telephone survey (NPR/Kaiser Foundation/
Kennedy School 2001), conducted in English and Spanish, took the unusual step 
of breaking down reported answers by income group.  The sample included 294 
respondents with an income of less than the federal poverty level, 613 with an 
income of between 100 percent and 200 percent of the federal poverty level, and 
1,045 with an income above 200 percent of the federal poverty level.  Results for the 
groups were weighted to reflect the actual distribution in the nation.
All were asked, “Which is the bigger cause of poverty today − that people are 
not doing enough to help themselves out of poverty, or that circumstances beyond 
their control cause them to be poor?”  Some 39 percent of those respondents whose 
incomes were below the poverty line said that people were not doing enough to help 
themselves, but 57 percent of those respondents attributed poverty to circumstances 
beyond the control of the poor.  Those barely above the poverty line themselves 
split, with 46 percent of those respondents citing circumstances, and 44 percent 
attributing the cause to a failure on the part of poor people to do enough to help 
themselves.  The group comprised of those with incomes at twice the poverty line 
and higher was the only group for whom a majority placed the onus on the poor 
themselves, 50 percent to 44 percent.
The three groups did not differ substantially on direct questions about whether 
a lack of motivation among poor people is a major cause of poverty; slightly more 
than half called it a major cause, and about a third tagged it as a minor cause. 
Roughly the same pattern held true on a “decline in moral values” as a cause, with 
half characterizing it as a major cause and about three in ten identifying it as a 
minor cause.  The differences were clearer when respondents were asked to specify 
the most important reason for poverty.  The poor were more likely to mention drug 
abuse, medical bills, a shortage of jobs, or jobs that only were part-time or that 
paid low wages.  Those slightly above the poverty line also mentioned low pay and 
drug abuse but added poor quality schools or declining moral values as reasons. 
The more economically comfortable group were most likely to mention a lack of 
motivation or declining moral values, but some also choose poor schools or low-
paying jobs.
The public opinion split on reasons for poverty carries over into anti-poverty 
programs, under the generic term “welfare.”  Of course, welfare long has held a 
negative stigma in the U.S. (Gilens 1999) and has fostered persistent myths with 
little relation to the reality of poverty (Seccombe 2007).  Two polls (Kaiser 1994; 
and NBC and Wall Street Journal 1994) asked fairly similar questions about the 
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reasons people were on welfare.  The Kaiser poll found that 65 percent of the 
respondents attributed recipients’ “choos[ing] not [to] work” as a major reason and 
that 26 percent identified that same as a minor reason.  More than seven in ten 
thought a major reason people were on welfare was that  welfare pays better than 
some jobs, and 62 percent listed as a major reason that women have more babies in 
order to get larger checks.
In the NBC poll, 57 percent of the respondents characterized a decline in 
moral values as a major reason for poverty, and 20 percent termed it a moderately 
important reason.  Fifty nine percent of the NBC respondents thought that the 
breakdown of the traditional family unit was a major reason, and 20 percent 
believed that it was a moderate reason.  Fifty three percent said a major reason was 
that welfare pays better than some jobs.  Fully half of the respondents listed as a 
major reason women having babies for the purpose of receiving larger checks, and 
one in five labeled that as a moderate reason.  An insufficiency of jobs and racial 
discrimination by employers were chosen less often as reasons by respondents to 
both polls.  Poor education scored highly as a reason in the Kaiser poll, but not as 
much in the NBC poll.
Negative public attitudes toward the poor also appear in historical assessments 
of anti-poverty programs.  Schwarz (1988) compiled several studies about Great 
Society anti-poverty programs and found that they achieved their objectives 
and reduced poverty.  Such was not the case in public-opinion polls.  A study by 
Americans Talk Issues Foundation (1994) found more of the respondents (31%) 
had a negative opinion of the 1960s War-on-Poverty programs than those who 
had a positive opinion (22%).  Among those with a negative opinion, 45 percent 
said that the programs had not reduced poverty, 22 percent said that the programs 
had made recipients dependent on welfare, and 14 percent complained that the 
programs had merely created yet another government bureaucracy.
Public assumptions and mythologies about poverty and welfare also dovetail 
with views on immigration, race, and electoral choices.  When presented in one 
study (Kane, Parsons & Associates 1984) with the statement, “Most refugees 
admitted to the U.S. wind up on welfare,” 45 percent of the respondents agreed 
and indicated that the asserted opinion was a good reason not to allow refugees to 
enter the United States.  Another 19% thought that the opinion was true but had 
no relevance; 23 percent thought it untrue; and 10 percent replied, “Don’t know.”
The General Social Survey (GSS) (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 2007) has 
asked the question, “On the average (negroes/blacks/African-Americans) have 
worse jobs, income, and housing than white people.  Do you think these differences 
are . . . [b]ecause most (negroes/blacks/African-Americans) just don’t have the 
motivation or willpower to pull themselves up out of poverty?”  More than 54 
percent of respondents overall replied, “Yes.”  One should note that the GSS first 
asked this question in 1977, then every year or other year starting in 1985.  The 
percentages initially ran as high as 64.7 percent, yes.  The percentage generally has 
declined with passing years but in 2006 was still 49.8 percent of the respondents 
agreeing with the statement.
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If Lakoff is correct about moral politics, then the following three hypotheses 
will hold true.  Hypothesis One is that those who view themselves as conservatives 
will exhibit the highest levels of associating poverty with personal moral failure, 
while those viewing themselves as liberal will exhibit the lowest levels of viewing 
poverty as associated with personal moral failure.  Hypothesis Two is that those 
who self-identify with the Republican Party will exhibit the highest levels of 
viewing poverty as associated with personal moral failure, while those who self-
identify with the Democratic Party will exhibit the lowest levels of viewing poverty 
as associated with personal moral failure.  The inverse also should hold true.  Thus, 
Hypothesis Three is that Republicans and conservatives will be more likely than 
their Democratic and liberal counterparts to view wealth as a consequence of moral 
uprightness, including hard work.
Methods
The researcher used keyword searches to find polls in which respondents gave 
reasons for poverty or wealth.  Roper’s iPoll archive was very useful in obtaining 
some of the descriptive data cited in the literature review.  In addition, the researcher 
obtained the Pew Religion and Public Life and the NPR/Kaiser/Kennedy datasets 
through Roper’s iPoll archive.1  Each was imported into a Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (SPSS) file for data analysis.  The General Social Survey, 
National Race and Politics Survey (Sniderman, Tetlock & Piazza 1991), and the 
American National Election Survey were available for online analysis through the 
Survey Documentation & Analysis (SDA) archive.2,  The Association of Religious 
Data Archives had an additional useful poll, imported into an SPSS file for further 
analysis.
The previously mentioned hypotheses were tested using both measures of 
correlation/association and, where possible, multiple regressions.  The regressions 
tested “why poor” reasons against political philosophy and party identification and 
viable alternative explanations for variance such as age, income, education, and 
religiosity to test the strength of the relationship.
Findings:  Correlations and Associations
The U.S. General Social Survey is available online from 1972 to 2006. 
Unfortunately, only in 1990 did GSS ask respondents questions about why people 
are poor.  In the GSS self-identifying as a conservative correlated with attributing 
poverty to lack of effort and loose morals on the part of the poor themselves. 
Identifying as a liberal correlated with attributing poverty more to poor schools 
and not enough jobs.  These relationships were linear and met a high standard of 
statistical significance (Table 1).
Party identification held to the same pattern on three of the four proffered 
reasons why people are poor.  Greater identification with the Democratic Party 
also meant respondents were more likely to attribute poverty to lousy jobs or failing 
1 The survey results reported here were obtained from searches of the iPoll Databank and other resources 
provided by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
2 Available at http://sda.berkeley.edu/.
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schools.  Greater identification with the Republican Party meant associating poverty 
with lack of effort by the poor.  Though Republicans were slightly more likely than 
Democrats to link poverty to loose morals or drunkenness, this tendency failed to 
achieve statistical significance (Table 2).
The 1991 National Race and Politics Survey presented the statement, “Most 
people are poor because they . . .” and offered a personal factors reply (do not try hard 
enough, coded 1) and a social factors reply (do not get the training and education 
they need, coded 2).  Democrats (N=326) and Independents (N=293) leaned 
toward the social explanation.  Both had a mean of 1.87.  The 311 Republicans 
did not lean so heavily in that direction, having a mean of 1.79 (ANOVA, Sum of 
Squares 1.217, df=2, Mean Square .608, Fisher F-value 4.602, p =.0103).  The 167 
liberals had a mean of 1.90, compared to a mean of 1.87 for moderates (N=248) 
and a mean of 1.78 for conservatives (N=224).  This was statistically significant in 
the expected duration (ANOVA, Sum of Squares 1.747, df=2, Mean Square .873, 
Fisher F-value 6.781, p=.0012).
The NPR/Kaiser/Kennedy School Poll (2001) showed a clear pattern on 
political philosophy and “why poor” questions—circumstances beyond the control 
of the poor versus not doing enough to help themselves.  Self-identified liberals 
opted for the circumstances-beyond-control answer by a plurality of 207 to 124. 
Conservatives chose the not-doing-enough-self-help answer by nearly two to one, 
257 to 131.  Moderates split fairly closely, with 263 choosing the not-enough 
explanation and 235 selecting the circumstances-beyond-control factor.  The same 
pattern held true in political party identification.  Respondents who identified with 
the Republican Party replied “not doing enough” by more than two to one, 337 
to 164, while Democrats chose “circumstances beyond their control” by a closer 
margin, 362 to 235.  Independents split closely, with 224 responding “not enough 
self-help” to 216 responding “circumstances beyond their control.”
The responses also can be analyzed by this scale, coding 1 for “not enough self-
help” and 2 for “circumstances beyond their control.”  By that measure, declared 
Republicans averaged 1.33, Democrats 1.61, and Independents 1.49 (ANOVA, 
Sum of Squares 21.256, df=2, Mean Square 10.628, Fisher F-value 44.972, p 
<.0001).  The means barely budged when the measure changed to which party 
the respondent felt more closely aligned to his or her views, Republicans 1.33, 
Democrats 1.61, Neither 1.49 (ANOVA, Sum of Squares 6.400, df=2, Mean 
Square 3.2, Fisher F-value 13.573, p  < .0001).  Those who called themselves 
conservative had a mean of 1.34, liberals 1.63, and moderates 1.47 (ANOVA, Sum 
of Squares 14.792, df=2, Mean Square 7.396, Fisher F-value 31.133, p <.0001).
The Pew Religion and Public Life Survey (2002) also confirmed the strong 
association between ideology and “why poor” answers.  The scale was from 1 = very 
conservative to 5 = very liberal.  On that scale, respondents who said people were 
poor because of personal failings averaged 2.69 compared to a much more liberal 
3.05 for those who credited society’s failures for poverty (t=9.3339, p < .0001).
The results were similar for why children, in general, were being raised in 
poverty:  2.63 for personal failings; 3.03 for social and economic conditions 
(t=7.9984, p < .0001).  Modifying the question to “ten million American children 
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in poverty” had little effect:  personal failings, 2.63; social/economic conditions, 
3.00 (t=7.5195, p < .0001).
The results also did not change much when the respondents’ replies were 
grouped into a two-by-two table by political party identification.  Republicans 
attributed poverty to personal factors rather than societal ones by better than a 
three-to-one ratio, 303 to 90.  Democrats also blamed personal factors, but at a much 
smaller ratio, 215 respondents to 134 (Chi-Square p-value < .0001).  Democrats 
split nearly evenly, 93 to 94, on personal-versus-societal reasons for children in 
poverty, but Republicans stuck to personal reasons, 118 to 59 (Chi-Square p-value 
= .0014).  The numbers were not much different when the wording was modified 
to “ten million children in poverty.”  Republicans blamed personal factors, 139 to 
65; Democrats opted for societal factors, 81 to 72 (Chi-Square p-value < .0001).
Findings:  Regressions
The GSS results from four potential causes were recoded and combined so 
that high scores were from citing social conditions (poor schools, insufficient jobs), 
and low scores were from citing individual failings (laziness, moral problems, or 
drunkenness).  This served as the dependent variable.  Five independent variables 
were entered in a multiple regression.  Conservative views and strong association 
with the Republican Party correlated strongly with attributing poverty to individual 
failings; so did rising respondent income.  Education ran in the opposite direction; 
greater education meant a greater tendency to cite social conditions for poverty. 
Respondent age was not associated with reasons given for poverty (Table 3).
The 1991 National Race and Politics Survey found that conservative 
respondents were much more likely than their liberal counterparts to say that most 
people are poor because they do not try hard enough.  Liberal respondents opted 
for the choice that the poor do not get the training and education that they need. 
Party identification was not significant, and neither were factors such as age and 
income.  Education fell just shy of a .05 standard of significance (Table 3).
The NPR/Kaiser/Kennedy (2001) poll had the clearest and firmest links 
between political philosophy or party and “why poor” answers.  Liberals and 
Democrats opted for “circumstances beyond their control” while conservatives 
and Republicans said the poor are not doing enough to help themselves.  These 
relationships were significant below a .001 standard, while education, income, age, 
and religiosity were not significant at all (Table 3).
The Pew Religion and Public Life Survey (2002) had one question about 
why people are poor and another about why children grow up in poverty.  Low 
scores were for giving social reasons, high scores for individual reasons for poverty. 
The combined score on “why poor” became the dependent variable against the 
independent variables of education, party preference, age, income, conservative 
to liberal philosophy, and a religiosity score summed from four measures (church 
attendance, importance of religion, involvement in church, and prayer).  Once again, 
greater education and being liberal correlated with societal explanations; being 
Republican correlated with individual reasons given for poverty (Table 3).
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Findings:  Why Are People Rich?
Answers to the inverse question “Why are people rich?” (even though rarely 
phrased precisely that way) also reveal a clear cleavage in the American electorate. 
The Pew Social Trends Survey (Pew Research Center 2008) asked the question 
“Which of these statements come closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right:  (1) most people are wealthy today because of their own hard work, 
ambition, or education, or (2) most rich people today are wealthy because they 
know the right people or were born into wealthy families?”
Those who attributed wealth to hard work scored a mean 2.67 on an ideology 
scale from 1 (very conservative) to 5 (very liberal).  Those who tilted toward 
connections and family were more liberal at 2.99 (t=7.3165, p<.0001).  Democrats 
cited connections over hard work 469 to 311, while Republicans declared hard 
work ahead of connections 330 to 172 (Fisher two-tailed Chi-Square p <.0001).
Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives split even more 
dramatically on the source of success for one particular individual, George W. 
Bush (Gallup, CNN, and USA Today 2003).  The two response options were:  (1) 
mainly based on his own merits, or (2) mainly because of his family’s wealth and 
influence.  On a five-point partisan scale, 1 = Strongly Republican to 5= Strongly 
Democratic, those who cited Bush’s own merits averaged 1.9966, while those who 
credited the subject’s family connections leaned heavily toward the Democratic end 
of the scale, 3.7777 (t=19.6689, p<.0001).  The five-point ideology scale results 
were similar, means of 2.4389 for merit and a more liberal 3.1494 for family 
connections (t=12.1302, p<.0001).
For several years, Gallup also has asked two other questions about wealth:  (1) 
whether distribution of money and wealth in the U.S. is fair or should be more 
evenly distributed, and (2) whether the government should redistribute the wealth 
by imposing heavier taxes on the rich (Gallup and USA Today, 2009; Gallup, 
2008; Gallup, CNN, and USA Today 2003).  Those wanting more even wealth 
distribution, and those willing to use taxation to accomplish that goal, consistently 
were more liberal and more likely to be Democrats than those who thought current 
wealth distribution to be fair and opposed taxation for redistribution (Table 4).
Both Democrats, 453 to 49, and Republicans, 404 to 18, declared that the 
fundamental purpose of the U.S. Constitution is to protect and serve the interests 
of all the people regardless of their wealth and power, instead of protecting 
and serving the interests largely of people who are powerful and rich (National 
Constitution Center, 2002).  A follow-up question asked, “In reality would you say 
all citizens actually have the same rights and freedoms offered in the Constitution 
or that citizens who are rich and powerful have more of them?”  Republicans split 
almost evenly between those options, 201 to 216.  Democrats, however, by 148 
to 347 tilted heavily toward the view that, in practice, the rich enjoy greater rights 
(Chi-square p <.0001).  In the same survey, Republicans and Democrats differed 
substantially in self-reported sympathy and compassion for homeless people 
(t=9.4729, p <.0001).  Collectively these results support Hypothesis Three.
Democrats and Republicans had some differences on questions of faith, 
God, and wealth (Time and SRBI, 2006).  The biggest split was on the statement 
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“Christians in America do not do enough for the poor.”  Republicans disagreed, 140 
to 127; Democrats agreed, 137 to 70 (Chi-square p <.0001).  Republicans split 
evenly, 136 to 136, on whether poverty can be a blessing from God; Democrats 
disagreed, 128 to 82 (Chi-square, p = .0209).  Neither Democrats nor Republicans 
agreed with the proposition “If you pray enough, God will give you what money 
you ask for.”  Republicans overwhelmingly rejected the statement, 23 to 250, while 
a greater proportion of Democrats agreed, 41 to 173 (Chi-square p = .0007).
Partisan preference, however, did not yield statistically significant differences 
on a broad array of other questions:  whether giving away ten percent of one’s 
income is the minimum God expects; if one earns a lot, one should give away most 
of it and live modestly; Jesus was not rich, and we should follow his example; if you 
give away your money, God will bless you with more; God is not interested in how 
rich or poor one is; whether material wealth is a sign of God’s blessing; whether 
poverty is a sign God is unhappy with something in one’s life; and attitudes toward 
churches practicing a gospel of material success.
Discussion
These secondary analyses make a strong case that answers to the questions “Why 
are people poor?” and “Why are people rich?” demonstrate a clear and compelling 
cleavage in the American electorate and a major frame for political messages.  These 
datasets show that conservatives and Republicans tend to blame personal failings of 
the poor for poverty, while liberals and Democrats tend to blame social conditions. 
These tendencies held up at statistically significant levels (p <.05) in most of the 
datasets in which party preference and/or liberal-to-conservative orientation were 
measured.  Education was the only alternative tested that had much explanatory 
power.  The more highly educated respondents opted for social explanations for 
poverty at statistically significant levels in some studies.  Analyses of reasons for 
wealth also connect strongly with party and political philosophy.  Collectively, these 
results support the hypotheses tested in this project.
In the light of these results, the researcher conducted one more secondary 
analysis, using the American National Election Study 2004 (Krosnik & Lupia 
2004).  One must caution that this survey never asked about the causes of poverty. 
It only had a “feeling thermometer,” scaled 0 to 100, and used for many groups, 
including poor people.  Nevertheless, one finds a bit of an echo of the results from 
the other datasets.  Political party affiliation, running from Strongly Democratic 
to Strongly Republican, was associated at highly significant levels with the feeling 
thermometer regarding poor people.  Democrats felt more warmly toward the 
poor, Republicans were colder toward the poor.  Political philosophy, liberal to 
conservative, was not significant.  Income yielded confusing results; respondent 
income was associated with the feeling thermometer, but household income was 
not.  These results were placed at the bottom of Table 3.
One cannot state how long the current state of party and ideological alignment 
will last, but these secondary analyses confirm Lakoff ’s recent observations about 
how Republican/Democratic and conservative/liberal political orientations mirror 
a stern father versus nurturing family mindset.  These findings also validate the recent 
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observation by Zucker and Weiner that Attribution Theory may well be at play in 
how people explain poverty.  Democrats and liberals (and the highly educated) lean 
toward external agents and outside forces.  Republicans and conservatives tend to 
blame the poor for their own plight, seeing individual failings as the primary, even 
sole, cause of American poverty.
Finally, from an ethical perspective, one must note with alarm how mediated 
portrayals of poverty have tracked, mirrored, and likely exacerbated this conservative 
alignment with a “blame the poor” perspective and the racial stereotypes that go 
along for the ride.
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Table 1
General Social Survey 1990:
Political Philosophy by Reasons Why People Are Poor
(scaled 1 very important, 2 somewhat important, 3 not important)
 
Personal: Lack of Effort* Loose Morals** Social: Poor Schools* Lousy Jobs**
Extremely 
Liberal 1.86 2.34 1.64 1.55
Liberal 1.86 2.08 1.61 1.66
Slightly
Liberal 1.67 1.90 1.82 1.80
Moderate 1.59 1.86 1.88 1.88
Slightly
Conservative 1.56 1.85 1.95 1.94
Conservative 1.54 1.72 1.95 1.92
Extremely
Conservative 1.53 2.00 1.89 1.62
* ANOVA Sum of Squares 13.617, df=6, 
Mean Square 2.269, Fisher F-value 5.548, 
p=.000.
 
** ANOVA Sum of Squares 22.230, df=6, 
Mean Square 3.705, Fisher F-value 5.934, 
p=.000.
* ANOVA Sum of Squares 14.876, 
df=6, Mean Square 4.207, Fisher F-
value 4.207, p=.003.
**ANOVA Sum of Squares 11.942, 
df=6, Mean Square 3.574, Fisher F-
value 3.574, p=.0016.
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Table 2
General Social Survey 1990:
Political Identification by Reasons Why People Are Poor
(scaled 1 very important, 2 somewhat important, 3 not important)
 
Personal: Lack of Effort* Loose Morals** Social: Poor Schools* Lousy Jobs**
Strong 
Democrat 1.75 1.98 1.68 1.61
Weak
Democrat 1.63 1.90 1.84 1.77
Independent
Leans
Democratic 1.75 1.82 1.79 1.82
Independent 1.61 1.77 1.86 1.82
Independent
Leans
Republican 1.57 1.85 1.94 1.89
Weak
Republican 1.55 1.87 1.95 1.95
Strong
Republican 1.54 1.78 2.03 2.13
* ANOVA Sum of Squares 7.741, df=6, 
Mean Square 1.290, Fisher F-value 3.193, 
p=.004.
 
**ANOVA Sum of Squares 5.193, df=6, 
Mean Square .866, Fisher F-value 1.370, 
p=.223.
* ANOVA Sum of Squares 13.525, 
df=6, Mean Square 2.254, Fisher F-value 
3.863, p=.001.
** ANOVA Sum of Squares 26.856, 
df=6, Mean Square 4.476, Fisher F-value 
8.383, p=.000.
Table 3
National Surveys, Multiple Regression on Reasons Given for Poverty
(Individual versus Social)
and Political/Other Variables
Survey/Variable B Std. Error Std. Beta t Sig. (p)
1990
GSS/Liberal-Conservative -.186 .042 -.163 -.4.474 .000
GSS/Party ID -.103 .028 -.133 -.3.672 .000
GSS/Education  .060 .021  .101 2.845 .005
GSS/Income -.056 .016 -.120  -3.405 .001
GSS/Age -.003 .004 -.027 -.795 .427
1991
Race/Liberal-Conservative -.059 .021 -.127 -2.895 .004
Race/Party ID: D to R -.001 .019 -.001 -.029 .977
Race/Education .026 .013 .084 1.932 .054
Race/Income -.006 .004 -.057 -1.320 .188
Race/Age -.001 .001 -.127 1.296 .195
2001
NPR/Liberal-Conservative -.082 .033 -.124 6.299 .000
NPR/Party ID: R to D .287 .051 .283 5.648 .000
NPR/Religiosity -.021 .047 -.021 -.449 .654
NPR/Education .018 .015 .059 1.194 .233
NPR/Income -.065 .048 -.066 -1.340 .181
NPR/Age .002 .001 .064 1.334 .183
2002
Pew/Conservative-Liberal -.036 .014 -.066 -2.604 .009
Pew/Party ID .106 .013 .201 8.020 .000
Pew/Religiosity .004 .003 .029 1.334 .182
Pew/Education -.031 .006 -.114 -5.050 .000
Pew/Income -.004 .004 -.023 -1.004 .315
Pew/Age .001 .001 .031 1.435 .151
*ANES (Measured Poor People in a Feeling Thermometer rather than Poverty Reasons)
2004
ANES/Liberal-Conservative .853 .591 .068 1.442 .150
ANES/Party ID: D to R -1.322 .492 -.154 -3.287 .001
ANES/Education -.236 .481 -.020 -.490 .624
ANES/Resp. Income -.453 .146 -.158 -3.104 .002
ANES/HH Income .019 .163 .006 .116 .908
ANES/Age .052 .043 .046 1.217 .224
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Table 4
Gallup Polls on Fairness of Wealth Distribution, Taxes for Redistribution
Poll Reply Mean N Std. Dev. Significance
March 2009/ Fair 2.34 375 .849 t=11.772
Ideology scaled More Equally 3.05 549 .933 p <.0001
 Redistribute 3.08 466 .943 t=11.0003
 Not Redistribute 2.43 487 .881 p <.0001
Fair/More Equally by Party: Republicans 181/86, Democrats 64/276; Chi-square p<.0001
Redistribute/Not by Party: Republicans 69/225, Democrats 249/92; Chi-square p <.0001
October 2008/ Fair 2.30 395 .882 t=11.7888
Ideology scaled More Equally 3.08 544 1.079 p <.0001
 Redistribute 3.20 432 1.069 t=13.0196
 Not Redistribute 2.37 525 .903 p <.0001
Fair/More Equally by Party: Republicans 229/87, Democrats 49/287; Chi-square p<.0001
Redistribute/Not by Party: Republican 46/283, Democrats 253/85; Chi-square p <.0001
January 2003/ Fair 2.54 312 .874 t=6.7341
Ideology scaled More Equally 2.97 629 .916 p <.0001
January 2003/ Fair 2.05 311 1.368 t=12.8686
Party scaled More Equally 3.40 622 1.565 p <.0001
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Introduction
Current scholarship that assesses the impacts of science, technology, and 
innovation (STI) on economic growth employs the National Innovation Systems 
(individually and collectively, NIS) framework—a  systemic model that considers 
a variety of actors as part of a much larger and complex system of innovation 
(Freeman 1987; Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993).  Within this system, not only are 
the individual roles of each actor important for advancing the economy, but equally 
important are the interactions between the actors.  According to the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the NIS approach is 
defined as one:
that stresses that the flows of technology and information among 
people, enterprises and institutions are key to the innovative process.  
Innovation and technology development are the result of a complex set 
of relationships among actors in a system, which includes enterprises, 
universities and government research institutes (OECD 1997, 7).
Two of the chief subsystems within an NIS are the “republic of science” (i.e., 
the science system) and the “realm of technology” (including industrial and 
entrepreneurial innovators) as defined by Dasgupta and David (1994).  The 
distinction between science and technology is determined by the goals and reward 
structures of the institutes under study:
It is the nature of the goals accepted as legitimate within the two 
communities of researchers, the norms of behavior especially in regard 
to the disclosure of knowledge, and the features of the reward systems 
that constitute the fundamental structural differences between the 
pursuit of knowledge undertaken in the realm of Technology and 
the conduct of essentially the same inquiries under the auspices of 
the Republic of Science.  Loosely speaking, we associate the latter 
with the world of academic science, whereas Technology refers to the 
world of industrial and military research and development (Dasgupta 
and David 1994, 495).
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Within the science system, researchers aim to create knowledge and diffuse it 
as quickly as possible.  The reward for a scientist’s discoveries is respect and prestige 
among her fellow scientific community members (Merton 1942).  In the United 
States, much like many other economies, the science system network consists 
mainly of institutes of higher education (OECD 1996) but also includes federal 
research laboratories, nonprofit organizations, and industrial basic research labs.1 
Conversely, industry and entrepreneurs are primarily concerned with maximizing 
profits, and they achieve financial gains by creating new patentable products and 
processes.  Most of the literature thus associates industry and entrepreneurs with 
the “realm of technology.”2, 3
Although the republic of science, the realm of technology, and the relationship 
between the two are important according to the NIS framework, it is nonetheless 
productive to explore the economics literature on each institution individually.  This 
article provides a synthesis of the literature on the impact of the science system as it 
relates to the innovative capability of the economy.4
The science system has three major roles in the NIS (OECD 1996).  First, 
it generates new knowledge in the form of codified information, such as theories 
and natural laws published in scientific journals, new methodologies presented at 
industry-related conferences, or new instruments created in the laboratory (Salter 
and Martin 2001).  According to economic growth theory, the economy can sustain 
permanent economic growth so long as the knowledge stock continues to grow. 
Second, the science system transmits existing knowledge to the future scientific 
labor force through education.  This is because most of the science system resides 
within institutes of higher education.  Furthermore, innovators cannot successfully 
exploit codified knowledge unless they (or their work force) understand the 
information that is presented to them.  Therefore, innovators will need to employ 
properly trained scientists to exploit the current state of knowledge.  Third, owing 
to its unique set of values and norms, the science system motivates scientists to 
diffuse their research findings as quickly and as widely as possible.  How this 
1 In the United States, according to the National Science Board, the largest performers of basic research in 
terms of financial expenditure are the higher education sector and federal research laboratories (National Science 
Board 2010).  For 2007, the two combined accounted for 73.2 percent of all basic research expenditures in the 
economy with the rest being performed by industry (14 percent) and nonprofit organizations (12.8 percent)  Id.
2 This is not to say that other sectors of the economy are not important for innovation.  For example, 
consumers are considered to be an important source of new ideas within the innovation literature (Schmookler 
1966; von Hippel 1978).
3 Innovators encompass a broader range of agents, including firms, entrepreneurs, federal laboratories, and 
even some members of the higher-education community.  Although it would be an overgeneralization to assert 
that “all universities are part of the science system” or that “all firms focus solely on innovation,” much of the current 
literature does make this generalization due to data limitations, for simplicity, or because the majority of particular 
sectors focus on one or the other.  For instance, of total R&D expenditures by universities in 2007, 76 percent 
was for basic research; for total R&D expenditures by industry in 2007, 96 percent was for applied research and 
development (National Science Board 2010).
4 Salter and Martin (2001) provide one of the most comprehensive and appealing reviews of the impact of 
scientific research on the economy.  They suggest six main economic benefits of publicly funded research.  These 
are (i) increased stock of information, (ii) introduction of new instrumentation and methodologies, (iii)supply of 
skilled graduates, (iv) creation of professional networks, (v) technological problem solving, and (vi) creation of new 
firms.
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knowledge is diffused is one of the more important elements in the NIS approach to 
understanding economic growth.  So long as the science system successfully creates, 
transmits, and diffuses knowledge, an economy enjoys an increased capability to 
innovate as innovators exploit scientific research outcomes output in their own 
production processes.
Definitions and Concepts
Types of Research
 The science system invests most of its resources in research—basic, applied, 
and use-inspired.5  Traditionally, basic research (pure science) is defined as research 
aimed at expanding the current state of fundamental knowledge even if there is no 
commercial benefit to the research.  The economic benefits of basic research occur 
when “the results of research can be used to predict the results of trying one or 
another alternative solution to a practical problem” (Nelson 1959, 299).  Scientific 
knowledge allows the researcher to form credible expectations about the outcomes 
of different solutions—without actually investigating them individually.
 Applied research is defined as determining how best to use the current stock of 
scientific knowledge for commercial purposes.  The case for linking basic research 
and applied research was set by Stokes, who argued that “although a great deal of 
research is wholly guided by one or the other of the goals of understanding [basic] 
and use [applied], some studies of great importance show that the successive choices 
of research are influenced by both these goals” (Stokes 1997, 12).  An adaptation of 
Stokes’s quadrant is reproduced in the next section.  Stokes argued that government 
funding should be geared towards use-inspired research rather than choosing either 
basic or applied research.
R&D, Technology, and Economic Growth
 An economy’s aggregate production function defines the ability of such 
an economy to produce goods and services (output) using current inputs (e.g., 
machinery and labor).  In its most general form, output per person (GDP per 
capita) simply depends on inputs per person (e.g., machines per capita) and 
technical progress.  Accordingly, the long-run economic growth rate depends on 
changes in inputs and/or technical progress and on how effective such inputs are in 
producing output.  In theory, it is assumed that physical capital exhibits diminishing 
marginal product.  This means that, holding all else constant, capital per worker 
grows as it becomes less and less effective at producing additional output.  Eventually, 
growth in capital does not lead to growth in income per capita, and the economy 
reaches a  “standstill” with zero growth. 6  Neoclassical growth theorists posit that 
new technologies can get the economy out of the zero-growth slump by making 
5 Industry tends to invest in applied research, development, and the deployment stages of technology. 
However, a discussion of such is beyond the scope of this article.
6 In the most general sense, investing in physical inputs is limited to the space available in which these inputs 
are employed.  In the extreme, one can imagine the aggregation of all landmasses on Earth and how, eventually, 
the building of and employment of machinery, buildings, and people will cause crowding.  Inevitably, the addition 
of another input to production will not produce as much additional output as it would have before.  However, if 
technological progress occurs, an economy will be able to use a given amount of capital more efficiently (i.e., growth 
in GDP per capita can occur without growth in capita/labor).
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current inputs more productive.  For example, one unit of physical capital per capita 
can now produce two units of output rather than one.  The major point is that 
neoclassical growth theory tells us that an economy cannot rely solely on an input 
that exhibits diminishing marginal product to sustain long-run economic growth if 
technical progress does not exist.
 Neoclassical models, however, fail to explain where technical progress comes 
from. Since then, economists have attempted to explain other sources of long-run 
economic growth that do not rely on an exogenous (i.e., external) source of technical 
progress.  This set of literature is known as endogenous growth (i.e., generated from 
within) theory, which posits ways in which the economy creates growth based on 
the decisions made by agents within that economy.  The most relevant subset of 
endogenous growth theory models is largely based on R&D as another input into 
production, alongside physical capital (Aghion and Howitt 1992; Grossman and 
Helpman 1994; Romer 1990).  The defining characteristic of the R&D-based 
models of endogenous growth is the two-fold effect that research has on output—
making it such a productive input that it outweighs the diminishing marginal 
product of capital.
 Successful research not only raises the efficiency in which output is produced 
(e.g., by improving existing intermediate products or processes), but it also raises 
the productivity of the entire scientific labor force (e.g., knowledge transfers 
between scientists make it easier to conduct future research).  Conceptually, the 
following example explains the latter effect: consider a room of scientists who 
conduct research.  When one more researcher is added to the room, she adds to 
the existing stock of knowledge by producing an improved method of production. 
Subsequently, this knowledge spills over to other scientists, who then proceed to 
create even more knowledge and improved processes—and the cycle continues. 
These R&D-based models conclude that the economic growth rate is defined by 
the growth in science inputs (e.g., number researchers or research funding) and how 
large knowledge spillovers are.
R&D, Technology, and Economic Growth  Globally
 The same thought process carries over to a global economy context—knowledge 
is not only transferred within an industry but also across industries, across time, and 
across the globe (Feenstra 1996; Grossman and Helpman 1991).  Therefore, the 
productivity of a country should depend on both its own R&D investment activities 
and the R&D activities of other countries (if R&D spillovers exist).  Furthermore, 
productivity is influenced positively by the rate of knowledge diffusion (i.e., how 
quickly knowledge spillovers are diffused) and whether the receiving country has a 
threshold level of absorptive capacity (i.e., the level of sophistication necessary to 
grasp and exploit the knowledge) (Keller 2004).  The absence of technological and 
scientific knowledge spillovers has been one explanation for the large productivity 
differentials among countries—if spillovers remain geographically proximate to 
where knowledge production takes place, then other countries will not be able to 
exploit it.
 However, globalization has made diffusion easier, facilitating large spillovers 
capable of extending beyond traditional geographical limits and occurring between 
more developed, innovating countries and less developed, adopting countries. 
These spillovers tend to be somewhat asymmetric or, in many cases, unidirectional 
(Branstetter 2001).  That is, larger and more advanced economies tend to create 
knowledge spillovers that diffuse to other economies (both developed and 
developing), but the reverse is not true. According to Keller, “For most countries, 
foreign sources of technology account for ninety percent or more of domestic 
productivity growth.  At present, only a handful of rich countries account for most 
of the world’s creation of new technology” (Keller 2004, 752).
 As developing economies recognize the importance of strong scientific 
and technological infrastructures and continue to invest in improving such an 
infrastructures, they are becoming more competitive with developed economies 
like the United States, which implies that the net effect of economies in transition 
on global social welfare can be positive or negative.  That is, negative effects caused 
by increased competition from foreign sources (e.g., job loss for unskilled labor, 
lowering of real wages, and loss of market share) may or may not be outweighed 
by the positive impacts of global knowledge spillovers (e.g., more products, lower 
prices, job creation for highly skilled labor, and increases in real wages for highly 
skilled labor).
 Certainly worth mentioning is the recent debate about whether  the offshoring 
of R&D is potentially damaging to the U.S. economy (Bhagwati, Panagariya, and 
Srinivasan 2004; Samuelson 2004; Tassey 2010).  Pure theory of international 
trade shows that trade benefits the global economy by allowing countries to 
specialize in the manufacture and export of products that they can most efficiently 
produce.  For instance, the United States, whose economy once was based largely on 
manufacturing, has moved to being a knowledge-intensive economy.  Even though 
the transition from a manufacturing- to a knowledge-based economy creates losses 
in unskilled employment, the benefits of increased high-skill employment, higher 
variety of goods, and lower prices are seen to outweigh the losses.  Nonetheless, 
firms in the United States have been increasingly sending R&D activities offshore 
(Tassey 2010).  This transfer reduces costs and raises productivity, which a is good 
thing. Tassey explains, however, that there are potentially substantial costs from this 
behavior.  Offshoring R&D replaces domestic R&D labor with foreign labor and 
allows foreign R&D centers to have a co-location advantage—(host countries will 
benefit more from the R&D centers located within their own borders since spillovers 
are geographically localized.)  Furthermore, as more and more R&D functions are 
moved offshore, a global pool of skilled labor grows, causing downward pressure on 
wages for high-skill jobs (Samuelson 2004).  As countries advance their scientific, 
technological, and innovation-enhancing infrastructures, they create competition 
in technology-intensive goods, a market in which the United States has historically 
enjoyed a near monopoly.  Whether or not these benefits will outweigh any negative 
impact on skilled wages is unknown.
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Tacit and Codified Knowledge
 Within the literature, there are two distinguishable types of knowledge—
codified and tacit.  Codified knowledge is expressed in a format that is compact, 
standardized, and relatively easy to transfer (Cowan, David, and Foray 2000). 
Codified knowledge is produced, for instance, when scientists conduct basic research 
and develop new theories, models, instruments, etc.  The most common channels 
through which codified knowledge diffuses are publications and conferences; 
as a result, innovators have relatively easy access to codified knowledge.  Tacit 
knowledge, on the other hand, is knowledge that is “person-embodied” and that 
cannot be articulated or codified, such as skills or know-how (Polanyi 1958).  Tacit 
knowledge becomes embodied within scientists through experience.  They develop 
practical problem-solving skills and become highly specialized workers in their 
fields of study.  This embodied knowledge can be diffused through joint research 
collaboration between the science system and firms or by firms hiring trained 
scientists.7  Significantly, tacit knowledge is just as important as codified knowledge 
for innovation, but tacit knowledge is not always as readily accessible.  The ability 
of an innovator to fully understand and successfully exploit codified knowledge 
requires some threshold level of scientific understanding within her organization 
(Cohen  Levinthal 1989).
 Furthermore, the science system largely comprises universities, whose primary 
focus is on educating current science students.  Successful students are the backbone 
of the scientific labor force—but only after they have obtained their degrees and 
launched their careers.  This means that codified knowledge and tacit knowledge 
are diffused not only in a geographic sense, but also in an inter-temporal sense. 
That is, the tacit skills being learned by current students will be utilized either when 
they enter the science system as qualified scientists or when they enter the scientific 
work force ashighly skilled, specialized employees within industry.  The codified 
knowledge learned through current textbooks and articles will be used as the 
foundation on which they will build their new theories and develop new knowledge.
The Science System, Knowledge Accumulation, and Economic Growth
 The characteristics of scientific knowledge play a fundamental role in 
understanding the contribution of that knowledge to growth in any given economy. 
First, the potential future economic benefits of scientific knowledge are highly 
uncertain and unpredictable.  Advances in knowledge may be exploited immediately, 
or it may take many years, possibly decades, for industry to begin to apply the 
knowledge.  Similarly, advances in knowledge may have no commercial application. 
This reality may disincline risk-averse firms to invest in basic research.  Second, 
knowledge is generally characterized by nonrivalry and nonexcludability; in short, 
it is a public good (Arrow 1971).
 Nonrivalry of knowledge means that, once it has been created, one person’s use 
7 Brökel and Binder (2007) discuss how Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge has diverged into two definitions 
in the literature.  Whether or not tacit knowledge is actually transferrable is subject to debate and has implications 
on the extent of knowledge spillovers.  First, if tacit knowledge is truly inherent in an individual and is completely 
uncodifiable, then it cannot be transferred to someone else, even through interaction.  Second, if tacit knowledge 
can be “taught” through apprenticeships or interaction with experts, then interpersonal interaction represents an 
important method for the transfer of such knowledge.
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of it does not diminish its usefulness to others.  As a result, the cost of producing a 
piece of information is zero for each subsequent user of that knowledge.  For example, 
scientists A and B can use a chemical formula at the same time; or once scientist A 
has used the formula, scientist B can use it without incurring additional costs.  A 
counter-example is a private good such as an apple, which cannot simultaneously 
be consumed by more than one person.  Or, if person A eats an apple, the cost of 
producing another apple is greater than zero.  Nonexcludability means that the 
producer of knowledge cannot (or chooses not to) prohibit anyone from using it.8, 9 
In proceeding with the example of the chemical formula, a scientist who publishes 
his research findings makes them available to others.  These characteristics imply 
that once knowledge is created, it is costless to access and does not vanish when 
others use it.  Thus, an institution that invests in basic research produces knowledge 
that can be freely accessed by other institutions—even if these other institutions 
did not invest in the science themselves and pay nothing to access it.10
 According to economic theory, a profit-maximizing firm will not want to 
invest resources in science if it will not earn money (uncertainty, time lags) and/
or if others use it without paying for it.  Put another way, a profit-maximizing 
firm will free-ride on the investments made by other firms.  The clear outcome 
of this profit-maximizing mentality is meager investment in basic research and a 
parallel tendency to regard science as proprietary and thus discourage its diffusion. 
Consequently, the public-good properties of knowledge provide a rationale behind 
a government’s investment in basic research.  Theoretically, governments can either 
subsidize investment in science or conduct it themselves.  Globally, most national 
governments provide basic research funding to the science system.11  Furthermore, 
this is why most firms use the science system as an external source of knowledge in 
lieu of conducting basic research in-house.
 Still there are arguments that, even if the assumptions of nonexcludability 
and nonrivalry hold, there are supplementary reasons for firms to conduct basic 
research that outweigh the associated disincentives (Rosenberg 1990).  First, a 
firm’s decision to invest in basic research often is based on the anticipation that 
returns from the investment with cover costs, regardless of the spillover to other 
firms.  Second, a firm’s decision to conduct basic research in-house can lead to 
more productive applied research and development opportunities.  Third, since 
the commercialization of science is a long-term process, large successful firms that 
believe they will have a strong market presence in the future are often inclined 
to invest in basic research today.  Finally, firms that invest in basic research often 
create a specialized R&D department that has the means to fully understand and 
exploit external sources of knowledge.  As Rosenberg contends, in-house science is 
8 The classic example is national defense.
9 The science system has unique institutional norms such that scientists are motivated to publicly display their 
research findings as quickly as possible.  For a detailed discussion of the norms of science, please refer to section 
titled “Mertonian Norms of Science and the Diffusion of Codified Knowledge,” below.
10 See Kealy and Al-Ubayadli (2001), who argue that knowledge is not a public good.
11 See supra note 1.
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a requisite for firms hoping to tap into the network of scientists conducting basic 
research in other sectors.  Or, put another way, for firms to exploit the knowledge 
created by universities and laboratories, they must exceed a threshold level of in-
house capability.
 This last point leads to the debate over whether it really is “costless” for a firm to 
use knowledge.  As stated by Rosenberg:
[S]uch knowledge is regarded by economists as being “on the shelf ” 
and costlessly available to all comers once it has been produced.  
But this model is seriously flawed because it frequently requires a 
substantial research capability [in-house]. . . . The cost of maintaining 
this capability is high, because it is likely to require a cadre of in-
house scientists who can do these things.  And, in order to maintain 
such a cadre, the firm must be willing to let them perform basic 
research (Rosenberg 1990, 171).
Thus, at issue is whether or not knowledge really is a non-rival good.  For example, a 
firm would need to employ scientists who have the ability to understand a chemical 
formula, and since most scientists are driven by esteem and recognition, the firm 
would most likely need to grant their scientists the freedom to publish.  Similarly, 
although a chemist, economist, businessperson, and auto technician could all access 
the formula at zero cost, it is likely that only the chemist could understand it entirely 
or adapt it for commercial use.  Furthermore, for the chemist to understand the 
formula, he must have invested in education and attained experience in the field of 
chemistry.  In short, accessing the formula might be free, but using it and converting 
it into something of economic value has an associated cost.  This discussion suggests 
that science is not purely a public good, but rather a quasi-public good (Kealy and 
Al-Ubayadli 2001).
Science, Innovation, and Economic Growth—The Empirical 
Evidence
Nonpatent Citation Studies
 Intangible knowledge is most often codified in the form of research findings 
published in peer-reviewed scientific journals.  One method of measuring 
the importance of science to innovation and thus to economic growth is to use 
nonpatent citation analysis.  Economists Adam B. Jaffe, Bronwyn H. Hall, and 
Manuel Trajtenberg created a large database of more than three million patents 
granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) (Hall, Jaffe, 
and Trajtenberg 2001).  All patents must cite the sources used for their creation, 
including but not limited to, other patents (known as patent citations), conference 
proceedings, scientific articles, and nonscientific articles.  Any reference not made to 
other patents is referred to as a nonpatent citation (NPC).
 By studying these NPCs, one can determine “backward citations” (i.e., those 
references Patent A cites) and “forward citations” (i.e., all subsequent patents 
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that cite Patent A).  Economists attempting to measure a patent’s dependence 
on scientific knowledge use backward NPCs, which reference previous scientific 
articles in scholarly journals, as proxies for knowledge.12  It is important to note 
that the usefulness of patents as indicators of innovation has been debated within 
the literature.  The foremost issue is that patents really are more representative of 
inventions and not innovations.  An invention is the initial occurrence of an idea and 
so does not necessarily require entry into a market.  An innovation is the realization 
of an invention, and so is a derivative of an invention.  In this sense, an invention does 
not have economic value until it becomes an innovation.  Many patented inventions 
never make it to the market and thus are never commercialized.  Furthermore, 
using patent citation analysis inherently assumes that science is simply an input 
into technological advancement (i.e., a one-way linear model).  Consequently, such 
analysis doesn’t capture the idea that feedback loops exist and that technology can 
also advance science.
 Recently, a study used scientific NPCs as a measure of the closeness between 
science and ten fields of technology and examined how this interaction is correlated 
with both technological productivity (patents per capita) and a country’s relative 
technological specialization (i.e., the technological domain in which it specializes) 
(van Looy et al. 2003).  The focus was on eight of the largest European economies, 
with data compiled from 1992 to 1996.13  The results indicated that science and 
productivity are positively correlated for newly emerging technologies or ones that 
initially relied on science (biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, organic fine chemistry, 
and semiconductors) but not for those that began independently from science.  The 
findings of this study suggest that science improves productivity for a particular 
set of technological domains.  The important implication for this is that there 
should not be a one-size-fits-all policy governing science and technology.  For those 
industries characterized by science intensity, policy should be directed toward 
spurring more collaboration between the science system and industry.  For others, 
a different approach geared more toward innovation policy, and not science policy 
per se, should prevail.
Surveys of Innovative Firms
 The most often used method of assessing the importance of scientific 
research to technological progress involves asking innovative firms directly if their 
innovations relied on science.  The method begins by defining which firms are 
considered innovative (i.e., did they introduce a new or improved product or process 
innovation?).  Next, the innovative firms are asked a series of questions related to 
their business organization, the sources of their ideas and information, how they 
developed the innovation, etc.  Currently, most industrialized economies conduct 
bi-annual or annual surveys.  The most well-known survey is the Community 
12 Forward citations are used most often as indicators of the quality or value of a patent (i.e., the most forward 
citations a patent has, the higher its value).
13 The technological domains include biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, organic fine chemistry, semiconductors, 
agriculture and food, chemistry, optics, information technology, basic materials chemistry, telecommunications, 
and analysis, measurement, and control technology.  European economies include Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland.  van Looy et al. 2003.
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Innovation Survey (CIS), which is carried out by members of the European Union, 
Iceland, and Norway.  Similar surveys are conducted in Japan, Latin American 
economies, South Korea, and Switzerland.  Unfortunately, the United States is one 
of the few economies that does not use a standard innovation survey.  The closest 
is the National Science Foundation’s Survey of Industrial R&D and Innovation, 
which includes a much broader set of firms, including both innovating and non-
innovating companies.  Private surveys in the United States, such as the well-
known Yale Survey and the Carnegie Mellon Survey, have been used to gauge the 
importance of science and innovation.
 Mansfield (1991, 1998) was the first to survey firms about the reliance 
of their technological innovation on public research output.  Firms in seven 
manufacturing industries were asked whether or not new products and processes 
would have been developed at all or without substantial delay in the absence of 
recent academic research (occurring within fifteen years).  The 1991 conclusions 
show that, on average, eleven percent of product innovations and nine percent 
of process innovations could not have been developed without recent academic 
research.  Furthermore, the results indicate how the importance of science varied 
across different types of industries.  For instance, firms in information-processing, 
pharmaceuticals, and metals industries relied heavily on academic research, whereas 
petroleum and chemical industries did not.
 In his 1998 update, Mansfield found that, in the absence of academic research, 
an average of fourteen percent of new products and eleven percent of new processes 
across industries could have not been developed without substantial delay.  These 
figures transformed into new product sales of forty-four billion (5.1 percent of 
total sales) and seventeen billion in cost savings (two percent of total costs).  There 
are several extensions of the Mansfield approach to analyzing a firm’s reliance on 
public-sector research.  Using data from the Fourth Mannheim Innovation Survey 
given to German manufacturing firms, Beise and Stahl (1999) produced findings 
similar to Mansfield’s.  Of the R&D intensive firms surveyed, 15.9 percent relied 
on public research institutions in Germany.  For non-R&D-intensive firms, 6.2 
percent utilized public research.  The authors estimated an increase of DM19.4 
billion (4.5 percent of total sales) in industry sales of new product innovations that 
relied on public research.  Further, university research and public research institutes 
accounted for 78 and 63 percent, respectively, of the increase in industry sales. 
Beise and Stahl also added a statistical specification that estimated the propensity 
of a firm  anto utilize public research.  The authors found that the larger the firm 
in terms of employees and R&D intensity, the more likely the firm will use public 
research outputs.
 Malo (2009) modified the Mansfield approach by focusing on the importance 
of public research in combinatorial chemistry to new pharmaceutical drug 
discovery.  By asking firms to rank, using the Likert Scale,14 the importance of 
different scientific and technological sub-fields of the drug-discovery process, Malo 
found that public research in basic science fields of organic chemistry, genomics, 
14 The Likert Scale is a psychometric scale most often used in questionnaire surveys.  In such suveys, respondents 
are asked to choose a subjective rating (e.g., strongly agree, agree, disagree, etc.) for a given statement.
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and biochemistry ranks as the most important.15  Further, his results indicate that 
scientific publications ranked first as a source for basic research for new entrants, 
whereas hiring was ranked number one for larger firms.
 Some of the literature finds that public research is not as important as other 
sources of information for innovating firms.  Monjon and Waelbroeck (2003) use 
data from the European CIS survey of French manufacturing firms to estimate 
the propensity of an innovating firm to develop a new product, which they call a 
radical innovation, over improving existing products, which they term incremental 
innovation.  The results indicate that a firm is more likely to produce radical 
innovations if it utilizes external information sources, including the vertical chain 
of supply (customers and input suppliers) and patent publications.  Increased 
reliance on information from universities and public research organizations 
actually decreases the probability of radical innovation, although these coefficients 
are not statistically significant.  The authors caution that the insignificance of the 
coefficients does not necessarily mean that the information source is not important; 
rather, it could mean that the information source is important both to radical and 
incremental innovation.
 Furthermore, Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2002) analyzed survey data from 
the 1994 Carnegie Mellon Survey of R&D managers at manufacturing firms and 
found that, across all industries, public research is used much less frequently for 
the development of ideas that issued from a firm’s own vertical chain of production 
(customers and input suppliers).  However, nearly sixty percent of firms in the 
pharmaceutical, petroleum, steel, machine tool, semiconductor, and aerospace 
industries used basic research as a source of ideas.  Further, if firms did use basic 
research, most of them obtained it from publications in the form of research findings 
and instruments and methodologies or by interacting at informal meetings, instead 
of by using designed prototypes.
The Science System as an Educator of the Future Scientific 
Work Force
Tacit Knowledge and Absorptive Capacity
 Knowledge-based endogenous growth models hypothesize that the 
accumulation of knowledge leads to perpetual growth (Aghion and Howitt 1992; 
Grossman and Helpman 1994; Romer 1990).  In nearly all of the endogenous 
growth models, it is implicitly assumed that the firm has the ability to use the 
codified knowledge generated by the science system.  However, firms may not 
possess the particular expertise necessary to exploit this external knowledge 
effectively. In other words, a firm’s labor force must possess a requisite level of tacit 
skill if the firm is to exploit external knowledge.  This is what is known as a firm’s 
“absorptive capacity” (Cohen and Levinthal 1989).  As Polanyi states of the crucial 
link between codified and tacit knowledge, “explicit (codified) knowledge must rely 
on being tacitly understood and applied” (Polanyi 1966, 7).
15 For example, one of the survey questions from Malo (2009) is “What is the relevance of public research (i.e., 
knowledge) in combinatorial chemistry to combinatorial drug discovery along a seven point Likert Scale where 1= 
highly irrelevant and 7= highly relevant?”
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 A well-educated scientific labor force not only generates and commercializes 
new ideas, but also has the inherent ability to build upon the existing stock of 
knowledge.  The science system is not only a research haven, but because it primarily 
consists of institutes of higher education, its chief mission is to transmit current 
scientific knowledge to the future scientific labor force.  In essence, the science 
system creates a specialized labor force by educating current students through 
lectures, by posing problems, and by providing laboratory experience.
 Educating the future work force in science is essential for two main reasons. 
First, to advance the current state of knowledge, scientists must be able to fully 
understand it.  That is, students must be fluent in the current state of science if they 
are to build upon it.  Second, after these students have entered the scientific labor 
force, they can (i) create technological innovations themselves, and/or (ii) help 
increase the absorptive capacity of an innovating firm (Salter and Martin 2001).
Institutional Norms of the Science System and Their Impact 
on the Diffusion of Knowledge
 According to the endogenous growth theory, the fundamental feature of 
knowledge is its positive spillover effects, which result from knowledge’s public-
good properties of nonexcludability and nonrivalry.  The theory contends that new 
knowledge spills over, or flows, from those who have invested in and produced it 
relative to other parts of the economy.  According to the national innovations system 
approach, the innovative capability of an economy depends on how effectively this 
knowledge flows between and among various economic agents OECD 1997). 
Indeed, how new scientific knowledge and the knowledge embodied within 
researchers diffuse across various sectors is a major determinant of technological 
progress.16,17
 Distinct diffusion channels exist for codified and tacit knowledge.  The science 
system generates new knowledge in the form of ideas, laws, and theories that can be 
broken down and codified in an understandable written form.  Although primarily 
disseminated through scientific publications, this new codified knowledge can also 
diffuse through nonscientific publications, seminars, and even informal interactions 
between scientists and industrialists.
 At the same time, the science system also educates, which effectively “generates” 
tacit knowledge, as professors and scientists transfer the existing state of knowledge 
to current students through books, lectures, and hands-on learning experiences 
(e.g., laboratory experiments and internships).  Hands-on learning also builds and 
16 This is not to say that the only important linkage is that between industry and the science system.  Inter-
industry, customer-industry, and nonprofit-industry relationships are also important but beyond the scope of this 
review.
17 Of course, users of scientific knowledge include not only firms, but also the science system itself (indeed, 
this is the argument behind its positive spillovers).  This statement merely reflects the general truism that firms 
utilize knowledge to innovate.  The science system utilizes knowledge to improve upon it and to create more 
knowledge.  The former sector has a more direct effect on economic growth, as technological innovation is what 
directly contributes to economic growth.  Science is an input into technological innovation.
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refines the tacit skills embodied within scientists.  This tacit knowledge is further 
diffused to technologists through face-to-face interaction (e.g., conferences, informal 
meetings).  In these settings, the scientist transfers his embodied knowledge to the 
firm/entrepreneur.  This embodied knowledge is also transferred when scientists 
depart the science system to join industry.  One could reasonably argue that the 
science system’s capacity to transfer knowledge is just as important as its creation of 
the knowledge in the first place (OECD 1996).
 The science system is unique among the actors within an economy that 
economists traditionally study.  In particular, agents within the science system 
are not driven to maximize profits, as is the case within the realm of technology. 
Furthermore, a scientist’s output is critically reviewed and analyzed—in effect, 
vetted—by her peers within the science system.  This review process establishes 
the credibly of newly created knowledge and attests to its value and relevance to 
the current state of science and technology.  This particular norm of the science 
system is what allows codified knowledge to create the positive spillovers that 
are so important to economic growth.  If scientists were driven only to maximize 
profits, they would opt to keep their research findings secret to prevent others from 
exploiting them.  Instead, the norms governing the science system motivate the 
producers of knowledge to diffuse their research findings as quickly and widely as 
possible.18  The following section discusses how the unique institutional norms of 
the science system encourage the diffusion of both types of knowledge and, in the 
process, create the spillovers necessary for economic growth.
Mertonian Norms of Science and the Diffusion of Codified Knowledge
 It is worth noting that scientists are not bound by law to reveal their research 
findings; they can—and sometimes do—opt to keep their work secret (Callon 
1994).  However, since the scientific revolution, most scientists have conformed 
to an evolving set of norms termed the Mertonian norms of science or represented 
by the acronym CUDOS (communalism, universalism, disinterestedness, and 
organized skepticism) (Merton 1942).  The most relevant of these in terms of effects 
on the economy are communalism and organized skepticism.  Communalism is the 
idea that scientists are inclined to share their work freely with their peers to gain 
recognition and prestige, rather than cloak their findings in secrecy in hopes of later 
exploiting those findings to gain financial reward.  Organized skepticism refers to 
the idea that research findings are extensively reviewed, evaluated, and critiqued by 
a scientist’s peers before those findings are deemed valid.19
 Codified knowledge is so accessible largely because of the prevailing incentives 
that reward scientists for freely sharing their research.  Motivated by the recognition 
and the esteem associated with the pursuit of ground-breaking research, scientists 
within the science system want to create knowledge and diffuse it as quickly and 
18 As stated earlier, universities are the major component of the science system.  It is important to note that 
universities do patent some of their research findings, leading to the conclusion that there is some research that is 
kept secret.  In general, however, universities are the biggest producers of easily accessible codified knowledge.
19 David (2004) provides a review of the origins of open science.
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widely as possible.  The unique institutional norm of open science not only motivates 
quick dispersion of new knowledge, but also reduces replication of research and 
provides credibility to research findings by inviting public critique (Arrow 1971; 
Nelson 1959).
 Codified knowledge is diffused chiefly through publications,20 but the growth 
of information and communication technologies has expedited and simplified the 
diffusion process and dramatically expanded the audience (Roberts 2000).  Indeed, 
the global reach of digitized videos, images, and publications has eliminated many 
geographical and intertemporal boundaries.  As a consequence, codified knowledge 
is no longer necessarily localized to a particular region.  The new scientific discovery 
published in an American scholarly journal now is available globally in PDF format 
on the Internet.  Firms in Japan can immediately access this new knowledge and 
then capitalize on it by creating commercial applications of such knowledge.
Social Networks and the Diffusion of Tacit Knowledge
 Innovating firms that tap publications and other external sources for ideas often 
rely on scientists who embody the tacit skills necessary to exploit the knowledge 
contained within these codified sources.  However, firms do not necessarily have to 
employ scientists; they can interact with them through research collaboration and 
various other formal and informal channels.
 Skills inherent in one person (i.e., tacit knowledge) cannot easily be transferred 
person-to-person in a codified form, but tacit knowledge can be diffused to 
industry by the movement of researchers from the science system to industry, 
through firms’ consultation with trained problem solvers, or through structured 
research collaboration (OECD 2005).  These tacit channels are most important in 
the transference of new discoveries that cannot be codified quickly, and they help 
explain why the more innovative firms locate near universities or other research 
laboratories (Arundel, van de Paal, and Soete 1995; Singh 2005; Zucker, Darby, 
and Armstrong 2002).  The same explanation accounts for the clusters of innovative 
firms that exist in particular regions, including Boston’s Route 128 (home of MIT 
and Harvard), Silicon Valley (home of Stanford University), and Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee (home of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and proximate to the 
University of Tennessee) (Anselin, Varga, and Acs1997; Saxenian 1994).  Being 
located close to the source of knowledge—both codified and tacit—helps facilitates 
the diffusion of that knowledge.
Evaluating Localization Effects through Analysis of Nonpatent Citations 
 The diffusion of knowledge is measured in terms of the geographical distribution 
of spillovers or by surveying firms on the relative importance of various sources 
of knowledge.  Codified knowledge is diffused primarily through publications; so 
evaluating the spillover effect (in terms of geographic distance) of a piece of codified 
knowledge involves analysis of patent citations (Arundel and Geuna 2004).  If the 
spillover is localized (i.e., users of the knowledge are located proximate to the source 
20 Over time, the science system has established an institution that transfers codified knowledge in a systematic 
way.
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of the knowledge), one can infer that tacit knowledge served as an important source 
of information (Anselin, Varga, and Acs 1997, 2000).  By contrast, firms that rely 
more on codified (versus tacit) knowledge would have little incentive to locate close 
to the source of the information.  In his seminal work, Jaffe (1989) found that 
patents are most likely to be granted in research-intensive states (i.e., those states 
with the largest amounts of funding for university research).  Through an analysis 
of patent citations, Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) found that patents 
from a particular state or statistical metropolitan area are more likely to cite existing 
patents or published findings produced locally.
 Sorenson and Fleming (2004) analyzed 16,728 U.S. utility patent citations to 
compare the diffusion of knowledge from published, versus unpublished, materials. 
As one might expect, the researchers found that published articles diffuse further 
and faster than those that are not published, which supports the view that open 
science makes an important contribution to the spillover effect.  Similarly, the 
diffusion of knowledge through publication is more prominent than the diffusion 
through social networks (Sorenson and Singh 2007), which further affirms the 
importance of the norms of open science.
Results of Surveys of Innovative Firms
 Most often, surveys of firms simply ask which sources of knowledge are 
the most important to the firms’ innovative capability.  For example, in the case 
of the PACE Survey, firms are given a set of different information sources (e.g., 
publications, conferences, interpersonal interactions, trained scientists) and asked to 
rank them, using the Likert Scale, in terms of importance.  Following the discovery 
that knowledge spillover tends to be localized, the economics literature has sought 
to determine why.  The explanation cited most often is that firms are more effective 
at exploiting codified knowledge if they have direct access to the local producers of 
that knowledge.
 Survey results provide mixed evidence on the importance to industry of 
various sources of knowledge.  Malo (2009) conducted a global survey of top R&D 
managers who specialize in combinatorial chemistry and asked them to rank the 
importance of different sources of basic scientific knowledge.  New firms ranked 
publications as the most important, ahead of research contracts and conferences. 
Large established firms ranked hiring, patents, and publications as most important, 
in that order.
 For external sources of information, public research is ranked as the most 
important relative to competitors, R&D firms, and joint ventures, according to a 
random draw of the 1994 Carnegie Mellon Survey results (Cohen et al. 2002). 
Of different diffusion channels, the survey ranked publications, conferences, and 
informal contacts as the most important public research sources.  Furthermore, it 
was found that more-codified sources of public research, such as publications and 
conferences, contributed more to the completion of existing R&D projects.  Tacit 
sources, such as informal contacts and recent hires, were positively correlated to the 
introduction of new R&D projects.  The 1993 PACE Survey of Europe’s largest 
industrial firms shows that external sources of tacit knowledge are ranked higher 
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than external sources of codified knowledge.  These sources include hiring trained 
scientists and engineers, having informal personal contacts, and pursuing research 
contracting (Arundel and Geuna 2004).
Conclusion
 This article summarizes the current economics literature on the different 
mechanisms through which the science system affects the economy.  The science 
system produces new knowledge upon which innovation builds, creates a skilled 
scientific labor force that will continue to advance the current state of knowledge, 
and helps firms/entrepreneurs create innovation.  Further, the system diffuses 
knowledge quickly and widely, generating the many spillovers that contribute to 
economic growth.  Ten conclusions arise from this analysis:
According to knowledge-based endogenous growth models (e.g., those that 
use science, R&D, or human capital as an input for production), perpetual 
economic growth can result exclusively from the positive spillovers created 
by cumulative knowledge, regardless of advances in exogenous technical 
progress.  Advancement in knowledge affects production in two ways:  by 
reducing the cost of future research and by increasing the productivity 
of other inputs (e.g., researchers, engineers, intermediate goods). 
Consequently, an economy that has a continuously growing knowledge 
base will enjoy ever-increasing GDP per capita growth over the long run.
1. Scientific knowledge is either codified (explicit) or tacit 
(implicit).  Codified knowledge is that which is expressed in 
a compact and standardized format, such as in publications 
and presentations (Cowan, David, and Foray 2000).  Tacit 
knowledge, by contrast, is “person embodied” and develops 
over time through experiences (Polanyi 1958).  These two 
forms of knowledge are highly complementary, and most 
scholars agree that innovators trying to exploit knowledge 
require both.
2. Views diverge on the characteristics of codified knowledge, 
and this divergence has important growth and policy 
implications.  First is the proposition that knowledge is a 
public good that creates the positive spillovers necessary 
for economic growth (Arrow 1971).  Accordingly, profit-
maximizing agents will lack the incentive to invest in 
science because they (i) cannot appropriate the full returns 
of their research findings and (ii) they can freely capitalize 
on research conducted—and funded—by others.  This 
provides a rationale for government-funded science.  Others 
argue that knowledge is not a public good—although access 
to knowledge may be costless, understanding and exploiting 
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it is not.  In this view, science is not characterized by large 
spillovers, and the rationale for government-funded science 
is thus weakened.
3. Rosenberg (1990) summarizes several alternative incentives 
that explain why a firm will invest in science, even if it is 
a public good.  First, large firms are not concerned about 
capturing all of the returns generated by their own research.  
Indeed, all that matters is that their returns cover their costs 
and generate a profit.  Second, in-house research teams allow 
a firm to operate on the frontiers of knowledge, and this 
can point them in the direction of exploitable commercial 
opportunities.  Third, an in-house science team is capable 
of understanding—and exploiting—external sources of 
knowledge.
4. Econometric studies that attempt to quantify the impact 
of science on the economy are fraught with difficulties, 
and, as a result, few if any such studies exist.  However, a 
few econometric studies that calculate a rate of return on 
firm-level basic research investment show that there is a 
large premium on basic research over applied research and 
development.  That is, the rate of return on one dollar spent 
on basic research is much higher than the rate of return if 
the same dollar is spent on applied research (Lichtenberg 
and Siegel 1991; Griliches 1979).
5. Publicly funded basic research is shown to complement 
firm-level basic research.  Thus, a one-dollar investment 
in basic research by the government creates additional 
investment in basic research by private firms.
6. An often-used methodology to date that relates the 
importance of science to innovation involves nonpatent 
citation studies, which indicate that innovation has 
increasingly relied on science.  Predictably, science improves 
productivity for particular sets of technology sectors.  
The important implication is that there should not be a 
one-size-fits-all policy governing science, technology, and 
innovation.  In particular, for those industries characterized 
by science intensity, policy should be directed toward more 
collaboration between the science system and industry, 
which would accomplish quicker diffusion of knowledge 
between firms and the science system.
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7. Surveys provide mixed results on the important sources 
of innovation ideas.  High-technology firms most often 
rely on scientific knowledge, while less high-tech firms find 
that input from the vertical chain of production is the best 
source of insight into new commercial opportunities.  High-
medium-, and low-technology firms all report that one of 
the most important benefits of the science system is the 
educated scientific work force that the system creates.
8. University-industry collaboration is becoming increasingly 
important for innovation.  In economies across the globe, 
university and industry scientists are collaborating much 
more frequently on both research (as evidenced by co-
authorship on scientific articles) and on innovation (as 
evidenced by co-inventors on patent applications).  Science 
and technology policies are beginning to focus on ways to 
motivate such collaboration within one’s own country and 
with scientists from other countries.
9. The science system diffuses information in the forms of 
codified and tacit knowledge; but to some extent, the two 
sources are inextricably linked.  Indeed, evidence consistently 
suggests that those who are most likely to exploit research 
findings published in a journal (codified knowledge) also live 
and work geographically proximate to where the knowledge 
was produced.  The explanation is that, for firms to make 
full use of codified knowledge published from region A, 
they must also rely on the tacit knowledge of the publishing 
researcher to fully grasp the science.  This is why innovative 
firms often locate near universities or government research 
laboratories.
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Student Article
Explosive Trace Detection Searches in 
Airports 
Benjamin Signer, The University of Tennessee−Knoxville
Introduction1
 If you are a frequent air traveler, the dance is old hat to you by now.  You get 
to the airport at least an hour early.  Check in at the desk if you have not done so 
online.  Check a bag?  No, thank you.  At thirty dollars a bag, you will just use 
your carry-on.  Then you join the queue at security.  Eventually, a Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) officer scans your identification and boarding 
pass, and you take off your shoes in anticipation of the x-ray machine.  You submit 
everything metal to the x-ray conveyor (laptop in a separate case, of course) and 
shamble barefoot and beltless through the metal detector, praying that you will 
pass the officer’s disinterested scrutiny.  If all goes well, you collect your belongings, 
re-dress, and head to your gate.
 Since the attempted Christmas Day bombing on the flight from Amsterdam 
to Detroit, though, the TSA has added another move to the dance.2  In an attempt 
to detect explosives on a person that are not detectable by metal detectors, officers 
have begun swabbing passengers’ hands for traces of explosive material while they 
wait in line before being scanned by the metal detectors.  By conducting the tests on 
passengers prior to their reaching the metal detectors, the TSA hopes to increase 
safety without increasing wait times at security checkpoints.  By conducting the 
search before a passenger passes through the metal detector, however,  security 
personnel are treading onto a legal issue that has not been fully resolved.
 The legality of searching passengers by having them pass through a metal 
detector is well established.  Courts have long styled the metal detector as the 
symbolic portal that, once passed through, lowers a person’s expectation of privacy, 
but hand swabbing of passengers occurs before they cross this point of lowered 
expectations.  How will courts respond to this?  Is this an acceptable incremental 
decrease in our already lowered expectation of privacy at airports or an impermissible 
intrusion on what remains of our privacy expectations?
 This article discusses the technology behind the new hand-swab searches as 
well as some alternative airport security methods.  It then covers exceptions to 
1 In connection with the preparation of this article, I would like to thank Scott Broyles for his invaluable 
technical assistance and my father, Greg Signer, for his editorial assistance.
2 Doug Guthrie and George Hunter, Suspected ‘underwear bomber’ arraigned on terror conspiracy 
charges, The Detroit News, Dec. 17, 2010, available at http://www.detnews.com/article/20101217/
METRO/12170394/1409/ metro/Suspected-%E2%80%98underwear-bomber%E2%80%99-arraigned-on-
terror-conspiracy-charges.
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the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, existing airport search law, and 
extrapolates the likely result of a court case in which the legality of an airport search 
is at issue.
Technical Information
 Airport security was initiated primarily to keep passengers from carrying 
weapons onto a plane.  However, the 1960s hijacker intent on diverting planes and 
passengers to make a political statement has evolved into today’s terrorist willing 
to blow up planes and passengers (and often him or herself ) to make a political 
statement.  Preventing the smuggling of explosive devices onto airplanes has become 
as important as, if not more important than, keeping weapons off planes, especially 
since airplane cockpits have been secured.  In response, the technology of explosive 
detection also has evolved.  Today, there are many methods of explosive detection, 
each with its own pros and cons.
The Explosive Trace Detector
 The TSA is currently using a piece of technology referred to as the Explosive 
Trace Detector (“ETD”) to test the hands of some passengers.  The ETD involves the 
acquisition and analysis of microscopic traces of explosive compounds.3  According 
to Scott Broyles, an official with the Safe Skies Alliance, “The ETD is a tried and 
true system which has been used in aviation security since prior to TSA’s inception. 
It is considered to be very accurate and dependable.”  The ETD is normally used 
for screening carry-on luggage at security checkpoints and sometimes for screening 
luggage to be placed in the cargo compartment of passenger aircraft.4
 The TSA has begun to deploy ETDs randomly to screen passengers’ hands 
while they wait to pass through metal detectors as part of its effort to make security 
methods less predictable and, it believes, unavoidable.  “There seems to be no doubt 
regarding the technology’s ability to perform reliably and accurately.  I am not aware 
of another technology or search method that could serve as an alternative while 
providing the same accurate results,” says Broyles.5
Organic Methods of Explosive Detection
 A crucial part of a court’s analysis of a search method is its effectiveness and 
invasiveness compared to other search methods.  The method with which the 
general public is probably most familiar is the use of specially trained canines.  A 
dog’s olfactory bulb is roughly forty times larger than a human’s and has around 
3 Lisa Thiesan et al., Survey of Commercially Available Explosives Detection Technologies and Equipment 
2004, a research report prepared for the National Law Enforcement and Correction Technology Center, a Program 
of the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice (2004), at 24, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/208861.pdf.
4 E-mail interview by the author with Scott Broyles, Chief Operating Officer, National Safe Skies Alliance 
( Jan. 2011).
5 Id.
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200 million smell receptors.6  Dogs can detect scents in concentrations 100 million 
times lower than those that are detectible by humans.7  There are downsides to 
using trained dogs, though.  Dogs can cause a disturbance when they interact with 
small children or cause discomfort for passengers and employees who may be 
allergic to or who may fear dogs.  Like people, dogs are also capable of becoming 
tired or bored, which decreases their effectiveness.
 Some biotech scientists are reportedly working on a technique for detecting 
explosives with honeybees; but this system is still in development, and little is 
known about it.  Bees reportedly are capable of working for days before they have 
to be returned to their hive.8  Researchers at Colorado State University are also 
working on breeding bomb-detecting plants.  By manipulating the plants’ DNA, 
they can cause the plants to change color in the presence of certain explosive trace 
chemicals or pollutants.  However, this formidable flora is still three or four years 
away from deployment.9
Machine Olfaction
 The method of machine olfaction detection, sometimes called an “electronic 
nose,” works much like an organic nose.  Scent molecules strike a sensor that 
generates a signal that is analyzed by a computer.  In an electronic nose, the 
computer is an actual computer running a series of complex algorithms, while 
in an actual nose, a brain acts as the computer.  These devices can detect a single 
chemical with certainty.  The downside is that the more components a substance 
has, the less effective an electronic nose is at detecting them.10  So an electronic 
nose could identify the sulphur fumes from rotten eggs but would struggle with the 
sublime and complex aroma of my award-winning chili.  This means that a machine 
olfaction system may be relatively ineffective at detecting even a simple fertilizer 
bomb, which is a binary explosive.
Chemiluminescence
 Chemiluminescence is the creation of light resulting from certain chemical 
reactions.  Most explosives contain nitrogen.  Nitrogen molecules can be excited 
to emit infrared radiation.  The amount of emitted infrared radiation is directly 
proportional to the amount of the original explosive material that was present. 
Chemiluminescence systems are small, some weighing as little as seven pounds, 
but can cost up to $60,000 for each detector.  A significant disadvantage of the 
6 Stanley Coren, How Dogs Think (2004).
7 Natural History Museum of Los Angeles County, Smell, http://web.archive.org/web/20080801101136/
http://www.nhm.org/ exhibitions/dogs/formfunction/smell.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2011).
8 British Broadcasting Corporation, Hot picks: UK tech start-ups, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/
pagetools/ print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/6972526.stm (last visited Jan. 21, 2011).
9 John Roach, Bomb sniffing plants to the rescue, MSNBC, Jan. 27, 2011, http://cosmiclog.msnbc.msn.
com/_news/ 2011/01/27/5936102-bomb-sniffing-plants-to-the-rescue (last visited Jan. 20, 2011).
10 Larry Senesac and Thomas G. Thundat, Nanosensors for trace explosive detection, 11 Materials Today 28, 
31 (2008).
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chemiluminescence system is that it is unable to detect a non-nitrogen based 
explosive.11
Mass Spectrometry
 Mass spectrometry works by ionizing molecules and passing them through 
a filter, which allows them to be identified based on their charge-to-mass ratio. 
All molecules have different weights and fragmentation patterns that makes 
them readily identifiable.  Mass spectrometry is extremely reliable in identifying 
an unknown substance.  Unfortunately, mass spectrometry units are neither very 
portable (the smallest versions weighing in at around seventy-five pounds) nor 
cheap (the cheapest versions costing around $135,000).  The units also take a 
relatively long time to analyze a sample.12
Optical Dynamic Detection
 Optical dynamic detection systems are currently under development by 
Princeton University and the U. S. Department of Energy under the direction of 
the U. S. Department of Homeland Security.  Optical dynamic detection works by 
using a laser to excite the electrons in molecules in a suspicious package.  A second 
laser then passes through the package analyzing its spectrum.  One advantage of the 
optical dynamic detection system is that it is able to identify where an explosive is in 
a package.  This system is not ready for use yet, however, and one of its drawbacks 
is that can only work on packages, not people.13
The Law
The Fourth Amendment Generally
 The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prevents unreasonable 
searches and seizures by the government.  In most circumstances, this means that a 
judge must pre-approve a search and issue a search warrant based upon a showing of 
probable cause that the target of the requested search has or is engaged in criminal 
conduct and that the search will result in the discovery of evidence of such criminal 
wrongdoing.  The purpose of a warrant is to prevent the second-guessing of the 
reasonableness of a search and to allow an impartial judge to substitute his or her 
judgment for the searching officer’s.14
 A search is “ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of an individualized suspicion 
of wrongdoing.”15  There are certain situations, however, in which a search is still 
reasonable and lawful, even without prior judicial approval based upon probable 
cause.  Perhaps the best-known example is a search incident to a lawful arrest. 
11 Thiesan, supra note 3, at 33.
12 Id. at 39.
13 Tudor Vieru, New Explosive Detection Method Created, Softpedia, April 9, 2010.
14 U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976).
15 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
Anyone who has ever seen  a suspect arrested either on television or in real life has 
seen the cops do a quick frisk and search of the detainee’s person.  This search is 
allowed because courts have readily accepted that a police officer has the right to 
ensure his or her own safety by searching detained persons.16  Guards are also free 
to require identification and search people entering federal office buildings to help 
protect the building.17  Police are also allowed to set up road checkpoints to check 
for intoxicated drivers to help protect the motoring public.18  These exceptions to 
the warrant requirement fall into two main categories, the administrative search 
exception and the special needs search exception.
The Administrative Search Exception
 An administrative search exception is generally used to allow government to 
conduct inspections of a commercial entity in a well-regulated industry.  Applying 
this exception requires a finding of three criteria:
“First, there must be a ‘substantial’ government interest . . . 
.”  “Second, the warrantless inspections must be ‘necessary to 
further [the] regulatory scheme.’”  Third, the regulatory statute 
authorizing administrative inspections “must perform the two 
basic functions of a warrant:  it must advise the owner of the 
commercial premises that the search is being made pursuant to 
the law and has a properly defined scope, and it must limit the 
discretion of the inspecting officers.”19
As can be seen from the wording of the criteria, the administrative search exception 
was originally contemplated to deal with regulatory searches.  For example, the 
county health inspector does not need to apply for a warrant to search a restaurant 
located within his jurisdiction.  Even though administrative regulations may have 
the same purpose as penal laws, they do not lose their validity ”simply because 
the government has chosen to ‘address a major social problem both by way of an 
administrative scheme and through penal sanctions.’”20
 In the 1960s, the hijacking of commercial airliners started occurring largely as a 
means to bring attention to the hijackers’ political agenda, although a few hijackers 
were merely run-of-the-mill criminals.  The federal government moved quickly to 
secure the nation’s burgeoning passenger air industry by installing magnetometers 
to screen passengers before they could board an airplane and to inspect containers 
16 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
17 Dickerson v. Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732, 750-51 (2d Cir. 2010).
18 Martinez-Fuerte, supra note 14.
19 Kyle P. Hanson, Suspicionless Terrorism Checkpoints Since 9/11:  Searching for Uniformity, 56 Drake L. Rev. 
171, 178-79 (2007).
20 Id. (emphasis in original).
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at airports.21  Lacking any other schema for interpreting the new searches, courts 
evaluated them under the administrative search exception.22  “Given the high 
potential for harm to people and property, airport searches were found to be 
reasonable as long as people could avoid the searches by choosing not to fly, thus 
reducing the intrusion of the screenings to a minimal level.”23
The Special Needs Search Exception
 Over time, though, the courts have articulated another exception to the warrant 
requirement—the special needs exception:
[W]here a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special 
governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, 
it is necessary to balance the individual’s privacy expectations 
against the Government’s interests to determine whether it is 
impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized 
suspicion in the particular context.24
There is an additional step to the analysis in that the search must be reasonably 
effective at advancing the special governmental need.25
 What is a special governmental need beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement?  Generally, in deciding whether the special needs exception should 
apply, courts must first examine “whether the search “‘serve[s] as [its] immediate 
purpose an objective distinct from the ordinary evidence gathering associated 
with crime investigation.’”26  The next step is to determine the reasonableness of 
the search.  To determine whether the search was reasonable, the courts balance 
several competing considerations, including “(1) the weight and immediacy of the 
government interest, (2) ‘the nature of the privacy interest allegedly compromised 
by’ the search, (3) ‘the character of the intrusion imposed’ by the search, and (4) the 
efficacy of the search in advancing the government interest.”27
 In U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, the special governmental need was to secure the 
border against illegal immigrants.28  The Border Patrol established checkpoints on 
a California highway near the Mexican border.  Agents slowed all passing cars for 
a quick visual inspection and diverted some to another area for a secondary search. 
21 Scott McCartney, The Golden Age ofFlight, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748704684604575380992283473182.html?mod=googlenews_wsj.
22 Hanson, supra note 19, at 179.
23 Id. at 179-80.
24 Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989).
25 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454-55 (1990).
26 MacWadea v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 268 (2d Cir. 2006).
27 Id. at 269 (citations omitted).
28 Martinez-Fuerte, supra note 14.
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The court upheld the searches based on the need to interdict the flow of illegal 
immigrants and the relatively small intrusion that the drivers experienced.29
 However, the special need exception can, at times, straddle a fine line.  In 
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz,30 the court upheld checkpoint searches 
for intoxicated drivers, while in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,31 a checkpoint 
search for illegal drugs was deemed improper.  The distinction between the two 
searches made by the courts was that the government has a need to protect drivers 
from their intoxicated peers that goes beyond the enforcement of criminal laws, 
whereas searching cars for drugs can only serve the purpose of advancing a criminal 
investigation.32  If Indianapolis had only searched the cars of drivers who showed 
the effects of drug use, the city might also have prevailed in its case.
 Though the special needs exception is currently in vogue for explaining the 
permissibility of antiterrorism checkpoint searches, not everyone agreesthat the 
exception is warranted.  According to Ric Simmons, “the special needs doctrine 
does not provide much in the way of principled guidance to courts struggling to 
evaluate antiterrorism searches. . . . [T]he Supreme Court has . . . struggle[d] to 
find a principled distinction between searches for special needs and searches for a 
law enforcement purpose.”33  Simmons points to a growing circuit split among the 
federal circuit courts of appeals concerning the exception.  The Eleventh Circuit has 
held that antiterrorism searches do not serve a special need.  The Second Circuit 
has held the opposite, perhaps giving greater weight to the need, given thelocation 
of the court in New York City.  Other circuits require a terrorist threat to reach 
some level of specificity before concluding that antiterrorism searches are justified.34
Airport Searches in Particular
 Until the security changes brought about by the terrorist attacks on September 
11, 2001, airport searches consisted almost entirely of magnetometer scans of 
passengers and x-ray scans of their luggage.  Scanning a passenger with a metal 
detector or their luggage with an x-ray device is a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.  Requiring a warrant for such searches, though, would “exalt 
form over substance.”  The Fourth Circuit noted in U.S. v. Epperson that no judge 
would deny a warrant for such a search, given the overwhelming governmental 
interest in air travel safety and the corresponding minimal invasion of passengers’ 
privacy.35
29 Id. at 552.
30 Sitz, supra note 25.
31 Edmond, supra note 15.
32 Sitz, supra note 25, at 451-52; Edmond, supra note 15, at 453-454.
33 Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists:  Why Public Safety is Not a Special Need, 59 Duke L. J. 843, 884 
(2010).
34 Id.
35 U.S. v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972).
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 The Epperson court articulated a two-step test for determining the 
constitutionality of an airport search (abandoning the much more complex 
flamenco test).  The search must first be justified at its inception.36  This is where 
the administrative or special needs exception comes into play.  Though given the 
prevailing winds of jurisprudence, the special needs exception seems likely to 
provide the basis these days.  The next step is to determine whether the search is 
“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified interference in the 
first place.”37  In Epperson, a search solely to discover weapons to prevent air piracy 
was fully justified given the relatively unobtrusive nature of passing through a metal 
detector.  The court reasoned that, “The use of the [magnetometer], . . . unlike frisking, 
cannot possibly be ‘an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience,’ . 
. . because the person scrutinized is not even aware of the examination.”38  As the 
Second Circuit noted in U.S. v. Edwards, “More than a million Americans subject 
themselves to [magnetometer searches] daily; all but a handful do so cheerfully, 
even eagerly, knowing it is essential for their protection.”39
 Subsequent searches based on the findings from the magnetometer may or may 
not be valid, depending on the procedure that the screening officers utilize.  If a 
passenger triggers an alert from a metal detector, he or she is not automatically 
subject to a frisking.  The screening officers must first give the passenger a chance 
to remove whatever metal might have been forgotten on his or her person and to 
pass through the detector again.  Security agents must exhaust other efficient and 
unobtrusive means before a more invasive search may be undertaken.40  For instance, 
merely observing a suspicious bulge in a passenger’s jacket is not enough to justify a 
search.41  Only after a passenger is unable to explain his or her continued triggering 
of a magnetometer is the frisking a valid search.42  Once a search is justified, though, 
anything discovered by an officer conducting such a search is fair game regardless of 
whether it was what the officer was searching for.43
 Some courts consider a consent theory when deciding the validity of an airport 
search.  In People v. Kuhn,44 a New York court held that a passenger’s consent was 
established by the absence of coercive tactics by the security officers, the absence 
of any official compulsion in the manner of the security officers in requesting 
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.; James L. Buchwalter, Validity of Airport Security Measures, 125 ALR 5th 281 (2005).
39 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974).
40 U.S. v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 808 (2d Cir. 1974).
41 People v. Erdman, 69 Misc. 2d 103 (N.Y. 1972).
42 Epperson, supra note 35 at 772.
43 Id.
44 306 N.E.2d 777 (N.Y. 1973).
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permission to search the passengers, and the fact that passengers had not been 
chosen arbitrarily for screening.
 However, as the Ninth Circuit has pointed out recently in U.S. v. Aukai,45 the 
validity of an airport search does not depend on consent.  “[W]here an airport 
screening search is otherwise reasonable . . . all that is required is the passenger’s 
election to attempt entry into the secured area of an airport.”46  Under current 
TSA rules, that point is when a passenger either passes through a magnetometer 
or places his bag on the conveyor for the x-ray machine.  Although the government 
argued during oral arguments in Aukai that this point of election could occur 
sooner if the TSA chooses to modify their rules, the court declined to speculate 
on the constitutionality of this argument.47  The Ninth Circuit was quick to note, 
however, that while the constitutional validity of airport searches does not depend 
on consent, the scope of such searches is not limitless.  The search must be no 
more extensive nor intensive than necessary given the state of current detection 
technology.48
Probable Outcome of a Court Case
 Consider a hypothetical court case.  David Defendant is attempting to fly from 
Knoxville, Tennessee, to Washington, D.C., to participate in one of the ’capital’s 
famous pancake breakfasts, Tennessee Tuesdays, sponsored by the state’s two 
United States Senators.  David works as a mechanic but is also an avid gardener 
and uses a lot of fertilizer in his avocation.  David had to work the morning of his 
flight and was in such a rush to get to the airport that he neglected to wash his 
hands before leaving.  It should come as no surprise then that he had diesel fuel and 
traces of fertilizer on his hands.  David also suffers from glaucoma, which he treats 
with marijuana.  The possession and use of marijuana is a crime under Tennessee 
and federal law.
 David arrives at Knoxville’s McGhee Tyson Airport with plenty of time before 
his flight, as any responsible traveler should.  David checks his baggage at the counter 
for his airline.  As a smart traveler, David knows to carry important medications on 
his person or to pack them in his carry-on bag.  Considering his marijuana to be a 
medical necessity, David tucks it into his pocket.  Obviously, David is on a collision 
course with the American criminal justice system.
 In line for the security screening, one TSA officer checks David’s identification 
and ticket, and a second officer asks David if he minds having his hands swabbed 
and tested for explosives.  Not wanting to rock the boat and not knowing that he 
had anything suspicious on his hands David consents.  Unfortunately for David, 
ammonium nitrate, a commonly used fertilizer, becomes a potent and powerful 
45 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007).
46 Id. at 961.
47 Id. at 962 n.9.
48 Id. at 962.
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explosive when combined with diesel fuel.49  The hand swab detects the ANFO 
(ammonium nitrate / fuel oil) traces.  The TSA officer alerts an officer from the 
airport authority, who conducts a more invasive search of David and his carry-on 
bag.  The airport authorities pull David’s checked bag aside and search it as well. 
The search turns up no other evidence of a bomb, and David is able to easily explain 
away the presence of ANFO on his hands.  Unfortunately for David, the search also 
uncovers the’ marijuana in his pocket.
 David is arrested and charged in federal court with possession of marijuana. 
David hires a prominent local defense attorney, Bertie Barrister, to defend him. 
Barrister, recognizing a novel legal issue, files a motion to exclude the marijuana 
on the basis that the hand swab was an improper invasion of David’s Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable searches.  The deputy U.S. Attorney 
handling the case files a motion supporting the search and subsequent seizure of 
the marijuana.
 The district court will first determine if the search was justified at its inception.50 
To do this, the court will need to determine what non-law enforcement interest 
the search served.  In this case, that is clearly an antiterrorism security interest. 
The next step in determining whether the search was justified at its inception is to 
look to the MacWade factors cited favorably recently in Dickerson v. Napolitano.51 
Weighing the factors listed earlier, the weight of the government’s interest in 
searching passengers is quite heavy.  Recent attempts to destroy passenger airliners 
by such sartorial scoundrels as the Underwear Bomber or the Shoe Bomber have 
served to highlight the immediacy of the threat that airliners face from smuggled 
explosives.52
 The privacy interests infringed by the search, however, are rather minimal.  The 
palm of one’s hand is the part of the body that most comes into contact with the 
world.  It is likely that a passenger has touched dozens, if not hundreds, of other 
things on his way to the airport.  The character of the intrusion is slight.  Simply 
touching someone’s hand does not seem terribly invasive; millions of Americans 
consent to such contacts everyday.  The search is apparently very effective in 
detecting explosives, and no other available technology presents a less intrusive or 
more effective alternative.  In the light of the minimal intrusion into a not very 
private area and the weight and immediacy of the threat, most, if not all, courts 
would find this type of search justified.
 The next step in the two-step analysis is to determine whether the search was 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the search in the 
49 See, e.g., Jo Thomas , Jury to Be Picked in 2d Oklahoma Bomb Trial,  N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1997, at A17.
50 Epperson, supra note 35, at 771.
51 604 F.3d 732, 750-51 (2d Cir. 2010).
52 See, e.g., Doug Guthrie and George Hunter, Suspected ‘underwear bomber’ arraigned on terror conspiracy 
charges, Detroit News, Dec. 17, 2010, available at http://www.detnews.com/article/20101217/ 
METRO/12170394/1409/metro/Suspected-%E2%80%98underwear-bomber%E2%80%99-arraigned-on-
terror-conspiracy-charges; Judge denies bail to accused shoe bomber, CNN, Dec. 28, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/ 
2001/US/12/28/inv.reid/.
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first place.53  The circumstances that justified the search would be the threat of a 
passenger smuggling explosives onto an airliner.  People who are likely attempting 
to smuggle explosives onto a plane have probably come into recent contact with 
explosives.  The ETD search is meant to alert the security officers to people who 
have handled explosive materials recently.  ETD is not terribly useful for some 
purpose other than explosive detection.  So using ETD is reasonably related to 
detecting people smuggling explosives.
 The final issue to deal with is whether Defendant attempted to enter into a 
secured area of the airport.54  As discussed earlier, courts agree that individuals have 
a lowered expectation of privacy when they enter a secured area.  Whether David 
did or not may rest in part on whether the TSA has updated its policy manual to 
address searches prior to the point at which passengers reach a magnetometer or 
x-ray.  Unfortunately, that information is not publicly available.  If the TSA has 
updated its manual, then the court will have to deal with the question that the Ninth 
Circuit put off in Aukai regarding moving the metaphorical security portal.  Given 
that the physical location of the magnetometer can vary from airport to airport, the 
courts may readily accept that expectations of privacy are lowered when a person 
lines up to pass through the magnetometer.  A passenger will still have notice that 
he or she is now subject to a search, especially if there are signs informing the public 
that hand swabbing can occur in line are posted.  The hand swab should also not be 
any more coercive than the magnetometer or x-ray.
 Now that we have established that the hand swab was a valid search, we 
must decide whether the subsequent search of Defendant’s person was justified. 
Extrapolating from the rules for subsequent searches based on magnetometer 
searches, security officers must first exhaust other less invasive means of search 
before patting down a person.55  To the best of my knowledge, McGhee Tyson 
does not have any other means of explosive detection.56  It is possible that security 
officers at McGhee Tyson could call for a bomb-sniffing dog from the Knoxville 
Police Department or the Knox County Sheriff ’s Office.  However, bomb dogs may 
not always pinpoint where on a person’s body explosives might be.  So all a dog may 
be able to do is confirm the presence of an explosive trace on Defendant, which 
the ETD has already done.  This means that there is no other less invasive search 
technique that security officers can use short of a frisk.  Therefore, the search of 
David’s person is valid along with the discovering of his contraband.  The defense’s 
motion to suppress fails.
A Word on Full-Body Imaging Scanners
 Though the scope of this article primarily concerns swabbing hands for 
explosive traces, it would be remiss to not at least mention the newly implemented 
53 Epperson, supra note 35, at 771.
54 U.S. v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2007).
55 Albarado, supra note 40, at 808.
56 Actually, to the best of my knowledge, McGhee Tyson does not utilize ETD at all, but for the sake of the 
hypothetical let’s just assume that it does.
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backscatter x-ray machines, given the amount of attention that such devices have 
received recently in the media.  Despite the uproar over the use of backscanner 
x-ray machines, most analysts seem to conclude that searches using such devices are 
constitutional.  I think that it is a much closer call than that.
 As established earlier, part of the analysis for determining the validity of a search 
is weighing the relative intrusion of the search versus the effectiveness of the search 
in accomplishing its goal.  Because the full-body imaging scanners create something 
akin to a nude department store mannequin based on the subject’s body, they would 
have to be very effective to overcome the privacy hurdle.57  Security experts debate 
the effectiveness of these machines, though.  A terrorist can easily fool the scanners 
by hiding his contraband in a body cavity.58  Rafi Sela, an Israeli security expert 
who helped design the security at Ben Gurion International Airport, has said, “‘I 
don’t know why everybody is running to buy these expensive and useless machines. 
I can overcome the body scanners with enough explosives to bring down a Boeing 
747.’ . . .‘That’s why we haven’t put them in our airport.’”59  If the scanners are indeed 
ineffective, then courts should not be willing to trade privacy for them.
Conclusion
 The struggle to prevent terrorists from waging terror on commercial air flights 
is a constant escalation between evolving tactics and technology.  The years since 
the September 11th terrorist attacks have seen airport search technology improve 
from simple metal detectors to explosive detection systems and full-body imagers. 
As airport searches evolve, we must continue to weigh the value of such searches 
against our value of privacy and protection against unreasonable searches.  Many 
commentators accuse current security practices of being nothing more than security 
theater.  It is up to the courts to weigh these searches against our rights.  If security 
is, indeed, theater, then judges must be critics of, and not active participants in, the 
show.
57 See, e.g., Tuan Nguyen, New X-Ray Scanner at Airports Sees Through Clothes but Not Skin, Daily Tech, Dec. 5, 
2006, available at http://www.dailytech.com/New+XRay+Scanner+at+Airports+Sees+Through+Clothes+bu
t+Not+ Skin/article5204.htm.
58 Sheila MacVicar, Al Qaeda Bombers Learn from Drug Smugglers, CBS Evening News, Sept. 28, 2009, 
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/09/28/eveningnews/main5347847.shtml.
59 Sarah Schmidt, Full-body scanners ‘useless,’ air security expert says, Vancouver Sun, Apr. 23, 2010, available 
at www.infowars.com/full-body-scanners-useless-air-security-expert-says/.
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